factual relativism

factual + relativism

factual relativism (uncountable)

1. (philosophy of science) The view that scientific facts about the world are not absolute, but are relative to historical eras and to evolving scientific theories.
2. (philosophy, sociology) The claim that the world itself, or the facts about the world, are different for different individuals, or groups, or cultures.
   • 2013, Henrik Rydenfelt, Constructivist Problems, Realist Solutions, in J. Kegley and K. Skowronski, eds. Persuasion and Compulsion in Democracy. Lanham: Lexington Books, p. 164:

     factual relativism ... attempts to argue that the world itself, or the “facts,” are different for different individuals (groups, cultures). Hence truth, too, is relative.

   • 2005, Iris Einheuser, “Varieties of Relativism: Indexical, Propositional and Factual”, in Varieties of Relativism: Indexical, Propositional and Factual:

     Factual relativism, according to which the facts ... may differ across perspectives — that is, different facts obtain relative to different perspectives.

   • 2001, Jean Bricmont, Alan Sokal, “Chapter 3: Science and Sociology of Science: Beyond War and Peace”, in Jay A. Labinger, Harry M. Collins, editors, One Culture?: A Conversation about Science, page 38:

     Whereas moral relativism deals with matters of value, cognitive relativism deals with matters of fact (although sharp distinctions may at times be difficult to make) (Hollis and Lukes 1982, p. 2).

• cognitive relativism