Lebanese Shia Muslims
المسلمون الشيعة اللبنانيون
Distribution of Shi'a Muslims in Lebanon
Total population
~1,800,000
Languages
Vernacular:
Lebanese Arabic
Religion
Islam (Shia Islam)

Lebanese Shia Muslims (Arabic: المسلمون الشيعة اللبنانيون), communally and historically known as matāwila (Arabic: متاولة, plural of متوال mutawālin;[1] pronounced as متوالي metouali or matawali in Lebanese Arabic[2]), are Lebanese people who are adherents of Shia Islam in Lebanon, which plays a major role alongside Lebanon's main Sunni, Maronite and Druze sects. The vast majority of Shia Muslims in Lebanon adhere to Twelver Shi'ism,[3][4] making them the primary Twelver Shia community in the Levant.[5]

Today, Shia Muslims constitute around 32% of the Lebanese population,[6] surpassing both the once-majority Christians and Sunnis.[7] Under the terms of an unwritten agreement known as the National Pact between the various political and religious leaders of Lebanon, Shias are the only sect eligible for the post of Speaker of Parliament.[8][9][10][11]

History

Origins

The cultural and linguistic heritage of the Lebanese people is a blend of both indigenous elements and the foreign cultures that have come to rule the land and its people over the course of thousands of years. In a 2013 interview the lead investigator, Pierre Zalloua, pointed out that genetic variation preceded religious variation and divisions: "Lebanon already had well-differentiated communities with their own genetic peculiarities, but not significant differences, and religions came as layers of paint on top. There is no distinct pattern that shows that one community carries significantly more Phoenician than another."[12]

Lebanon throughout its history was home of many historic peoples who inhabited the region. The Lebanese coast was mainly inhabited by Phoenician Canaanites throughout the Bronze and Iron ages, who built the cities of Tyre, Sidon, Byblos and Tripoli, which was founded as a center of a confederation between Aradians, Sidonians, and Tyrians. Further east, the Bekaa valley was known as Amqu in the Bronze Age, and was part of Amorite kingdom of Qatna and later Amurru kingdom, and had local city-states such as Enišasi.[13]

During the Iron Age, the Bekaa was dominated by the Aramaeans, who formed kingdoms nearby in Damascus and Hamath, and established the kingdom of Aram-Zobah where Hazael might have been born, and was later also settled by Itureans, who were likely Arabs themselves. These Itureans inhabited the hills above Tyre in Southern Lebanon, historically known as Jabal Amel, since at least the times of Alexander the Great, who fought them after they blocked his army's access to wood supply.[14]

During Roman rule, Aramaic became the lingua franca of the entire Levant and Lebanon, replacing spoken Phoenician on the coast, while Greek was used as language of administration, education and trading. It is important to note that most villages and towns in Lebanon today have Aramaic names, reflecting this heritage. However, Beirut became the only fully Latin speaking city in the whole east. On the coast, Tyre prospered under the Romans and was allowed to keep much of its independence as a "civitas foederata".[15]

On the other hand, Jabal Amel was inhabited by Banu Amilah, its namesake, who have particular importance for the Lebanese Shia for adopting and nurturing Shi'ism in the southern population. The Banu Amilah were part of the Nabataean Arab foederati of the Roman Empire, and they were connected to other pre-Islamic Arabs such as Judham and Balqayn, whose presence in the region likely dates back to Biblical times according to Irfan Shahîd.[16] As the Muslim conquest of the Levant reached Lebanon, these Arab tribes received the most power which encouraged the non-Arabic-speaking population to adopt Arabic as the main language.[17]

Early Islamic period

The spread of Shia Islam in Lebanon was a complex, multi-faceted phenomnon over a few centuries. By the time of the Islamic conquest, Jabal Amel was an ethno-linguistic hybrid which included the tribes of Amilah and Judham as well as Hamdan émigrés,[18][19] and non-Arab communities.[20] According to Irfan Shahîd, the pre-Islamic tribes of Amilah and Judham were part of the Nabataean foederati of the Romans, whose presence in the region dates back to Biblical times.[16][21] Banu Amilah, according to tenth century historian al-Tabari, were also affiliates of the Ghassanids who supplied troops to the Byzantines.[22]

Hamdanid dominions c. 955 AD

During the early Islamic period, Jabal Amel and the adjacent areas likely hosted several disgruntled groups or communities that were susceptible to Twelver Shia doctrine, and a positive and inviting dialectical relationship between the theological construct of Imamism and its social milieu gave precedence to the Shiite possibility.[20] According to Muhajir, the beginning of the process can be traced right after the Hasan–Muawiya treaty in 661.[18] Per Harris, the 842 revolt in Palestine and Jabal Amel gave rare exposure to a Shia-minded population on the fringes of Mount Lebanon in Jabal Amel.[23]

In Syria, Aleppo, which figures in the scholastic heritage of Jabal Amel, had become fertile ground for Twelver Shi'ism under the reign of the Hamdanids (944–991),[24][25][26] and cultural and material interactions between Aleppo and Jabal Amel may have reinforced nascent local development of Twelver Shi'ism in the area prior to Isma'ili Fatimid ascent in Egypt (969–1174).[20][27] Before Fatimid Ismaili da'wa took hold in Syria, cultural exchange between scholars in Jabal Amel and Iraq contributed to a mutual systematic observation of the Ja'fari school, which also continued after Fatimid demise.[20]

A political map of the Levant (c. 1090), highlighting the territories of Tripoli and Tyre

Shiites also had a strong presence in certain areas in northern Palestine and Transjordan as confirmed by al-Maqdisi (c. 966-985),[28] mainly in Tiberias, Amman and Qadas.[29][18][20][30][31] Traveling through Tyre and Tripoli c. 1047, Nasir Khusraw noted in his Safarnama that most of the inhabitants of the two cities were Shiite.[20] Ibn Asakir (1106–1175), during his ten-year residence in Tyre, noted strong opposition to his views from some of the rafida, a pejorative term denoting Shiites.[20] Tripoli was ruled by Banu Ammar from 1079, who invested large sums in turning the city into a famous center for learning, founding a "House of Knowledge" that attracted scholars as well as a notable library of 100,000 volumes.[32]

Mamluk period

By the early 14th century, Jabal Amel was becoming the Twelver Shia center of the entire Levant. During this period, a stream of scholars shifted to Jabal Amel from Aleppo due to Mamluk takeover as the area provided refuge from Sunni rigor.[17] The towns of Jezzine and Karak Nuh replaced the former urban centers of Shiite learning in the Levant, and Shiite scholars enjoyed protection under Shia chiefs starting from Husam ad-Din Bishara in 1187 until the crisis of 1781.[33][34] One particular scholar from Jezzine, Muhammad ibn Makki, became a widely known Shi'i faqīh who advocated developing religious law through debate with Sunni scholars,[35][36] whose fame as a legal expert spread as far as Khorasan, where the reigning Sarbadar invited him to instruct his court in Twelver Shiism.[35] On 30 June 1384, Ibn Makki was charged with heresy and subsequently executed in Citadel of Damascus:[35]

Between 1292 and 1305, the Mamluks carried out a series of punitive expeditions against the Shia population of Kisrawan region in Mount Lebanon east of Beirut, headed by Aqqush al-Afram.[35] According to Mamluk chronicler Badr al-Din al-Ayni, in 1292, the Sultan al-Ashraf Khalil compelled Baydara to take three thousand cavalry up the coast from Egypt, entering Kisrawan from the south. According to al-Ayni, the defenders, whom he called kafarat rawafid, mobilized 10,000 defenders who lured Mamluk contingents into ambushes.[37] The campaign was a failure, and Baydara was only able to extricate his troops after offering gifts and releasing prisoners.[37]

In 1299, Kisrawan mountaineers attacked the fleeing Mamluk army, which brought Kisrawan back to Mamluk priority, prompting a swift retribution in 1300.[38] Punishment did not suffice, and following the death of the Ilkhan Ghazan in 1304, the Mamluks assembled the main Mamluk field army for a third campaign.[38]

According to al-Maqrizi, al-Ayni and Druze chronicler Salih ibn Yahya, 50,000 Mamluk troops marched from Damascus in July 1305 to meet up with another army under the na'ib of Tripoli coming from the south, also summoning their Druze Buhturid allies. The Mamluk pincer movement converged on the Kisrawan rebels, resulting in fierce battles that eventually crushed the defenders.[39][35][40][41] The Mamluks then devastated villages and cultivation through August 1305 and expelled much of the population, most of whom settled in Southern Lebanon and the Beqaa valley.[35][42]

The Wa'il clan, ancestors of the Ali al-Saghirs who entered Jabal Amel with Salah al-Din, took over local leadership in the early 13th century. Under the Mamluks, they competed with the Shukr chiefs of Bint Jbeil. Another family called Sudun appeared in southern Jabal Amel by the early sixteenth century who were possibly the descendants of Sudun, the Mamluk na'ib of Damascus in 1478. The Bisharas seem to have continued in power after Husam ad-Din, and in 1425, Damascus chronicler Ibn Tulun reports that an Ibn Bishara sponsored rebuilding in the ruins of Tyre. Around 1500, Druze chronicler Ibn Sibat references an Abd al-Satir bin Bishara who crushed an attempt in the winter of 1504–1505 by the Bedouin Beqaa lord to subject Jabal Amel under his domains.[43][34]

The Bisharas reportedly also served as supervisors of the Mamluk army in Damascus as early as 1383.[34] Twelver Shia also represented much of the rural population in the Beqaa Valley at the time, especially around Karak Nuh, but unlike Jabal Amel, the region was contested by Sunni chiefs.[17][34] The illustrious Murtada family of Sayyid descent served as deputies of Baalbek throughout most of the period, and were named supervisors of the newly endowed Alid shrine of Sayyidah Zaynab near Damascus in 1366.[40] They seem to have been replaced by the Harfush dynasty as deputies of Baalbek by 1498 according to historians Ibn Homsi and Ibn Tulun.[40]

Under Ottoman rule

An 18th century copy of a miniature depicting Sheikh Baha'uddin al-Amili

The Ottoman conquest of the Levant following the Battle of Marj Dabiq in 1516 brought them into contact with the Shiites of Lebanon, the only Shiite community extant in the Levant, and the second in the empire next to the Qizilbash of Eastern Anatolia.[40] After the conquest in 1516, leading Shia families in Jabal Amel, Bekaa valley and Mount Lebanon, which had been ensconced there prior to Ottoman arrival, were co-opted into the Ottoman provincial administration as mukataacıs or even as governors of secondary sanjaks such as Tadmur and Homs, with fiscal and police responsibilities over a vast section of the Syrian coastal highlands.[40][44] Shiites represented much of the rural population in both Jabal Amel and the Bekaa valley at the time, and comprised a majority in Keserwan and the town of Burj near Beirut.[45][40][46][47][5][48]

Issam Khalife, in a study of Ottoman tax registers between 1519–1571, assesses the Shiite population at roughly 98,772 or 38% of the total population.[45][49][34] Shiites represented much of the rural populations in Jabal Amel and Bekaa valley. The largest towns were Bint Jbeil and Karak Nuh with a population of 1,500 and 4,500 respectively.[45] They represented the majority of households in Keserwan and were ubiquitous in the town of Burj near Beirut.[45] Between the 16th and 18th centuries, Shiite population experienced sharp decline due to frequent epidemic outbreaks and warfare; from an estimated population of 98,772 in 1519–1571[45] the Shia population numbered around 40,000 by 1765,[50] only to increase again to 55,120 in 1861.[51]

Relations between Ottoman governors and Shiite multezims proved problematic, as the latter frequently refused to contend the authority of the Ottoman Sultan or remit tax money to them.[40][46][47][48][34] Between 1691 and 1822, the Sublime Porte occasionally chose to invoke Ebussuud Efendi's fatwa and castigate them as Qizilbash heretics, mainly over evasion of tax remittal.[52][40] The Ottoman authorities, however, saw them neither as connected with the Anatolian tribes nor as supporters of Safavid Iran.[52]

Unlike the Druze and Christians, Shiite emirs were regularly denounced for their religious identity and persecuted as Qizilbash heretics per Ebussuud Efendi's definitions, and lacked separate recognition by the Ottoman millet system as a distinct community.[40][53][54] During the Ottoman–Safavid wars, the Ottomans would relay Shiite districts to rival families in Mount Lebanon, Damascus or Safed in an effort to leverage their power base against the Shia.[48][55][56]

During this time period, Shiites built particularly close ties with the Safavids of Iran, contributing significantly to the empire's conversion into Shia Islam.[57] Tahmasp I (1524–1576) appointed Muhaqqiq al-Karaki from Karak Nuh as the deputy of the Hidden Imam, and granted him extensive power over the sadrs (Grand viziers) in a prolix edict in 1533.[58] Tahmasp reportedly told him: "You are the real king and I am just one of your agents".[59][57] This brought new political and court power to the Islamic clerics and their networks, intersecting Tabriz, Qazvin, Isfahan, Rasht, Astarabad, and Amol.[59] Another prominent cleric was Baha'uddin al-Amili, who authored mathematical and astronomical treatises, including the possibility of the Earth's movement prior to the spread of the Copernican theory,[60] and is responsible for many architectural feats in the city of Isfahan.[61][62][34]

Decline

Beaufort castle, where Shia chiefs made a last stand against al-Jazzar in 1781

Shiites in Jabal Amel, the Bekaa valley and Mount Lebanon were communally referred to as Metoualis, a title unique to them.[63] Their peculiarity was noted by the orientalist travelers such as comte de Volney, who described them as a distinct society with their own set of customs and beliefs.[64][47] Nevertheless, their domains of iltizam were independent of each other.[63] The Harfushes of the Bekaa valley ruled a principality stretching from the entire Bekaa valley to Palmyra in the Syrian Desert at their peak in the early 17th century.[40] Jabal Amel was partitioned among the Sa'abs, the Munkars and the Ali al-Saghirs.[40]

Jabal Amel's pinnacle was reached under Nassif al-Nassar (1749–1781), whose alliance with Zahir al-Umar made their name formidable.[40][65][66][67] Jabal Amel also greatly benefited from the foreign demand for dyed cotton, and by the 1750s provided more tax revenues than Mount Lebanon.[68][5] In Mount Lebanon, the Hamadas quickly arose from lieutenants of the Sayfas to independent multezims, and by 1685 had firm control over a territory stretching from Syria (Safita and Krak des Chevaliers) to Keserwan.[40]

In the late 18th century, Shiite influence and prominence much diminished in favor of an increasingly powerful Maronite–Druze alliance which reached heights under the Sunni (and later Maronite) Shihab dynasty, who came to be favored by Ottoman governors.[40] The Hamadas of Mount Lebanon were left physically broken by a 20,000-strong Ottoman military campaign in 1693 and were eventually ousted by the Shihabs in 1771, prompting a Shiite influx into the Bekaa valley.[40][46][34] In Jabal Amel, the newly appointed Jazzar Pasha (1776–1804) killed Shia chief Nassif al-Nassar and 450 of his men in battle at the request of the Shia sheikh of Hunin in 1781,[69] proceeding to eliminate all of the rival Shiite chiefs and destroy their fortress towns and religious libraries in the process.[70] The effort was commended by the Sublime Porte in a letter filled with rhapsodic praise and a promise to al-Jazzar of the empire's unyielding support to "clean the land of the filth of their existence", in reference to the Shia clans.[40] The Harfushes gave refuge to those fleeing Mount Lebanon and Jabal Amel, allotting them land in Hermel and Ras Baalbek respectively.[40]

The consequent decline of chief Shiite families in 1771 and 1781 had tremendous impacts on the Shiites.[40] According to Comte de Volney, not more than 500 Shiite families had survived al-Jazzar's rampage in 1781 in Jabal Amel, who subsequently took refuge in the Beqaa Valley and Mount Lebanon, at the time of his visit in 1783–1785.[64][40] Many Shiite villages were reportedly abanoned and left uninhabited during this period, in both the Bekaa and Jabal Amel.[64][71] Effects of the crises accumulated those of past centuries; Frequent epidemic outbreaks throughout the centuries, warfare and food shortage affected Shiite demographics badly, whose estimated population of just under 100,000 in 1519–1545[45][49][34][47] went down to 55,120 by 1860.[51] According to Comte de Volney, the effects of al-Jazzar's rampage in 1781 were such that:

[...] driven as they now are from their native soil, it is probable they will be totally annihilated, and even their very name become extinct.[64]

Jazzar's harsh policies raised fury among Shiite villagers, who constantly harassed and attacked Jazzar's garrisons.[46] The period witnessed swift uprisings against his rule in Tyre and Chehour, and the insurgents managed to temporarily seize the Tebine citadel in 1783.[46] Insurgency continued until the end of al-Jazzar's rule in 1804.[46][34] The period came to an end when, in 1805, Bashir Shihab II mediated a treaty between the Shiites and Jazzar's successor, Sulayman Pasha al-Adil, in order to end the former's attacks. The agreement restored Shiite autonomy in Jabal Amel and granted a general amnesty for all Shia rebels, as well as a compensation for their losses after the battle of Yaroun, and granted the community the right to solve their internal problems without interference from the Ottoman governor.[46]

Tanzimat era

Following the Egyptian–Ottoman war of 1839–1841, during which Shiites in Jabal Amel and the Beqaa played a leading part in the uprising that would break Ibrahim Pasha's grip on the coastal highlands, the Ottomans bestowed the Pasha title upon the Ali al-Saghirs, restoring considerable autonomy to Jabal Amel as a district under the Ali al-Saghirs until 1865, when it was incorporated into the Syria vilayet under direct Ottoman rule.[52][46] The Harfushes returned to Baalbek in 1841 following the demise of the Shihabis, but were banished in 1865 to Edirne after their leading emir sided with Youssef Bey Karam.[52][40][46]

Great powers' influence became noticeable during this period and further widened the gap, with the French backing the Maronites, the British backing the Druze, the Austrians backing the Catholics, the Russians backing the Greek Orthodox and the Sunnis naturally backed by the Ottomans, all of whom established schools and missionaries across the country.[72][46] Shiites were the only ones without any support from outside powers, and did not benefit from the newly founded institutions.[72] It was during this period that orientalist travelers noted the impoverishment of the Shiites in Jabal Amel, who did not benefit from the subsequent reforms.[47]

In 1860, a civil conflict broke out in Mount Lebanon between the Druze and the Maronites, after which it spread to Damascus, Hauran and to a lesser extent the Galilee. Action among Shiites was sporadic and less intense, with Shiites either allying with the Druze or acting on their own. At one point Shiites also amassed a force of 8,000 to fight the Druze, who attacked and injured a prominent Shiite sheikh who was sheltering Christians in Jbaa, but the Druze ended up negotiating for a truce.[73] Many Christian refugees were reportedly given protection by the Shiites in Chyah and Jabal Amel, where they settled in a plethora of villages.[46] After chaos ended, the Shiites were put in charge of maintaining order in the Beqaa, around Damascus and Hauran, where they helped put down several Druze rebellions, and were incorporated into the military cadres in Damascus.[46]

Ottoman dissolution

During the period of Ottoman dissolution (1908–1922), strong sentiments of Arab nationalism arose among the Arabs in the empire, who established many movements and underground societies. Shiites were susecptible to these sentiments, who also despised the Ottomans for a variety of reasons. Despite previous Ottoman reforms, Shiites were deprived of their civil and religious rights and felt that their religious identity was revoked, so much so that they had to observe some rituals in secret. By 1918, Ottoman soldiers were stationed at the entrance to mosques and hussainiyas to prevent public commemoration of Ashura.[72][47]

Shiites worked keenly through groups such as Young Arab Society (al-Fatat), participating in conventions and conferences including the Arab Congress of 1913.[72][74] Among the prominent ones at the time were Ahmad Rida, Ahmad Aref al-Zein and Abdul Karim al-Khalil, a native of Chyah who founded the Al-Muntada al-Adabi (The Literary Club) in 1905, which effectively acted as an incubator for the growing Arab nationalist movement. The club was an immediate success, swiftly reaching a membership of several thousand, mostly students, with branches in Syria and Iraq.[75] Abdul Karim al-Khalil had planned for an armed revolt against the Ottomans, and set the date of operation after the defeat of Djemal Pasha's first campaign in 1915.[72][76][77] Not long after, Khalil was executed with some of his colleagues in 1916 after his activities were exposed by Shia rival, pro-Ottoman feudalist Kamel Assad, who received the Ottoman sultan in his house as a gesture of loyalty, garnering further criticism.[78][79]

Alongside these movements, there was a substantial rise of local papers and magazines, including al-Irfan and al-Morooj magazines in 1909, and Jabal Amel newspaper in 1911.[72]

French mandate period

With the Ottoman withdrawal in 1918, the French entered Nabatieh and barred the local populace from carrying out political activity. Local chiefs rejected the demand, and instead hoisted the Arab flag in several villages.[46] Shiites participated in the Syrian nationalist movement and Syrian National Congress in 1919, and prominent Shiites such as Ahmad Rida often stated their support for Syrian unity and independence within the Kingdom of Syria, emphasizing their Arab identity, while simultaneously defending Shiite particularism.[74][47]

Adham Khanjar and Sadiq Hamzeh, two prominent anti-French revolutionary figures

Following the official declaration of the Arab Kingdom of Syria in March 1920, anti-French riots and clashed broke out in the predominantly Shia areas of Jabal Amel and the Beqaa Valley. Rebels attacked French military bases and garrisons in their areas, and sectarian clashes also took place, notably in Ain Ebel, due to French arming and their perceived acceptance of French mandatory rule. The French sent an expedition of 4,000–6,000 soldiers lead by Colonel Niger to the south in an effort to pacify the Shiite rebels, devastating their villages and crushing Shiite rebels by June 1920.[46] The defeat dispersed thousands of peasants who feared harsh reprisals, and the high fines imposed on the villagers contributed to financial hardship in the region.[47]

The armed effort was paralleled by the nonviolent resistance movement lead by Abdul Husayn Sharafeddine since 1919, who demanded US support for Syrian unity during the King–Crane Commission visit. This angered the French, who encouraged an unsuccessful assassination attempt against him. Sharafeddine strongly denounced sectarian hostility as it only gave purpose for the French military presence. During the famous the conference of Wadi al-Hujayr on 24 April 1920, he called for the protection of Christians.

The Christians (Nasara) are your brethren in the country and in destiny. Show to them the love you show to yourselves. Protect their lives and possessions as you do to your own. Only by this can you face the conspiracy and put an end to the civil strife.[46]

This period of unrest ended in 1921 with a political amnesty offered by the French mandate authorities for all Shiite rebels who had took part in the fighting, with the intention to bind the Shia community in Lebanon to the new Mandate state.[47][46] When the Great Syrian Revolt broke out in 1925, the calm remained in Jabal Amel. Nevertheless, many Shiites joined the rebels in Syria, and played a central role in the battles of the Qalamoun Mountains and Akroum, where Shiites reportedly took a booty of more than 400 rifles and fifty horses from French forces.[5] Many Christians who fled their villages during the revolt were accommodated by Shia notables from Nabatieh and Bint Jbeil, an act that was appreciated by the local Christian clergy.

What the Shi'ites did for the Christians in the south will be cherished in our hearts for as long as Lebanon and the Christians remain. What happened should be written in gold. Long live Lebanon, Long live Lebanese unity and long live the Shiites.[46]

The region experienced a decade of stability following the revolt. Shiites had become largely accepting of Greater Lebanon for sectarian and non-sectarian reasons, and the establishment of the Ja'fari court further strengthened communal ties and validated a sense of particularism otherwise denied under the Ottomans.[47] Instead of armed rebellion and uprisings, protests and civil strikes in Shia areas became the medium to protest French policies and tobacco prices.[47][46] Shiites were later active in providing ammunition, manpower and assistance to Palestinian rebels during the 1936–1939 revolt in Palestine, which was co-administered from Bint Jbeil.[46]

Education

In the 19th century, Lebanon saw dramatic changes when missionaries started establishing schools throughout the country. While the French and Russians mainly encouraged Maronite and Orthodox active learning respectively, along with American Protestant missions in Beirut, the British established educational institutions in Druze areas, and Sunnis mainly benefitted from Ottoman state institutions. However, Shiites were the only ones who did not benefit from such activities. This neglectance continued into the early days of the French mandate.[46]

During the 1920s and 1930s, educational institutions became places for different religious communities to construct nationalist and sectarian modes of identification.[80] Shia leaders and religious clergy supported educational reforms in order to improve the social and political marginalization of the Shia community and increase their involvement in the newly born nation-state of Lebanon.[81] This led to the establishment of several private Shia schools in Lebanon, among them The Charitable Islamic ʿĀmili Society (al-Jamʿiyya al-Khayriyya al-Islāmiyya al-ʿĀmiliyya) in Beirut and The Charitable Jaʿfari Society (al-Jamʿiyya al-Khayriyya al-Jaʿfariyya) in Tyre.[81] While several Shia educational institutions were established before and at the beginning of the mandate period, they often ran out of support and funding which resulted in their abolishment.[81]

The primary outlet for discussions concerning educational reforms among Shia scholars was the monthly Shiite journal al-'Irfan, founded in 1909. In order to bring their demands (muṭālabiyya) to the attention of the French authorities, petitions were signed and presented to the French High Commissioner and the Service de l'Instruction Publique.[82] This institution – since 1920 headquartered in Beirut- oversaw every educational policy regarding public and private school in the mandate territories.[74] According to historian Elizabeth Thompson, private schools were part of "constant negotiations" between citizen and the French authorities in Lebanon, specifically regarding the hierarchical distribution of social capital along religious communal lines.[83] During these negotiations, petitions were often used by different sects to demand support for reforms. For example, the middle-class of predominantly urban Sunni areas expressed their demands for educational reforms through petitions directed towards the French High Commissioner and the League of Nations.[84]

Sayyid Abdul-Husayn Sharafeddine believed that the only way to ward off foreign political influence was to establish modern schools while maintaining Islamic teachings. In 1938, he built two schools, one for girls and another for boys, at his own expense. However, the girls' school did not last long due to financial difficulties and traditional views, prompting Sayyid Sharafeddine to transfer the girls and teach them in his own home. The boys' school was known as al-Ja'fariyya, and was able to continue despite financial difficulties.[46]

Ja'fari shar'ia courts

In January 1926, the French High Commissioner officially recognized the Shia community as an "independent religious community," which was permitted to judge matters of personal status "according to the principles of the rite known by the name of Ja'fari."[85] This meant that the Shiite Ja'fari jurisprudence or madhhab was legally recognized as an official madhhab, and held judicial and political power on multiple levels.[86] The institutionalization of Shia Islam during this period provoked discussions between Shiite scholars and clergy about how Shiite orthodoxy should be defined. For example, discussions about the mourning of the martyrdom of Imam Husain during Ashura, which was a clandestine affair before the 1920s and 1930s, led to its transformation into a public ceremony.[87]

On the other hand, the official recognition of legal and religious Shiite institutions by the French authorities strengthened a sectarian awareness within the Shia community. Historian Max Weiss underlines how "sectarian claims were increasingly bound up with the institutionalization of Shi'i difference."[88] With the Ja'fari shar'ia courts in practice, the Shia community was deliberately encouraged to "practice sectarianism" on a daily basis.

In modern-day Lebanon

In 1974, the forerunner of the Amal movement was established by Shiite cleric Musa al-Sadr and collaborators, aiming to enhance social and political conditions for Lebanon's underprivileged, predominantly focusing on Shiites.[89]

Sub-groups

Shia Twelvers (Metouali)

Shia Twelver (Metawali) woman in the Bekaa Valley in traditional clothes, 1950s

Shia Twelvers in Lebanon refers to the Shia Muslim Twelver community with a significant presence throughout Lebanon.

The jurisdiction of the Ottoman Empire was merely nominal in the Lebanon. Baalbek in the 18th century was really under the control of the Metawali, which also refers to the Shia Twelvers.[40] Metawali, Metouali, or Mutawili, is an archaic term used to specifically refer to Lebanese Twelver Shias in the past. The term was a way to distinguish the uniqueness and unity of the community. The term 'mutawili' is also the name of a trustee in Islamic waqf-system.

Seven Shia (Mutawili) villages that were reassigned from French Greater Lebanon to the British Mandate of Palestine in a 1924 border-redrawing agreement were forcibly depopulated during the 1948 Arab-Israeli War and repopulated by Jews.[90] The seven villages are Qadas, Nabi Yusha, al-Malikiyya, Hunin, Tarbikha, Abil al-Qamh, and Saliha.[91] The inhabitants in turn fled to Lebanon.[90]

In addition, the Shia Twelvers in Lebanon have close links to the Syrian Shia Twelvers.[92]

Alawites

Large mosque with tall minaret
Alawite El-Zahra Mosque in Jabal Mohsen, Lebanon

There are an estimated 50,000[3][93] Alawites in Lebanon, where they have lived since at least the 16th century.[94] They are recognized as one of the 18 official Lebanese sects, and due to the efforts of an Alawite leader Ali Eid, the Taif Agreement of 1989 gave them two reserved seats in the Parliament. Lebanese Alawites live mostly in the Jabal Mohsen neighbourhood of Tripoli, and in 10 villages in the Akkar region,[95][96][97] and are mainly represented by the Arab Democratic Party. Bab al-Tabbaneh, Jabal Mohsen clashes between pro-Syrian Alawites and anti-Syrian Sunnis have haunted Tripoli for decades.[98]

Isma'ilis

Isma'ilism, or "Sevener Shi'ism", is a branch of Shia Islam which emerged in 765 from a disagreement over the succession to Muhammad. Isma'ilis hold that Isma'il ibn Jafar was the true seventh imam, and not Musa al-Kadhim as the Twelvers believe. Isma'ili Shi'ism also differs doctrinally from Imami Shi'ism, having beliefs and practices that are more esoteric and maintaining seven pillars of faith rather than five pillars and ten ancillary precepts.

Though perhaps somewhat better established in neighbouring Syria, where the faith founded one of its first da'wah outposts in the city of Salamiyah (the supposed resting place of the Imam Isma'il) in the 8th century, it has been present in what is now Lebanon for centuries. Early Lebanese Isma'ilism showed perhaps an unusual propensity to foster radical movements within it, particularly in the areas of Wadi al-Taym, adjoining the Beqaa valley at the foot of Mount Hermon, and Jabal Shuf, in the highlands of Mount Lebanon.[99]

The syncretic beliefs of the Qarmatians, typically classed as an Isma'ili splinter sect with Zoroastrian influences, spread into the area of the Beqaa valley and possibly also Jabal Shuf starting in the 9th century. The group soon became widely vilified in the Islamic world for its armed campaigns across throughout the following decades, which included slaughtering Muslim pilgrims and sacking Mecca and Medina—and Salamiyah. Other Muslim rulers soon acted to crush this powerful heretical movement. In the Levant, the Qarmatians were ordered to be stamped out by the ruling Fatimid, themselves Isma'ilis and from whom the lineage of the modern Nizari Aga Khan is claimed to descend. The Qarmatian movement in the Levant was largely extinguished by the turn of the millennium.[99]

The semi-divine personality of the Fatimid caliph in Isma'ilism was elevated further in the doctrines of a secretive group which began to venerate the caliph Hakim as the embodiment of divine unity. Unsuccessful in the imperial capital of Cairo, they began discreetly proselytising around the year 1017 among certain Arab tribes in the Levant. The Isma'ilis of Wadi al-Taym and Jabal Shuf were among those who converted before the movement was permanently closed off a few decades later to guard against outside prying by mainstream Sunni and Shia Muslims, who often viewed their doctrines as heresy. This deeply esoteric group became known as the Druze, who in belief, practice, and history have long since become distinct from Isma'ilis proper. Druze constitute 5.2% of the modern population of Lebanon and still have a strong demographic presence in their traditional regions within the country to this day.[99]

Due to official persecution by the Sunni Zengid dynasty that stoked escalating sectarian clashes with Sunnis, many Isma'ilis in the regions of Damascus and Aleppo are said to have fled west during the 12th century. Some settled in the mountains of Lebanon, while others settled further north along the coastal ridges in Syria,[100] where the Alawites had earlier taken refuge—and where their brethren in the Assassins were cultivating a fearsome reputation as they staved off armies of Crusaders and Sunnis alike for many years.

Once far more numerous and widespread in many areas now part of Lebanon, the Isma'ili population has largely vanished over time. It has been suggested that Ottoman-era persecution might have spurred them to leave for elsewhere in the region, though there is no record or evidence of any kind of large exodus.[101]

Isma'ilis were originally included as one of five officially-defined Muslim sects in a 1936 edict issued by the French Mandate governing religious affairs in the territory of Greater Lebanon, alongside Sunnis, Twelver Shias, Alawites, and Druzes. However, Muslims collectively rejected being classified as divided, and so were left out of the law in the end. Ignored in a post-independence law passed in 1951 that defined only Judaism and Christian sects as official, Muslims continued under traditional Ottoman law, within the confines of which small communities like Isma'ilis and Alawites found it difficult to establish their own institutions.[102]

The Aga Khan IV made a brief stop in Beirut on 4 August 1957 while on a global tour of Nizari Isma'ili centres, drawing an estimated 600 Syrian and Lebanese followers of the religion to the Beirut Airport in order to welcome him.[103] In the mid-1980s, several hundred Isma'ilis were thought to still live in a few communities scattered across several parts of Lebanon.[104] Though they are nominally counted among the 18 officially-recognised sects under modern Lebanese law,[105] they currently have no representation in state functions[106] and continue to lack personal status laws for their sect, which has led to increased conversions to established sects to avoid the perpetual inconveniences this produces.[107]

War in the region has also caused pressures on Lebanese Isma'ilis. In the 2006 Lebanon War, Israeli warplanes bombed the factory of the Maliban Glass company in the Beqaa valley on 19 July. The factory was bought in the late 1960s by the Madhvani Group under the direction of Isma'ili entrepreneur Abdel-Hamid al-Fil after the Aga Khan personally brought the two into contact. It had expanded over the next few decades from an ailing relic to the largest glass manufacturer in the Levant, with 300 locally hired workers producing around 220,000 tons of glass per day. Al-Fil closed the plant down on 15 July just after the war broke out to safeguard against the deaths of workers in the event of such an attack, but the damage was estimated at a steep 55 million US dollars, with the reconstruction timeframe indefinite due to instability and government hesitation.[108]

Geographic distribution within Lebanon

Lebanese Shia Muslims are concentrated in south Beirut and its southern suburbs, northern and western area of the Beqaa Valley, as well as Southern Lebanon.[109]

Demographics

Lebanese Shia Muslims[110][111][6]
Year Percent
1861
 
 11.3%
1921
 
 17.2%
1932
 
 19.6%
1975
 
 26.2%
1988
 
 32.8%
2022
 
 31.2%

Note that the following percentages are estimates only. However, in a country that had last census in 1932, it is difficult to have correct population estimates.

The distribution of Lebanon's religious groups

A census in 1921 put the numbers of Shiites at 17.2% (104,947 of 609,069). The last official census in Lebanon in 1932 put the numbers of Shias at 19.6% of the population (154,208 of 785,543).[111] A study done by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1985 put the numbers of Shias at 41% of the population (919,000 of 2,228,000).[111][112][110] More recently, the CIA World Factbook estimated that Shia Muslims constitute 31.2% of Lebanon's population in 2022.[6]

Between 1921 and 1988, Shiites maintained the highest fertility rate of all communities, contributing to a rapid increase from 17% to 32%.[113]

Percentage growth of the Lebanese Shia Muslim population (other sources est.)[114][51][110][6][46][115][112][50][34]
Year Shiite Population Total Lebanese Population Percentage
154597,692256,57438%
186155,120487,60011.3%
1921104,947609,06917.2%
1932154,208785,54319.6%
1956250,6051,407,86817.8%
1975668,5002,550,00026.2%
19881,325,4994,044,78432.8%
20221,652,6005,296,81431.2%

Genetics

In a 2020 study published in the American Journal of Human Genetics, authors showed that there is substantial genetic continuity in Lebanon and the Levant since the Bronze Age (3300–1200 BC) interrupted by three significant admixture events during the Iron Age, Hellenistic, and Ottoman period, each contributing 3%–11% of non-local ancestry to the admixed population. The admixtures were tied to the Sea Peoples of the Late Bronze Age collapse, South or Central Asians and Ottoman Turks respectively.[116] Genetic studies have shown that there are no significant genetic differences between Lebanese Muslims and non-Muslims.[117]

Genetic studies on Lebanese people have shown that the most common Y-DNA Haplogroups among Lebanese Shias were J2 (26.5%), J1 (25.5%) and E1b1b (17.3%).[118] Although haplogroup J1 is most frequent in Arabian peninsula, studies have shown that it has been present in the Levant since the Bronze Age[119][120] and only expanded later into Arabia.[121] Other haplogroups present among Lebanese Shia include, G-M201 (10%), R1b, and T-L206 occurring at smaller, but significant rates.[118]

Notable Lebanese Shia Muslims

Religious figures

Political figures

Academics

Artists, singers and journalists

See also

References

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  117. ↑ Zalloua, Pierre A., Y-Chromosomal Diversity in Lebanon Is Structured by Recent Historical Events, The American Journal of Human Genetics 82, 873–882, April 2008
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  122. ↑ Chalabi, Tamara (2006). The Shi'is of Jabal `Amil and the New Lebanon: Community and Nation-State, 1918-1943, p.34
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