The South African Defence Review of 2012 was a policy review conducted by a panel of experts and chaired by retired politician and former Minister of Defence, Roelf Meyer. The review was commissioned by Lindiwe Sisulu the then Minister of Defence and Military Veterans, in July 2011. The review was motivated by the need to correct errors and shortcomings of the previous review.

The 1998 Defence Review and its consequences

The South African Defence Review of 1998, performed by management consultants from Deloitte and Touche and which forms the basis of the current defence policy, resulted in a number of serious problems:

• Aging lower rank and medically unfit personnel cannot be discharged due to enlistment contracts based on civil service employment principles.
• Inadequate provision for expeditionary/foreign deployment capacity. The review assumed the SANDF would not perform any foreign deployments. However, the reality is that the SANDF has been and still is heavily engaged in United Nations and African Union peacekeeping and enforcement operations (see the United Nations Force Intervention Brigade for example) in numerous countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. This oversight has necessitated expensive chartering of foreign civilian heavy airlifters to support deployed troops.
• "Corporate-like" structure not suited to military operational requirements - The South African Army's brigade and divisional structures were abolished and replaced by separate "formations" and classified by role such as infantry, armour, intelligence, training, artillery, engineers, etc. This created a "silo" structural system which complicated and hindered interaction and integration of the different formations. Deane-Peter Baker of the South African Institute for Security Studies said that the D&T plan, "while alleviating to an extent, the mistrust of the new South African leadership of the remaining apartheid-era South African Defence Force personnel in middle management positions, reduced the combat effectiveness of the Army" and by 2011 was seen as a mistake. The decision to limit the force's design of the SANDF to rely on short logistic lines for highly mechanised mobile forces in defence of national territory, which caused many supply issues during modern foreign deployments, was also considered a mistake. This is one of the major problems for the army and various solutions are being considered by the government to better equip forces deployed in out-of-area SANDF project operations.^[1]
• "Top heavy" command structure (generals/troops ratio too high)

According to defence minister Lindiwe Sisulu, the old report was no longer relevant to South Africa's current situation.^[2]

Mandate and terms of reference

The committee's first meeting with Minister Sisulu was on 13 July 2011 at the Castle of Good Hope in Cape Town.^[3]

Review organisation

The review body was organized into two components, the review committee and a resource group.^[4] The minister faced criticism due to the inclusion of Tony Yengeni in the committee as Yengeni had been convicted and sentenced for fraud relating to arms acquisition processes.^[5]

The following members were included in the review organisation:^[4][6]

First consultative draft

The first draft document, forming the basis of the public consultation process, was released on 12 April 2012.^[19][20]

Immediate capability enhancements

Immediate capability enhancements that are required to ensure that the SANDF can adequately perform its missions were identified in the consultative draft of the defence review.^{[21]: pages 418–420}

Special forces

The South African Special Forces require additional weapons and systems, including a small number of dedicated aircraft for insertion/extraction missions. Additional units should be created for specialised missions.^{[21]: pages 418–419}

Border security

The following needs were identified to ensure the SANDF can adequately defend South African borders.

• Agile and protected patrol vehicles.
• Surveillance equipment including unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), particularly micro-UAVs. Mobile and fixed acoustic, optronic and radar monitoring systems.
• A "backbone" communications system integrated with tactical air, ground and police communication systems.
• Various types of non-lethal weapons.
• A system to collate data for intelligence led operations.^{[21]: page 419}

Air Space Surveillance and Protection

The review found that static, mobile and airborne radar systems to track low-flying aircraft, and aircraft with the capability to intercept low and slow flying target aircraft were required in order for the SANDF to enhance its air surveillance and protection capabilities.^{[21]: page 419}

Extended Maritime Security Capability

Somali-based piracy expanding into the Mozambique channel had been identified as a risk and an urgent reason to expand South Africa's maritime capability. Immediate requirements for maritime patrol aircraft, offshore patrol vessels, additional shipboard helicopters and shoreline patrol equipment were identified.^{[21]: page 419}

Crisis Response Capability

The SAAF's Boeing 707s, previously used for in-flight refuelling, were retired in 2007.^[22]

The following requirements were identified to enable the SANDF to fulfill South Africa's regional security responsibilities:

• Equipment and weapons for parachute and air-landed battalion groups.
• A rejuvenation and expansion of medium airlift capability.
• Heavy/long range aircraft that when combined with medium airlift aircraft, will allow the Defence Force to deploy a parachute battalion group or an air-landed battalion group within 48 hours from South Africa to anywhere within the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region, or from a forward base within the continental SADC region to anywhere in an adjoining country.
• The establishment of in-flight refuelling capabilities to enable effective fighter support for crisis response deployments and to extend the reach of the Special Forces.^{[21]: pages 419–420}

Urgent capability enhancements

A Ratel IFV, in service since 1977.

As of 2014, the South African built Denel Rooivalk has still not received its Mokopa anti-tank guided missiles due to a lack of funding.^[23]

The SAS Drakensberg (A301), in service since 1987

Various areas were identified by the review in which the SANDF lacked adequate capability to perform near/medium term missions. Obsolete equipment that needed to be replaced in order for the SANDF to retain its capabilities were identified.^[21]: 420

Infantry Combat Vehicles

Infantry combat vehicles are suited to peacekeeping missions. The 30-year-old Ratel IFV was identified as being obsolete, making maintenance difficult. It was suggested that they be replaced urgently.^[21]: 420

Armoured Personnel Carriers

The Casspir and Mamba APC vehicles were identified as obsolete and in urgent need of replacement. The Mfezi Ambulance is also in need of replacement. A need for Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected patrol vehicles has arisen.^[21]: 421

Logistic Vehicles

The currently used SAMIL Trucks were identified as obsolete and in need of replacement.^[21]: 421

Light Artillery

Recent conflicts in Africa have proven that light artillery that can be deployed quickly if needed. A 105mm long-range gun and ammunition family has been under development by Denel Land Systems since 2012.^[21]: 421

Aerial Weapons

Weapons for the JAS-39 Gripen, BAe Hawk and Denel Rooivalk are needed in order for them to be operated effectively.^[21]: 421

Combat Support Ships

It was identified that future operations of the South African Navy might be extended to the Mozambique Channel. The SAS Drakensberg (A301) was identified for replacement.^[21]: 421

Public consultation process

The Public Participation Programme (PPP) consisted of a series of public meetings and consultations with stakeholder organisations at various venues around the country:^[24]

Second draft

The second draft, based on the first, but with changes as informed by input received through the public consultation process was published on 7 September 2012.^[27] Many of the changes were criticized by the pacifist civil society organisation, the Ceasefire Campaign, who said the proposed expansion of the defence force and increased expenditure was unnecessary as South Africa does not face any credible threat of conventional war.^[28]

Third draft

This draft was published on 10 April 2013.^[27] The draft recognised that South Africa was a significant military force in Southern Africa, however it is not considered as one of the world's major military forces.^[29]

Final version

The final edition, renamed the "2014" review due to the delay in publication,^[30][31] was accepted by Cabinet and submitted to Parliament in May 2014. The main points covered in the over 400-page document are:^[32]

The Defence Review identified 4 main goals of the SANDF:

1. Defend and Protect South Africa
2. Safeguard South Africa
3. Promote Peace & Security
4. Developmental & other tasks

To meet these goals the Review identified a number of Required Defence Capabilities:

• Joint Command and Control
• Defence Diplomacy
• Special Forces
• Special Operations forces
• Medium-Combat forces - configured and maintained as a projectable, multi-roled medium-combat capability with enhanced fire-power, manoeuvreability and protection making it suitable for a range of contingencies.
• Heavy-Combat forces - to deter South Africa's potential adversaries and conduct landward operations in high-threat situations and to augment the Medium-Combat forces
• Maritime Operations
• Air Operations
• Military Health
• Information Warfare capability

Realising that the cost of implementing all of the recommendations was immense, the Review recommended 5 Planning milestones for implementing the Review's recommendations:

• Planning Milestone 1: Arrest the decline in critical capabilities through immediate, directed interventions.
• Planning Milestone 2: Re-balance and re-organise the Defence Force as the foundation for future growth.
• Planning Milestone 3: Create a sustainable Defence Force that can meet current ordered defence commitments.
• Planning Milestone 4: Enhance the Defence Force's capacity to respond to nascent challenges in the strategic environment.
• Planning Milestone 5: Defend the Republic against insurgency and/or armed conflict to the level of limited war.

Response

The review, having been accepted by cabinet and renamed The "2014" Review, was submitted to parliament after the general election in May 2014. In September 2014, it was reported that official opposition, the Democratic Alliance shadow minister of defence and military veterans, David Maynier and defence analyst, Helmoed Heitman had expressed concerns with the delays the review was getting and said that dealing with and implementing the defence review was a matter of urgency.^[33] By October 2014 the Joint Standing Committee on Defence and Military Veterans had been established with the responsibility to take the review as input to eventually produce a new defence policy.^[34]

Research papers

During the review a number of essays were produced by members of the review structure. These documents were used to inform the process.^[35]

• Research Essay on a South African Methodology to Determine Level of Defence Ambition
• Research Essay on Changes to South African Defence Policy Since 1910
• Research Essay on Climate Change
• Research Essay on Cyber Warfare
• Research Essay on Defence Ambition, Concept & Capabilities
• Research Essay on International Defence Policy & Strategy Experiences
• Research Essay on Private Military Companies & Mercenarism
• Research Essay on Resources & Conflict
• Research Essay on Security Sector Reform
• Research Essay on the International Credit Crunch and Defence Spending

Notes

References

Further reading

• Various draft versions
• Final version - 25 March 2014 (as submitted to parliament)

External links

• South African Defence Review 2012 (website) (Archived 2015-02-24)
• Final Report (dated 2015) (Archived 2020-11-25)
• Defence Review 1998 (Archived 2020-10-23)