Redut
ЧВК «Редут»
Founders
  • Anatoly Karaziy[1]
  • Gen. Vladimir Alexeyev[1]
Leaders
  • Anatoly Karaziy[1]
  • Davor Savičić[2]
  • Col. Sergei Salivanov[2][3]
  • Lt.-Col. Mikheev Ivan Pavlovich †[4]
  • Cpt.-Lt. Matlaev Artem †[5]
  • Maj. Konstantin Mirzayants[4]
Dates of operation2008–present
AllegianceMinistry of Defence (Russia) (2022-present)[6][7]
HeadquartersKubinka, Russia
Size
Battles and wars
Designated as a terrorist group by Ukraine[12][13]
Websitehttp://redut-czentr.narod.ru/

Redut (Russian: ЧВК «Редут», romanized: ChVK «Redut»), also known as Redoubt, Redut-Antiterror or Centre R, formerly known as "Shield",[14][15] is a Russian Private Military Company (PMC) that is a part of the "Antiterror-family" — which consists of similarly named PMCs that protect commercial operations of Russian companies.[16][17] It is currently deployed by Russia in the Russian invasion of Ukraine.[18][19][20][21][22] According to an RFE/RL investigation, "Redut" is fully controlled and managed by GRU.[23]

It was established in 2008, as a merger of several minor veteran groupings of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, Russian Air Force and units of the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD), who had obtained combat experience in military and peacekeeping missions.[6]

Members of the group have been convicted of committing war crimes during the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

History

Origins

According to Norwegian researchers from the Forsvarets Forskningsinstitutt - FFI (Norwegian Defence Research Establishment), Redut-Antiterror emerged in 2008 from the PMSC Antiterror-Orel, which was founded in 2003 by members of the Russian Special Forces.[24] It is an affiliate or former branch of the Antiterror-Orel offshoot Tiger Top Rent Security[25] and primarily recruits soldiers of the Russian 45th Guards Special Reconnaissance Brigade.[26] Until 2022, Redut mainly offered the protection of Russian convoys and corporate real estate—including oil production facilities, military installations and Russian diplomats in many countries worldwide, for example of Gennady Timchenko's JSC Stroytransgaz facilities in Syria during the Syrian civil war.[26] It also provided military training and advisors for e.g. pro-Russian Abkhazian forces during the Russo-Georgian War.[27]

Russian invasion of Ukraine

For 2022 and the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Redut was planned to be a major competitor for the Russian MoD in the PMC scene, which is in conflict with the Wagner Group. Plans were organized by the deputy head of the GRU (Russian intelligence), General Vladimir Alexeyev, who made Anatoly Karaziy, a relative of his, head of it. Redut recruited many former Wagner members and Special Forces, totalling several thousands in January 2022, which angered Wagner head Prigozhin. The same month, he was invited to the office on Khoroshevskoye Highway. At first Prigozhin told Alexeyev that if Karaziy did not stop recruiting Wagnerites for Redut, Prigozhin would kill Karaziy. In response to this, Alexeyev allegedly invited Prigozhin to go to another office, where Karaziy was already waiting for him, who offered to sort it out on the spot. According to the source, Prigozhin was taken aback and began to say that he was misunderstood, and later retreated.[1][28] Alexeyev said that it was the Redut that was to play a decisive role in the first days of the invasion. According to one of the sources, it included a group that was supposed to kill Zelensky on the day of the invasion in the Kyiv offensive. Alexeyev himself was engaged not only in the military part, but also in the political one—he had to organize the transfer of power to new hands and negotiated this with Ukrainian politicians, for example with Azarov. Many of the plans of the GRU turned out to be known in advance to the Western and Ukrainian special services. In the Kyiv offensive, Redut sustained heavy losses in which the fighting force was compromised by up to 90%, which practically eliminated the Redut PMC, leaving Prigozhin's Wagner Group to dominate the scene.[1][28] After this event, remaining Redut contractors got invited to their base in Kubinka and were offered contracts by the Russian MoD, to serve officially in the Russian Armed Forces. As claimed by one of Redut's former commanders, that is why Redut is completely controlled and effectively rebuilt by the Russian MoD.[6][7]

Fall of Wagner

Despite the heavy casualties, Redut PMC grew sharply to around 7000 soldiers in 2023.[11] After the failed Wagner coup attempt, the MoD tried to dissolve the Wagner Group, by absorbing, eliminating or taking over parts of Wagner.[29] Redut, along Convoy,[30][31] play key roles, by directly profiting of these actions as a government controlled entities.[32] Experts assessed that Redut likely possesses the capabilities and intent[33] to take over operations of its rival Wagner in Syria and other countries after the likely decapitation of Wagner's leadership,[34][35] although noting that it doesn't have the same niveau of fighting experience in comparison.[36] Others saw a pro-MoD rebranding of Wagner as more likely.[37] In July, Wagner mercenaries in Syria and Ukraine were offered to move to Redut, which is in active competition with Wagner.[38] In August, ISW reported that efforts to dissolve Wagner partially succeeded, with two high-ranking Wagner representatives and commanders, namely Andrey "Sedoy" ("Grey" – ed.) Troshev and Vadim V. (alias: "Khrustal"), defecting to Redut—as claimed by the MoD and other Wagner commanders, denied by some Wagner insiders.[39] Furthermore, the Russian MoD is apparently using them to recruit Wagner personnel under the promise of new missions in Africa.[32] Shortly before the alleged death of Wagner founders Prigozhin and Dmitry Utkin, Redut began preparation to enter Africa, focusing recruitment efforts on this area.[40] iStories found posts on social networks urging people to join Redut with this message: "Wagner is in the past. If you are really interested in real work in Africa, the Ministry of Defence and PMC Redut is your choice!".[30] According to Mark Galeotti, director of Mayak Intelligence, Redut has emerged as the main Russian PMC and is much more active in Africa and Syria.[41]

Organization

According to Candace Rondeaux, Redut members tend to be abstemious and disciplined.[42] Rondeaux states that under Russian law, one wing of Redut is categorized as a "military training centre" and the whole is in her opinion "not a PMC, not some sort of special company" though she admits that it has extra-territorial [42]operations. She further states that Redut "is fully folded into the Ministry of Defense infrastructure and always has been."[42] The 2023 RFE/RFL investigation confirmed "Redut" being merely a front for GRU operations, maintained through a network of shadow companies with the primary purpose of legally distancing the special operations from Russian government.[23]

Recruitment

According to an investigation by the Russian-language version of RFE/RFL, advertisements for the PMC "Redut" are quite actively placed in Russian social media. Official requirements for application are at least 25 to 45 years of age, military and law enforcement agency experience, no ongoing law enforcement prosecution (expunged convictions, other than for pedophilia, drug distribution, or rape, are accepted) and medical certificates of the absence of tuberculosis (fluorography), hepatitis and HIV. However a member of the formation said that requirements are much lower.[26] It was leaked that representatives of Redut PMC recruit convicts in high-security prisons.[43]

A leaked contract referred to Redut as "RLSPI", which is described as a construction company registered in Rostov-on-Don, without mentioning military service. "RLSPI" is a regional laboratory for socio-psychological research [Unit 35555] under the Russian Ministry of Defense, located in Rostov-on-Don and belonging to the GRU, which is not indicated in the document. Additionally, payments in case of injury, death, and accommodation are specified. Since the annexation of four Ukrainian oblasts, salary is paid in Ruble instead of Dollars, since the territories are not considered foreign anymore.[26]

iStories reported that a journalist of theirs got offered to join the Redut formation "Wolves", to fight in Ukraine, without signing a MoD contract—bypassing the Russian MoD's requirement since July 1 for all volunteer formations participating in the war to have one.[44] This contradicts a statement by State Duma deputy Maxim Ivanov, who assured that PMC "Redut" and its units signed contracts with the Ministry of Defence.[45]

As reported by iStories in October 2023, women are also being recruited into the ranks of Redut's formation "Borz Battalion" now, as snipers and drone operators.[46]

Units

Don Brigade

Redut is believed to have a unit called "Don Brigade"[47] (also called "Don and the Union of Donbas Volunteers"), a volunteer detachment with many ethnic Cossack fighters, listed in BARS and linked to the Russian MoD.[48] Contractors are recruited and paid by Redut,[49] which acts as a financial institution. Many of them directly join Redut in special "Don units", while still formally considered part of the "Don Brigade".[50] It consists of the battalion "Terek", with two more in line for recruiting—"Kuban" and "Yenisei".[14]

Potok Battalion

In early 2023, Gazprom Neft, a subsidiary of Gazprom, was given permission to form a PMSC by the Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin. According to research by BBC News Russian, organization started in the city of Omsk, under the name "Gazprom Neft Security", led by former high-ranking members of Russia’s Federal Security Service and Internal Affairs Ministry.[51] The three main formations are "Fakel" (Torch), "Potok" (Stream) and "Plamya" (Flame), which are under control of the Russian MoD.[52] Later in April, members of the voluntary Gazprom military formation "Potok" were forced to sign contracts with Redut by the Russian MoD,[53][54][52][55] to fight with "Potok" under the command of Redut.[56]

Veterans Battalion

The Logo and patch of the Redut formation "Veterany", with the Russian tricolour at the top horizontally, the edges being green and the below part with white background and a black portrait of Putin in the middle, with the text "Veterany" or "Veterans" written below him.
Logo and Patch of the Redut formation "Veterans"

The "Veterans Battalion" is reported to be part of the Redut PMC,[47] with Redut conducting its recruitment and acting as a financial institution. According to Grey Dynamics, they are estimated to have 2000 fighters, and are mostly deployed for reconnaissance and assault. Contracts can be signed either 6 or 12 months of service, with pay estimates at around £2150 a month, going up depending on experience, performance, and rank. It is being advertised on Social Media such as Telegram, their website, and profits of positive reporting of Russian state TV on it. Required for joining is experience with small arms, 21 to 55 years of age, good physical shape, Russian passport and military identification. They are a well equipped with high quality weaponry, like drones and UAVs, APCs, MBTs, IFVs, logistical vehicles, automatic grenade launchers, mortars and artillery systems. Additionally, they are assessed to have superior training and significant combat experience in comparison to other Russian units, and are said to work effectively with other units. Veterans is known for its distinctive patch showing Putin.[57] According to reports, the 2nd Battalion of the 60th ”Veterans” Separate Air Assault Brigade is operating on one of the Bakhmut flanks.[49]

Others

Sources in the PMC say that there are other formations called "Ilimovtsy", "Hooligans", "Marines", "Axes" and reconnaissance and sabotage detachment "Wolves"—of which drone operator Cpt.-Lt. Matlaev Artem was killed in combat.[5] The "North" formation took heavy losses when engaging in friendly fire in the Kyiv offensive due to poor communication, including the commander of the "North Group" Lt.-Col. Mikheev Ivan Pavlovich ("Sever") †.[4]

Funding

Redut is in contract with the Russian Ministry of Defense and receives its funding through it.[7] Other major backers of the company are said to be Oleg Deripaska and Gennady Timchenko, according to information provided by the website Gulagu.net founded by Russian dissident Vladimir Osechkin, which cites a Redut deputy commander testifying under cover names. From them, the PMC received armored personnel carriers, helmets, and protective vests.[58][59]

Sanctions

On February 24, 2023, Redut was designated a Russian mercenary force—controlled by and linked to the GRU—fighting Ukraine by the United States Department of the Treasury,[60][19] according to executive order "E.O. 14024" by the United States President. Thus blocking any transfer, pay, export or withdraw of Redut's possessions and property in the United States.[61]

Ukrainian lawmakers approved Resolution "#3735" on February 9, 2023, recognizing Redut and other Russian private military companies as terrorist organizations.[12][13]

Activities

Main areas

Former areas

There are indications that the organisation provided military advisors and trainers for Abkhazian units in the Russo-Georgian War. It also saw action in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, Somalia, Caribbean countries, the former Yugoslavia, as well as Afghanistan and Indonesia.[64][27][65] Its services included the deployment of snipers, pioneers and guards. Redut formations have been deployed to protect convoys, corporate real estate—including oil production facilities, military installations and Russian diplomats, for example defending JSC Stroytransgaz facilities in Syria.[26] In order to establish itself in the Iraq environment, the company received direct support from the FSB (intelligence).[66]

War crimes

Four Russian soldiers, two head down, holding their prosecution documents, sit in a box with glass in the court room mid-session.
Redut PMC and GRU fighters being prosecuted in Kobelevskiy District Court, Poltava Oblast
A dug out hole with stone walls, iron ladder and tree branches laid over it.
Torture pit for ATO veterans in Borova, Kharkiv Oblast

At least two Redut fighters have been convicted of war crimes. On December 23, 2022, Ruslan Kolesnikov (born 1968) and Mikhail Ivanov (born 1977) were convicted of abducting and torturing three ATO veterans from the urban settlement Borova in Kharkiv oblast at the beginning of September, and sentenced to 11 years by the Kobelevskiy District Court in Poltava oblast.[67] The three victims were abducted for interrogation to find other ATO veterans, held with bags over their heads and with hands bound. During the interrogarion process, they were thrown into a pit for three days without food and water, repeatedly beaten on the limbs with hammers and threatened that their fingers would be cut off. Prior, three ATO veterans with torture marks were discovered dead in this hole.[20]

See also

References

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  2. 1 2 Osechkin, Vladimir (3 January 2023). "Слив \\\"Редута\\\": откровения Сергея \\\"Салех\\\" Саливанова о связи ЧВК, ВДВ и др". Gulagu.net (in Russian). Archived from the original on 12 July 2023. Retrieved 12 July 2023.
  3. ↑ Osechkin, Vladimir (28 December 2022). "Инсайд из ЧВК Редут в составе 45 ОБр СпН МинОбороны и роли Дерипаски". Gulagu.net. Archived from the original on 20 June 2023. Retrieved 12 July 2023.
  4. 1 2 3 "Расследование "Медузы" о наемниках на войне в Украине". Meduza (in Russian). Archived from the original on 20 July 2022. Retrieved 3 December 2022.
  5. 1 2 "Данные о погибших в Украине: еще 28 военных с Юга России и Северного Кавказа". Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (in Russian). 22 February 2023. Archived from the original on 22 February 2023. Retrieved 17 July 2023.
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  8. ↑ "В Сирии убиты трое наемников из российской ЧВК "Щит". Она занимается охраной объектов, принадлежащих Геннадию Тимченко". Meduza (in Russian). Archived from the original on 3 December 2022. Retrieved 3 December 2022.
  9. ↑ "Без "Щита"". Novaya Gazeta (in Russian). 8 October 2017. Archived from the original on 30 January 2023. Retrieved 3 December 2022.
  10. ↑ "Vladimir Osechkin about PMC Wagner and PMC Redut". The Odessa Journal. 28 October 2022. Archived from the original on 20 February 2023. Retrieved 21 February 2023.
  11. 1 2 Miller, Christopher; Seddon, Max; Ivanova, Polina (2 June 2023). "'Stream' and 'Torch': the Gazprom-backed militias fighting in Ukraine". Financial Times. Archived from the original on 3 June 2023. Retrieved 9 June 2023.
  12. 1 2 "Ukraine's Parliament Recognizes Wagner as Transnational Criminal Organization". Kyiv Post. 6 February 2023. Retrieved 25 May 2023.
  13. 1 2 "Проект Постанови про Звернення Верховної Ради України до Організації Об'єднаних Націй, Європейського Парламенту, Парламентської Асамблеї Ради Європи, Парламентської Асамблеї ОБСЄ, Парламентської Асамблеї НАТО, Парламентської Асамблеї ОЧЕС, урядів і парламентів держав світу про визнання російських приватних військових компаній терористичними організаціями" [Draft Resolution on Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine's Address to the United Nations, European Parliament, Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, BSEC Parliamentary Assembly, and governments and parliaments of the countries of the world on recognition of Russian private military companies as terrorist organisations]. Verkhovna Rada (in Ukrainian). Retrieved 25 May 2023.
  14. 1 2 "Пехота пуще неволи". Novaya Gazeta (in Russian). 10 August 2022. Archived from the original on 14 August 2022. Retrieved 19 June 2023.
  15. ↑ "Зона поражения". Novaya Gazeta (in Russian). 10 November 2022. Archived from the original on 20 June 2023. Retrieved 20 June 2023.
  16. ↑ "РЕГИОНАЛЬНАЯ ОБЩЕСТВЕННАЯ ОРГАНИЗАЦИЯ "ВЕТЕРАНОВ МИРОТВОРЧЕСКИХ МИССИЙ И ЛОКАЛЬНЫХ КОНФЛИКТОВ"". Registry for the Association of Veterans of Peacekeeping and Local Conflict Missions (Zachestnyibiznes). Archived from the original on 8 July 2019. Retrieved 3 May 2023.
  17. ↑ Osechkin, Vladimir (5 January 2023). "О тайнах руководства ЧВК Редут и ЧВК Вагнер, связи с ВДВ и ФСБ, олигархах…". Gulagu.net (in Russian). Archived from the original on 20 June 2023. Retrieved 12 July 2023.
  18. ↑ "Tracing Wagner's Roots". New America. Archived from the original on 9 May 2022. Retrieved 3 May 2023.
  19. 1 2 "Private Military Company Redut". OpenSanctions. 13 December 2019. Archived from the original on 27 April 2023. Retrieved 3 May 2023.
  20. 1 2 "Long sentences passed on 'Redut' mercenaries fighting Russia's war against Ukraine with Finnish citizen's funding". Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group. Archived from the original on 3 May 2023. Retrieved 3 May 2023.
  21. ↑ "The Emergence of Russian Private Military Companies: A New Tool of Clandestine Warfare" (PDF). Norwegian Defence Research Establishment. Archived from the original (PDF) on 26 April 2023. Retrieved 3 May 2023.
  22. ↑ "How Russia's GRU Set Up A Fake Private Military Company For Its War In Ukraine". rferl.org. RFE/RL. 10 October 2023. Retrieved 11 October 2023. An analysis indicated that Redut acts as a recruitment system for combat units that is coordinated and funded by the Russian military, in particular its intelligence agency, known as the GRU, according to the investigative documentary released on October 10 by Schemes and Systema, RFE/RL's Ukrainian and Russian investigative teams, respectively.
  23. 1 2 Schemes and Systema Read in Ukrainian Read in Russian. "Inside Russia's Fake Private Mercenary Company Fighting In Ukraine". RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty. Retrieved 8 December 2023.
  24. ↑ "Analyse: Russische PMCs im Nahen Osten und Afrika". Federal Agency for Civic Education (in German). 8 February 2021. Archived from the original on 3 May 2023. Retrieved 18 September 2022.
  25. ↑ "Отряд "Тигр" - Top Rent security". Tiger Top Rent Security (in Russian). Archived from the original on 15 September 2019.
  26. 1 2 3 4 5 "Не только "Вагнер". Как воюют российские наемники в других "подразделениях"". Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (in Russian). 18 May 2023. Archived from the original on 12 June 2023. Retrieved 11 June 2023.
  27. 1 2 "From 'Volunteers' to Quasi-PMCs: Retracing the Footprints of Russian Irregulars in the Yugoslav Wars and Post-Soviet Conflicts" (PDF). Jamestown Foundation. Archived from the original (PDF) on 15 March 2023. Retrieved 3 May 2023.
  28. 1 2 "Wie sich Prigoschin gegen andere Söldnertruppen durchgesetzt hat". Der Spiegel (in German). 15 May 2023. Archived from the original on 19 May 2023. Retrieved 11 June 2023.
  29. ↑ "'Final nail in the coffin' for Russia's Wagner Group as leader Prigozhin presumed dead". CNBC. 24 August 2023. Retrieved 25 August 2023.
  30. 1 2 "Накануне гибели Пригожина Минобороны начало набор бойцов в Африку через свои ЧВК, выяснили "Важные истории"". iStories (in Russian). 23 August 2023. Archived from the original on 25 August 2023. Retrieved 25 August 2023.
  31. ↑ Oliphant, Roland (24 August 2023). "Inside ambitious mercenary outfit Redut, the Wagner rival linked to the Russian spy services". The Daily Telegraph. Archived from the original on 6 September 2023. Retrieved 12 September 2023.
  32. 1 2 "Kremlin's efforts to disband Wagner Group partially succeed – ISW". Ukrainska Pravda. 21 August 2023. Archived from the original on 23 August 2023.
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  38. ↑ McLoughlin, Paul (12 July 2023). "Syria Insight: What next for Russia's Wagner Group?". The New Arab. Archived from the original on 1 August 2023. Retrieved 1 August 2023.
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  42. 1 2 3 "'Weakened Putin' turns to old GRU rivals to fill mercenary gaps". Times Radio. YouTube. 11 November 2023.
  43. 1 2 3 "Convicts in arms". Novaya Gazeta. 12 November 2022. Archived from the original on 22 January 2023. Retrieved 3 May 2023.
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  47. 1 2 "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 21" (PDF). Institute for the Study of War. 21 August 2022. Archived from the original (PDF) on 28 August 2022. Retrieved 20 June 2023.
  48. ↑ ""Их часто используют как пушечное мясо". Что известно о работе частных военных компаний на войне в Украине". Current Time TV (in Russian). 11 August 2022. Archived from the original on 13 August 2022. Retrieved 11 June 2023.
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  51. ↑ "The 'Privatization of Force' Presses on in Russia (Part One)". Jamestown Foundation. Archived from the original on 9 July 2023. Retrieved 9 July 2023.
  52. 1 2 ""Поток" под Бахмутом. Что известно о ЧВК, связанных с "Газпромом"". BBC News Russian (in Russian). 16 May 2023. Archived from the original on 17 May 2023. Retrieved 23 May 2023.
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  55. ↑ "It's not just Wagner At least three Gazprom-linked private military companies now have fighters in Ukraine". Meduza. 16 May 2023. Archived from the original on 17 May 2023. Retrieved 23 May 2023.
  56. ↑ "It's not just Wagner At least three Gazprom-linked private military companies now have fighters in Ukraine". Meduza. 16 May 2023. Archived from the original on 10 June 2023. Retrieved 11 June 2023.
  57. 1 2 Bertina, Alec (27 June 2023). "PMC Veterans (60 OMSB Veteran): Putin's Loyalists". Grey Dynamics. Archived from the original on 12 July 2023. Retrieved 12 July 2023.
  58. ↑ svizzera, RSINews, l’informazione della Radiotelevisione (30 January 2023). "Mercenari russi e quel legame con la Svizzera". Radiotelevisione svizzera (in Italian). Archived from the original on 5 March 2023. Retrieved 3 May 2023.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
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  67. ↑ ""Трошки пресували, звичайно". Чотирьох військовослужбовців РФ засудили за катування колишніх учасників АТО". Судовий Репортер (in Ukrainian). 24 December 2022. Archived from the original on 11 June 2023. Retrieved 11 June 2023.

Further reading

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