Early history

The CCP founded its military wing on 1 August 1927 during the Nanchang uprising, beginning the Chinese Civil War. Communist elements of the National Revolutionary Army rebelled under the leadership of Zhu De, He Long, Ye Jianying, Zhou Enlai, and other leftist elements of the Kuomintang (KMT), after the Shanghai massacre in 1927.^[15] They were then known as the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, or simply the Red Army.^[16]

In 1934 and 1935, the Red Army survived several campaigns led against it by Chiang Kai-Shek's KMT and engaged in the Long March.^[17]

During the Second Sino-Japanese War from 1937 to 1945, the CCP's military forces were nominally integrated into the National Revolutionary Army of the Republic of China forming two main units, the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army.^[9] During this time, these two military groups primarily employed guerrilla tactics, generally avoiding large-scale battles with the Japanese, at the same time consolidating by recruiting KMT troops and paramilitary forces behind Japanese lines into their forces.^[18]

After the Japanese surrender in 1945, the CCP continued to use the National Revolutionary Army unit structures until the decision was made in February 1947 to merge the Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army, renaming the new million-strong force the People's Liberation Army (PLA).^[9] The reorganization was completed by late 1948. The PLA eventually won the Chinese Civil War, establishing the People's Republic of China in 1949.^[19] It then underwent a drastic reorganization, with the establishment of the Air Force leadership structure in November 1949, followed by the Navy leadership structure the following April.^[20][21]

In 1950, the leadership structures of the artillery, armored troops, air defense troops, public security forces, and worker–soldier militias were also established. The chemical warfare defense forces, the railroad forces, the communications forces, and the strategic forces, as well as other separate forces (like engineering and construction, logistics and medical services), were established later on.

In this early period, the People's Liberation Army overwhelmingly consisted of peasants.^[22] Its treatment of soldiers and officers was egalitarian^[22] and formal ranks were not adopted until 1955.^[23] As a result of its egalitarian organization, the early PLA overturned strict traditional hierarchies that governed the lives of peasants.^[22] As sociologist Alessandro Russo summarizes, the peasant composition of the PLA hierarchy was a radical break with Chinese societal norms and "overturned the strict traditional hierarchies in unprecedented forms of egalitarianism[.]"^[22]

Modernization and conflicts

PLA troops entering Beijing in 1949 during the Chinese Civil War

Chinese troops gathered on a T-34/85 or a Type 58 medium tank leaving North Korea in 1958, 5 years after the Korean War ended with an armistice (a ceasefire) in 1953. The banner in the background of the picture bears a slogan (in Chinese) which declares "The Friendship And Unity of the North Korean And Chinese Peoples Are Always Steadfast And Strong!"

Marshal Lin Biao surveying the soldiers during the 10th-anniversary military parade in 1959.

During the 1950s, the PLA with Soviet assistance began to transform itself from a peasant army into a modern one.^[24] Since 1949, China has used nine different military strategies, which the PLA calls "strategic guidelines". The most important came in 1956, 1980, and 1993.^[10] Part of this process was the reorganization that created thirteen military regions in 1955. The PLA also contained many former National Revolutionary Army units and generals who had defected to the PLA.

In November 1950, some units of the PLA under the name of the People's Volunteer Army intervened in the Korean War as United Nations forces under General Douglas MacArthur approached the Yalu River.^[25] Under the weight of this offensive, Chinese forces drove MacArthur's forces out of North Korea and captured Seoul, but were subsequently pushed back south of Pyongyang north of the 38th Parallel.^[25] The war also catalyzed the rapid modernization of the PLAAF.^[26]

In 1962, the PLA ground force also fought India in the Sino-Indian War.^[27][28] In a series of border clashes in 1967 with Indian troops, the PLA suffered heavy numerical and tactical losses.^[29][30][31]

Before the Cultural Revolution, military region commanders tended to remain in their posts for long periods. As the PLA took a stronger role in politics, this began to be seen as somewhat of a threat to the CCP's (or, at least, civilian) control of the military. The longest-serving military region commanders were Xu Shiyou in the Nanjing Military Region (1954–74), Yang Dezhi in the Jinan Military Region (1958–74), Chen Xilian in the Shenyang Military Region (1959–73), and Han Xianchu in the Fuzhou Military Region (1960–74).^[32]

In the early days of the Cultural Revolution, the PLA abandoned the use of the military ranks that it had adopted in 1955.^[33]

The establishment of a professional military force equipped with modern weapons and doctrine was the last of the Four Modernizations announced by Zhou Enlai and supported by Deng Xiaoping.^[34][35] In keeping with Deng's mandate to reform, the PLA has demobilized millions of men and women since 1978 and has introduced modern methods in such areas as recruitment and manpower, strategy, and education and training.^[36] In 1979, the PLA fought Vietnam over a border skirmish in the Sino-Vietnamese War where both sides claimed victory.^[37] However, western analysts agree that Vietnam handily outperformed the PLA.^[32]

During the Sino-Soviet split, strained relations between China and the Soviet Union resulted in bloody border clashes and mutual backing of each other's adversaries.^[38] China and Afghanistan had neutral relations with each other during the King's rule.^[39] When the pro-Soviet Afghan Communists seized power in Afghanistan in 1978, relations between China and the Afghan communists quickly turned hostile.^[40] The Afghan pro-Soviet communists supported China's enemies in Vietnam and blamed China for supporting Afghan anticommunist militants.^[41] China responded to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan by supporting the Afghan mujahidin and ramping up their military presence near Afghanistan in Xinjiang.^[41] China acquired military equipment from the United States to defend itself from Soviet attacks.^[42]

The PLA Ground Force trained and supported the Afghan Mujahideen during the Soviet-Afghan War, moving its training camps for the mujahideen from Pakistan into China itself.^[43] Hundreds of millions of dollars worth of anti-aircraft missiles, rocket launchers, and machine guns were given to the Mujahideen by the Chinese.^[44] Chinese military advisors and army troops were also present with the Mujahideen during training.^[45]

Since 1980

In 1981, the PLA conducted its largest military exercise in North China since the founding of the People's Republic.^[10][46] In the 1980s, China shrunk its military considerably to free up resources for economic development, resulting in the relative decline in resources devoted to the PLA.^[47] Following the PLA's suppression of the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre, ideological correctness was temporarily revived as the dominant theme in Chinese military affairs.^[48]

Reform and modernization have today resumed their position as the PLA's primary objectives, although the armed forces' political loyalty to the CCP has remained a leading concern.^[49][50] Another area of concern to the political leadership was the PLA's involvement in civilian economic activities. These activities were thought to have impacted PLA readiness and have led the political leadership to attempt to divest the PLA from its non-military business interests.^[51][52]

Beginning in the 1980s, the PLA tried to transform itself from a land-based power centered on a vast ground force to a smaller, more mobile, high-tech one capable of mounting operations beyond its borders.^[10] The motivation for this was that a massive land invasion by Russia was no longer seen as a major threat, and the new threats to China are seen to be a declaration of independence by Taiwan, possibly with assistance from the United States, or a confrontation over the Spratly Islands.^[53]

In 1985, under the leadership of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and the CMC, the PLA changed from being constantly prepared to "hit early, strike hard and to fight a nuclear war" to developing the military in an era of peace.^[10] The PLA reoriented itself to modernization, improving its fighting ability, and becoming a world-class force. Deng Xiaoping stressed that the PLA needed to focus more on quality rather than on quantity.^[53]

The decision of the Chinese government in 1985 to reduce the size of the military by one million was completed by 1987. Staffing in military leadership was cut by about 50 percent. During the Ninth Five Year Plan (1996–2000) the PLA was reduced by a further 500,000. The PLA had also been expected to be reduced by another 200,000 by 2005. The PLA has focused on increasing mechanization and informatization to be able to fight a high-intensity war.^[53]

The PLA Honor Guard in Beijing, 2007

Former CMC chairman Jiang Zemin in 1990 called on the military to "meet political standards, be militarily competent, have a good working style, adhere strictly to discipline, and provide vigorous logistic support" (Chinese: 政治合格、军事过硬、作风优良、纪律严明、保障有力; pinyin: zhèngzhì hégé, jūnshì guòyìng, zuòfēng yōuliáng, jìlǜ yánmíng, bǎozhàng yǒulì).^[54] The 1991 Gulf War provided the Chinese leadership with a stark realization that the PLA was an oversized, almost-obsolete force.^[55][56]

The possibility of a militarized Japan has also been a continuous concern to the Chinese leadership since the late 1990s.^[57] In addition, China's military leadership has been reacting to and learning from the successes and failures of the United States Armed Forces during the Kosovo War,^[58] the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan,^[59] the 2003 invasion of Iraq,^[60] and the Iraqi insurgency.^[60] All these lessons inspired China to transform the PLA from a military based on quantity to one based on quality. Chairman Jiang Zemin officially made a "revolution in military affairs" (RMA) part of the official national military strategy in 1993 to modernize the Chinese armed forces.^[61]

A goal of the RMA is to transform the PLA into a force capable of winning what it calls "local wars under high-tech conditions" rather than a massive, numbers-dominated ground-type war.^[61] Chinese military planners call for short decisive campaigns, limited in both their geographic scope and their political goals. In contrast to the past, more attention is given to reconnaissance, mobility, and deep reach. This new vision has shifted resources towards the navy and air force. The PLA is also actively preparing for space warfare and cyber-warfare.^[62][63][64]

In 2002, the PLA began holding military exercises with militaries from other countries.^[65]: 242 From 2018 to 2023, more than half of these exercises have focused on military training other than war, generally antipiracy or antiterrorism exercises involving combatting non-state actors.^[65]: 242 In 2009, the PLA held its first military exercise in Africa, a humanitarian and medical training practice conducted in Gabon.^[65]: 242

For the past 10 to 20 years, the PLA has acquired some advanced weapons systems from Russia, including Sovremenny class destroyers,^[66] Sukhoi Su-27^[67] and Sukhoi Su-30 aircraft,^[68] and Kilo-class diesel-electric submarines.^[69] It has also started to produce several new classes of destroyers and frigates including the Type 052D class guided-missile destroyer.^[70][71] In addition, the PLAAF has designed its very own Chengdu J-10 fighter aircraft^[72] and a new stealth fighter, the Chengdu J-20.^[73] The PLA launched the new Jin class nuclear submarines on 3 December 2004 capable of launching nuclear warheads that could strike targets across the Pacific Ocean^[74] and have three aircraft carriers, with the latest, the Fujian, launched in 2022.^[75][76][77]

From 2014 to 2015, the PLA deployed 524 medical staff on a rotational basis to combat the Ebola virus outbreak in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Guinea-Bissau.^[65]: 245 As of 2023, this was the PLA's largest medical assistance mission in another country.^[65]: 245

In 2015, the PLA formed new units including the PLA Ground Force, the PLA Rocket Force and the PLA Strategic Support Force.^[78]

The PLA on 1 August 2017 marked its 90th anniversary.^[79] Before the big anniversary it mounted its biggest parade yet and the first outside of Beijing, held in the Zhurihe Training Base in the Northern Theater Command (within the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region).^[80]

In December 2023 Reuters reported a military leadership purge after high ranking generals were ousted from the Chinese legislature.^[81] In preceding years, sixty generals have been investigated and sacked.^[82]

Overseas deployments and peacekeeping operations

The People's Republic of China has sent the PLA to various hotspots as part of China's role as a prominent member of the United Nations.^[83] Such units usually include engineers and logistical units and members of the paramilitary People's Armed Police and have been deployed as part of peacekeeping operations in Lebanon,^[84][85] the Republic of the Congo,^[84] Sudan,^[86] Ivory Coast,^[87] Haiti,^[88][89] and more recently, Mali and South Sudan.^[84][90]

Engagements

• 1927–1950: Chinese Civil War^[91]
• 1937–1945: Second Sino-Japanese War^[92]
• 1949: Yangtze incident against British warships on the Yangtze River^[93]
• 1949: Incorporation of Xinjiang into the People's Republic of China^[94]
• 1950: Annexation of Tibet by the People's Republic of China^[95]
• 1950–1953: Korean War under the banner of the Chinese People's Volunteer Army^[96]
• 1954–1955: First Taiwan Strait Crisis^[97]
• 1955–1970: Vietnam War^[98]
• 1958: Second Taiwan Strait Crisis at Quemoy and Matsu^[99]
• 1962: Sino-Indian War^[100]
• 1967: Border skirmishes with India^[101]
• 1969: Sino-Soviet border conflict^[102]
• 1974: Battle of the Paracel Islands with South Vietnam^[103]
• 1979: Sino-Vietnamese War^[104]
• 1979–1990: Sino-Vietnamese conflicts^[105]
• 1988: Johnson South Reef Skirmish with Vietnam^[106]
• 1989: Enforcement of martial law in Beijing during the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre^[107]
• 1990: Barin uprising^[108]
• 1995–1996: Third Taiwan Strait Crisis^[109]
• 1997: PLA establishes Hong Kong Garrison
• 1999: PLA establishes Macao Garrison
• 2007–present: UNIFIL peacekeeping operations in Lebanon^[84]
• 2009–present: Anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden^[110]
• 2014: Search and rescue efforts for Malaysia Airlines Flight 370^[111]
• 2014: UN peacekeeping operations in Mali^[112]
• 2015: UNMISS peacekeeping operations in South Sudan^[113]
• 2020–2021: China–India skirmishes^[114]

Central Military Commission

The PLA is governed by the Central Military Commission (CMC); under the arrangement of "one institution with two names", there exists a state CMC and a Party CMC, although both commissions have identical personnel, organization and function, and effectively work as a single body.^[116] The only difference in membership between the two occurs for a few months every five years, during the period between a Party National Congress, when Party CMC membership changes, and the next ensuing National People's Congress, when the state CMC changes.^[117]

The CMC is composed of a chairman, vice chairpersons and regular members. The chairman of the CMC is the commander-in-chief of the PLA, with the post generally held by the paramount leader of China; since 1989, the post has generally been held together with the CCP general secretary.^[116][118] Unlike in other countries, the Ministry of National Defense and its Minister do not have command authority, largely acting as diplomatic liaisons of the CMC, though the Minister has always been a member of the CMC.^[116]

Chairman

• Xi Jinping (also General Secretary, President and Commander-in-chief of Joint Battle Command)

Vice Chairmen

• General Zhang Youxia
• General He Weidong

Members

• Chief of the Joint Staff Department – General Liu Zhenli
• Director of the Political Work Department – Admiral Miao Hua
• Secretary of the Commission for Discipline Inspection – General Zhang Shengmin

Previously, the PLA was governed by four general departments; the General Political, the General Logistics, the General Armament, and the General Staff Departments. These were abolished in 2016 under the military reforms undertaken by Xi Jinping, replaced with 15 new functional departments directly reporting to the CMC:^[119]

1. General Office
2. Joint Staff Department
3. Political Work Department
4. Logistic Support Department
5. Equipment Development Department
6. Training and Administration Department
7. National Defense Mobilization Department
8. Discipline Inspection Commission
9. Politics and Legal Affairs Commission
10. Science and Technology Commission
11. Office for Strategic Planning
12. Office for Reform and Organizational Structure
13. Office for International Military Cooperation
14. Audit Office
15. Agency for Offices Administration

Included among the 15 departments are three commissions. The CMC Discipline Inspection Commission is charged with rooting out corruption.

Political leadership

The CCP maintains absolute control over the PLA. It requires the PLA to undergo political education, instilling CCP ideology to its members.^[120] Additionally, China maintains a political commissar system.^[121] Regiment-level and higher units maintain CCP committees and political commissars (Chinese: 政治委员 or 政委).^[121][122] Additionally, battalion-level and company-level units respectively maintain political directors and political instructors.^[123] The political workers are officially equal to commanders in status.^[120] The political workers are officially responsible for the implementation of party committee decisions, instilling and maintaining party discipline, providing political education, and working with other components of the political work system.^[123]

As a rule, the political worker serves as the party committee secretary while the commander serves as the deputy secretary.^[123] Key decisions in the PLA are generally made in the CCP committees throughout the military.^[120] Due to the CCP's absolute leadership, non-CCP political parties, groups and organizations except the Communist Youth League of China are not allowed to establish organizations or have members in the PLA. Additionally, only the CCP is allowed to appoint the leading cadres at all levels of the PLA.^[122]

Theater commands

The five theater commands of the PLA^[124]

Until 2016, China's territory was divided into seven military regions, but they were reorganized into five theater commands in early 2016.^[119] This reflected a change in their concept of operations from primarily ground-oriented to mobile and coordinated movement of all services.^[125] The five theatre commands, in order of stated significance are:^[126]

• Eastern Theater Command
• Southern Theater Command
• Western Theater Command
• Northern Theater Command
• Central Theater Command

The military reforms have also introduced a major change in the areas of responsibility. Rather than separately commanding their troops, service branches are now primarily responsible for administrative tasks (like equipping and maintaining the troops). It is the theater commands now that have the command authority. This should, in theory, facilitate the implementation of joint operations across all service branches.^[127]

Organization table

Ranks

Officers

Rank group	General / flag officers										Senior officers						Junior officers								Officer cadet
PLA Ground Force[129]
			上将 Shàngjiàng		中将 Zhōngjiàng		少将 Shàojiàng				大校 Dàxiào	上校 Shàngxiào	中校 Zhōngxiào		少校 Shàoxiào		上尉 Shàngwèi		中尉 Zhōngwèi			少尉 Shàowèi			学员 Xuéyuán
PLA Navy[129]
			海军上将 Hǎijūn shàngjiàng		海军中将 Hǎijūn zhōngjiàng		海军少将 Hǎijūn shàojiàng				海军大校 Hǎijūn dàxiào	海军上校 Hǎijūn shàngxiào	海军中校 Hǎijūn zhōngxiào		海军少校 Hǎijūn shàoxiào		海军上尉 Hǎijūn shàngwèi		海军中尉 Hǎijūn zhōngwèi			海军少尉 Hǎijūn shàowèi			海军学员 Hǎijūn xuéyuán
PLA Air Force[129]
			空军上将 Kōngjūn shàngjiàng		空军中将 Kōngjūn zhōngjiàng		空军少将 Kōngjūn shàojiàng				空军大校 Kōngjūn dàxiào	空军上校 Kōngjūn shàngxiào	空军中校 Kōngjūn zhōngxiào		空军少校 Kōngjūn shàoxiào		空军上尉 Kōngjūn shàngwèi		空军中尉 Kōngjūn zhōngwèi			空军少尉 Kōngjūn shàowèi			空军学员 Kōngjūn xuéyuán
PLA Rocket Force			General		Lieutenant General		Major General				Colonel Commandant	Colonel	Lieutenant Colonel		Major		Captain		First Lieutenant			Second Lieutenant			Officer Cadet
			上将 Shàngjiàng		中将 Zhōngjiàng		少将 Shàojiàng				大校 Dàxiào	上校 Shàngxiào	中校 Zhōngxiào		少校 Shàoxiào		上尉 Shàngwèi		中尉 Zhōngwèi			少尉 Shàowèi			学员 Xuéyuán
PLA Strategic Support Force
			上将 Shàngjiàng		中将 Zhōngjiàng		少将 Shàojiàng				大校 Dàxiào	上校 Shàngxiào	中校 Zhōngxiào		少校 Shàoxiào		上尉 Shàngwèi		中尉 Zhōngwèi			少尉 Shàowèi			学员 Xuéyuán

Other ranks

Rank group	Senior NCOs																						Junior NCOs						Enlisted
PLA Ground Force[129]
	一级军士长 Yījí jūnshìzhǎng			二级军士长 Èrjí jūnshìzhǎng			三级军士长 Sānjí jūnshìzhǎng		四级军士长 Sìjí jūnshìzhǎng		上士 Shàngshì						中士 Zhōngshì						下士 Xiàshì						上等兵 Shàngděngbīng						列兵 Lièbīng
PLA Navy[129]
	海军一级军士长 Hǎijūn yījí jūnshìzhǎng			海军二级军士长 Hǎijūn èrjí jūnshìzhǎng			海军三级军士长 Hǎijūn sānjí jūnshìzhǎng		海军四级军士长 Hǎijūn sìjí jūnshìzhǎng		海军上士 Hǎijūn shàngshì						海军中士 Hǎijūn zhōngshì						海军下士 Hǎijūn xiàshì						海军上等兵 Hǎijūn shàngděngbīng						海军列兵 Hǎijūn lièbīng
PLA Air Force[129]
	空军一级军士长 Kōngjūn yījí jūnshìzhǎng			空军二级军士长 Kōngjūn èrjí jūnshìzhǎng			空军三级军士长 Kōngjūn sānjí jūnshìzhǎng		空军四级军士长 Kōngjūn sìjí jūnshìzhǎng		空军上士 Kōngjūn shàngshì						空军中士 Kōngjūn zhōngshì						空军下士 Kōngjūn xiàshì						空军上等兵 Kōngjūn shàngděngbīng						空军列兵 Kōngjūn lièbīng
PLA Rocket Force																											No equivalent
	Master sergeant class one 一级军士长 yījí jūnshìzhǎng			Master sergeant class two 二级军士长 èrjí jūnshìzhǎng			Master sergeant class three 三级军士长 sānjí jūnshìzhǎng		Master sergeant class four 四级军士长 sìjí jūnshìzhǎng		Sergeant first class 上士 shàngshì						Sergeant 中士 zhōngshì						Corporal 下士 xiàshì						Private first class 上等兵 shàngděngbīng						Private 列兵 lièbīng
PLA Strategic Support Force
	一级军士长 Yījí jūnshìzhǎng			二级军士长 Èrjí jūnshìzhǎng			三级军士长 Sānjí jūnshìzhǎng		四级军士长 Sìjí jūnshìzhǎng		上士 Shàngshì						中士 Zhōngshì						下士 Xiàshì						上等兵 Shàngděngbīng						列兵 Lièbīng

Ground Force (PLAGF)

A Type 99A main battle tank in service with the PLAGF

The PLA Ground Force (PLAGF) is the largest of the PLA's five services with 975,000 active duty personnel, approximately half of the PLA's total manpower of around 2 million personnel.^[132] The PLAGF is organized into twelve active duty group armies sequentially numbered from the 71st Group Army to the 83rd Group Army which are distributed to each of the PRC's five theatre commands, receiving two to three group armies per command. In wartime, numerous PLAGF reserve and paramilitary units may be mobilized to augment these active group armies. The PLAGF reserve component comprises approximately 510,000 personnel divided into thirty infantry and twelve anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) divisions. The PLAGF is led by Commander Liu Zhenli and Political Commissar Qin Shutong.^[133][134]

Navy (PLAN)

A PLAN destroyer conducting maritime interdiction operations at RIMPAC 2016

Until the early 1990s, the PLA Navy (PLAN) performed a subordinate role to the PLA Ground Force (PLAGF). Since then it has undergone rapid modernisation. The 300,000 strong PLAN is organised into three major fleets: the North Sea Fleet headquartered at Qingdao, the East Sea Fleet headquartered at Ningbo, and the South Sea Fleet headquartered in Zhanjiang.^[135] Each fleet consists of a number of surface ship, submarine, naval air force, coastal defence, and marine units.^[136][137]

The navy includes a 25,000 strong Marine Corps (organised into seven brigades), a 26,000 strong Naval Aviation Force operating several hundred attack helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft.^[138] As part of its overall programme of naval modernisation, the PLAN is in the stage of developing a blue water navy.^[139] In November 2012, then Party General Secretary Hu Jintao reported to the CCP's 18th National Congress his desire to "enhance our capacity for exploiting marine resource and build China into a strong maritime power".^[140] According to the United States Department of Defense, the PLAN has numerically the largest navy in the world.^[141] The PLAN is led by Commander Dong Jun and Political Commissar Yuan Huazhi.^[142]

Air Force (PLAAF)

A Chengdu J-20 5th generation stealth fighter

The 395,000 strong People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) is organized into five Theater Command Air Forces (TCAF) and 24 air divisions.^[143] The largest operational units within the Aviation Corps is the air division, which has 2 to 3 aviation regiments, each with 20 to 36 aircraft. The surface-to-air missile (SAM) Corps is organized into SAM divisions and brigades. There are also three airborne divisions manned by the PLAAF. J-XX and XXJ are names applied by Western intelligence agencies to describe programs by the People's Republic of China to develop one or more fifth-generation fighter aircraft.^[144][145] The PLAAF is led by Commander Chang Dingqiu and Political Commissar Guo Puxiao.^[146][147]

Rocket Force (PLARF)

DF-21Ds at the 2015 Victory Parade

The People's Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) is the main strategic missile force of the PLA and consists of at least 120,000 personnel.^[148] It controls China's nuclear and conventional strategic missiles.^[149] China's total nuclear arsenal size is estimated to be between 100 and 400 thermonuclear warheads. The PLARF is organized into bases sequentially numbered from 61 through 67, wherein the first six are operational and allocated to the nation's theater commands while Base 67 serves as the PRC's central nuclear weapons storage facility.^[150] The PLARF is led by Command Li Yuchao and Political Commissar Xu Zhongbo.^[151][152]

Strategic Support Force (PLASSF)

A space launch from the Wenchang Space Launch Site

Founded on 31 December 2015 as part of the first wave of reforms of the PLA, the People's Liberation Army Strategic Support Force (PLASSF) was established as the newest and latest branch of the PLA. Personnel numbers are estimated at 175,000.^[148] Initial announcements regarding the Strategic Support Force did not provide much detail, but Yang Yujun of the Chinese Ministry of Defense described it as an integration of all current combat support forces including but limited to space, cyber, electronic and intelligence branches. Additionally, commentators have speculated that the new service branch will include high-tech operations forces such as space, cyberspace and electronic warfare operations units, independent of other branches of the military.^[153]

Yin Zhuo, rear admiral of the People's Liberation Army Navy and member of the eleventh Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) said that "the major mission of the PLA Strategic Support Force is the provision of support to the combat operations so that the PLA can gain regional advantages in the aerospace, space, network and electromagnetic space warfare and ensure integrated operations in the conduction of US joint warfare style operations."^[154]

Special forces

A PLA Navy Special Operations Forces marine during a maritime operations exercise in RIMPAC 2014.

Cyberwarfare

There is a belief in the Western military doctrines that the PLA have already begun engaging countries using cyber-warfare.^[169] There has been a significant increase in the number of presumed Chinese military initiated cyber events from 1999 to the present day.^[170]

Cyberwarfare has gained recognition as a valuable technique because it is an asymmetric technique that is a part of information operations and information warfare. As is written by two PLAGF Colonels, Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui in the book Unrestricted Warfare, "Methods that are not characterized by the use of the force of arms, nor by the use of military power, nor even by the presence of casualties and bloodshed, are just as likely to facilitate the successful realization of the war's goals, if not more so.^[171]

While China has long been suspected of cyber spying, on 24 May 2011 the PLA announced the existence of having 'cyber capabilities'.^[172]

In February 2013, the media named "Comment Crew" as a hacker military faction for China's People's Liberation Army.^[173] In May 2014, a Federal Grand Jury in the United States indicted five Unit 61398 officers on criminal charges related to cyber attacks on private companies based in the United States after alleged investigations by the Federal Bureau of Investigation who exposed their identities in collaboration with US intelligence agencies such as the CIA.^[174][175]

In February 2020, the United States government indicted members of China's People's Liberation Army for the 2017 Equifax data breach, which involved hacking into Equifax and plundering sensitive data as part of a massive heist that also included stealing trade secrets, though the CCP denied these claims.^[176][177]

Nuclear capabilities

The range of the PLA Rocket Force's medium and intercontinental ballistic missiles (2006)

In 1955, China decided to proceed with a nuclear weapons program. The decision was made after the United States threatened the use of nuclear weapons against China should it take action against Quemoy and Matsu, coupled with the lack of interest of the Soviet Union for using its nuclear weapons in defense of China.

After their first nuclear test (China claims minimal Soviet assistance before 1960) on 16 October 1964, China was the first state to pledge no-first-use of nuclear weapons. On 1 July 1966, the Second Artillery Corps, as named by Premier Zhou Enlai, was formed. In 1967, China tested a fully functional hydrogen bomb.

China became a major international arms exporter during the 1980s. Beijing joined the Middle East arms control talks, which began in July 1991 to establish global guidelines for conventional arms transfers, and later announced that it would no longer participate because of the US decision to sell 150 F-16A/B aircraft to Taiwan on 2 September 1992.

It joined the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1984 and pledged to abstain from further atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons in 1986. China acceded to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1992 and supported its indefinite and unconditional extension in 1995. Nuclear weapons tests by China ceased in 1996, when it signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and agreed to seek an international ban on the production of fissile nuclear weapons material.

Beijing has deployed a modest ballistic missile force, including land and sea-based intermediate-range and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). It was estimated in 2007 that China has about 100–160 liquid-fuelled ICBMs capable of striking the United States with approximately 100–150 IRBMs able to strike Russia or Eastern Europe, as well as several hundred tactical SRBMs with ranges between 300 and 600 km.^[178] Currently, the Chinese nuclear stockpile is estimated to be between 50 and 75 land and sea based ICBMs.^[179]

China's nuclear program has historically followed a doctrine of minimal deterrence, which involves having the minimum force needed to deter an aggressor from launching a first strike. The current efforts of China appear to be aimed at maintaining a survivable nuclear force by, for example, using solid-fuelled ICBMs in silos rather than liquid-fuelled missiles. China's 2006 published deterrence policy states that they will "uphold the principles of counterattack in self-defense and limited development of nuclear weapons", but "has never entered, and will never enter into a nuclear arms race with any country". It goes on to describe that China will never undertake a first strike, or use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear state or zone.^[178]

In 2007, however, the United States' Department of Defense suggested that the Chinese position may be ambiguous, and nuclear weapons may be used both to deter conventional strikes/invasions on the Chinese mainland or as an international political tool – limiting the extent to which other nations can coerce China politically, an inherent, often inadvertent phenomenon in international relations as regards any state with nuclear capabilities.^[178]

Space

Having witnessed the crucial role of space to United States military success in the Gulf War, China continues to view space as a critical domain in both conflict and international strategic competition.^[180][181] The PLA operates a various satellite constellations performing reconnaissance, navigation, communication, and counterspace functions.^{[182][183][184][185]}

Significant components of the PLA's space-based reconnaissance include Jianbing (vanguard) satellites with cover names Yaogan (遥感; 'remote sensing') and Gaofen (高分; 'high resolution').^{[182][186][187]} These satellites collect electro-optical (EO) imagery to collect a literal representation of a target, synthetic aperture radar (SAR) imagery to penetrate the cloudy climates of southern China,^[188] and electronic intelligence (ELINT) to provide targeting intelligence on adversarial ships.^[189][190] The PLA also leverages a restricted, high-performance service of the country's BeiDou positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) satellites for its forces and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms.^[191][192] For secure communications, the PLA uses the Zhongxing and Fenghuo series of satellites which enable secure data and voice transmission over C-band, Ku-band, and UHF.^[184] PLA deployment of anti-satellite and counterspace satellites including those of the Shijian and Shiyan series have also brought significant concern from western nations.^{[193][194][195]}

The PLA also plays a significant role in the Chinese space program.^[180] To date, all the participants have been selected from members of the PLA Air Force.^[180] China became the third country in the world to have sent a man into space by its own means with the flight of Yang Liwei aboard the Shenzhou 5 spacecraft on 15 October 2003,^[196] the flight of Fei Junlong and Nie Haisheng aboard Shenzhou 6 on 12 October 2005,^[197] and Zhai Zhigang, Liu Boming, and Jing Haipeng aboard Shenzhou 7 on 25 September 2008.^[198]

The PLA started the development of an anti-ballistic and anti-satellite system in the 1960s, code named Project 640, including ground-based lasers and anti-satellite missiles.^[199] On 11 January 2007, China conducted a successful test of an anti-satellite missile, with an SC-19 class KKV.^[200]

The PLA has tested two types of hypersonic space vehicles, the Shenglong Spaceplane and a new one built by Chengdu Aircraft Corporation. Only a few pictures have appeared since it was revealed in late 2007. Earlier, images of the High-enthalpy Shock Waves Laboratory wind tunnel of the CAS Key Laboratory of high-temperature gas dynamics (LHD) were published in the Chinese media. Tests with speeds up to Mach 20 were reached around 2001.^[201][202]

Historical commercial activities

PLA Factory No. 6907, Wuhan. The white characters on the blue sign roughly translate to: "Secret/Classified Area, Do Not Enter Unless Invited."

Until the mid-1990s the PLA had extensive commercial enterprise holdings in non-military areas, particularly real estate. Almost all of these holdings were supposedly spun off in the mid-1990s. In most cases, the management of the companies remained unchanged, with the PLA officers running the companies simply retiring from the PLA to run the newly formed private holding companies.^[217]

The history of PLA involvement in commercial enterprises began in the 1950s and 1960s. Because of the socialist state-owned system and from a desire for military self-sufficiency, the PLA created a network of enterprises such as farms, guest houses, and factories intended to financially support its own needs. One unintended side effect of the Deng-era economic reforms was that many of these enterprises became very profitable.

By the early 1990s party officials and high military officials were becoming increasingly alarmed at the military's commercial involvement for several reasons. The military's involvement in commerce was seen to adversely affect military readiness and spread corruption. Further, there was great concern that having an independent source of funding would lead to decreased loyalty to the CCP. The result of this was an effort to spin off the PLA's commercial enterprises into private companies managed by former PLA officers, and to reform military procurement from a system in which the PLA directly controls its sources of supply to a contracting system more akin to those of Western countries. Jiang Zemin restricted the PLA from engaging in commercial practices, subject to a few exceptions.^[218]: 78 The separation of the PLA from its commercial interests was largely complete by 2000. It was met with very little resistance, as the spinoff was arranged in such a way that few lost out.^[217]

Anthem

The Central Military Band of the People's Liberation Army of China at the Great Hall of the People. The band is a common performer of the military anthem of the PLA at ceremonial protocol events.

The March of the Chinese People's Liberation Army was adopted as the military anthem by the Central Military Commission on 25 July 1988.^[219] The lyrics of the anthem were written by composer Gong Mu (real name: Zhang Yongnian; Chinese: 张永年) and the music was composed by Korea-born Chinese composer Zheng Lücheng.^[220][221]

Flag and insignia

The PLA's insignia consists of a roundel with a red star bearing the two Chinese characters "八一"(literally "eight-one"), referring to the Nanchang uprising which began on 1 August 1927 (first day of the eighth month) and symbolic as the CCP's founding of the PLA.^[222] The inclusion of the two characters ("八一") is symbolic of the party's revolutionary history carrying strong emotional connotations of the political power which it shed blood to obtain. The flag of the Chinese People's Liberation Army is the war flag of the People's Liberation Army; the layout of the flag has a golden star at the top left corner and "八一" to the right of the star, placed on a red field. Each service branch also has its flags: The top 5⁄8 of the flags is the same as the PLA flag; the bottom 3⁄8 are occupied by the colors of the branches.^[223]

The flag of the Ground Forces has a forest green bar at the bottom. The naval ensign has stripes of blue and white at the bottom. The Air Force uses a sky blue bar. The Rocket Force uses a yellow bar at the bottom. The forest green represents the earth, the blue and white stripes represent the seas, the sky blue represents the air and the yellow represents the flare of missile launching.^[224][225]

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  Navy
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  Rocket Force

Works cited

• Goldstein, Melvyn C. (1997). The Snow Lion and the Dragon: China, Tibet, and the Dalai Lama. University of California Press. ISBN 978-0-520-21254-1.
• The International Institute for Strategic Studies (14 February 2022). The Military Balance 2022. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-000-62003-0.

History

• Dreyer, Edward L. (1995). China at War: 1901–1949. Pearson Longman. ISBN 9780582051232.
• Fravel, M. Taylor (2019). Active Defense: China's Military Strategy Since 1949. Princeton University Press. ISBN 9780691210339.
• Li, Xiaobing (2007). A History of the Modern Chinese Army. University Press of Kentucky. ISBN 9780813172248.
• Whitson, William W.; Huang, Zhenxia; Chên-hsia, Huang (1973). The Chinese High Command: A History of Communist Military Politics, 1927–71. Praeger. ISBN 978-0333150535.

Present-day

• 2022 Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China (PDF). Arlington, Virginia: United States Department of Defense. 2022. (China Military Power Report, Annual Report to Congress)
• Chase, Michael S.; Jeffery, Engstrom; Cheung, Tai Ming; Gunness, Kristen A.; Harold, Scott; Puska, Susan; Berkowitz, Samuel K. (2015). China's Incomplete Military Transformation: Assessing the Weaknesses of the People's Liberation Army (PLA). RAND Corporation. ISBN 9780833088307.
• Fisher, Richard D. (2008). China's Military Modernization: Building for Regional and Global Reach. Praeger Security International. ISBN 9780275994860.
• Kamphausen, Roy; Lai, David; Scobell, Andrew (2009). Beyond the Strait: PLA Missions Other Than Taiwan. Lulu.com. ISBN 9781304886385.
• Pollpeter, Kevin; Allen, Kenneth W. (14 June 2012). The PLA as Organization v2.0 (PDF) (Report).