Armed conflict for control of the favelas in Greater Rio de Janeiro

BOPE agents during a raid using a "Caveirão" in 2007
Date27 December 2006 – present
Location
Brazil, São Paulo State (small scale) and Rio de Janeiro (large scale): Jacarezinho, Morro dos Macacos, Morro Sao Joao, Vila Cruzeiro and other favelas
Status

Ongoing

  • Militias control 60% of Rio's favelas
Belligerents

Militias

  • Liga da Justiça faction
  • Escritório do Crime faction
Police death squads

Primeiro Comando da Capital[1]

Terceiro Comando Puro

Amigos dos Amigos		 Comando Vermelho

 Brazil

Commanders and leaders
Coronel Jairo
Jerônimo Guimarães Filho †
Carlos Alexandre Silva Cavalcante †
Adriano Magalhães da Nóbrega †
Ricardo Teixeira Cruz
Aldemar Almeida dos Santos
Toni Ângelo de Souza Aguiar
Tandera Danilo Dias Lima
Delson Lima Neto †
Marco Antônio Figueiredo Martins †
Maciel Valente de Souza †		 André Macedo Oliveira
Marcos Roberto de Almeida
Celso Pinheiro Pimenta †
Antônio Francisco Bonfim Lopes
Alexandre Bandeira de Melo
Luciano Oliveira Felipe †
Róbson André da Silva †
Márcio José Sabino Pereira †
Coronel Bruno da Silva Loureiro		 Elias Maluco †
Mineiro da Cidade Alta †
Luiz Fernando da Costa
Casualties and losses
700+ deaths[2][3][4][5]

The armed conflict for control of the favelas in Greater Rio de Janeiro is an ongoing conflict between Brazilian militias, organized criminal groups Comando Vermelho, Amigos dos Amigos, Terceiro Comando Puro and the Brazilian state.

Organized criminal groups and paramilitaries largely control the favelas of Rio de Janeiro, with consistent intervention by Brazilian police and amongst rival organizations creating heightened instances of violence. To maintain dominance of drug markets and territory, criminal organizations have increasingly fostered relationships with political, social, and state actors, contributing to deepened corruption and failed remediation attempts by the Brazilian state to rid the favelas of organized criminal presence.

History of Organized Crime in Rio de Janeiro

Organized crime is intrinsically intertwined with Rio de Janeiro's history, growing with the development of the cities zones and their favelas. Rio de Janeiro is unique in that it has some of its wealthiest, tourist-driven communities located nearby neighborhoods that face high proportions of violence and criminal presence. This dynamic further perpetuates violence, increasing cries for police intervention from the wealthy which repress the poor,[6] and increases the reliance on groups such as miltias or organized crime, which often leverage protection and self-governance over state intervention. It is important to note that in order to accomplish drug market dominance and self-governance, though, organized crime heavily relies upon its relationships with political and state actors and institutions.[6]

Panorama night image of Rocinha, the largest favela in Rio de Janeiro.

Geographically and socially, Rio de Janeiro is split into three zones. The Zona Sul (South Zone) is the smallest region, but contains Rio's tourist destinations and wealthy residents,[7] as well as notable attractions Ipanema and Sugarloaf mountain. Zona Norte (North Zone) contains much of Rio's industrial areas, and is densely populated -- making it a key region for drug trafficking.[7] Zona Oeste (West Zone) is younger than the other two regions, due to its geographic setting. Largely rural, the area lacks the defining characteristics drug organizations look for, such as population or transportation opportunities.[7] Instead, organizations such as militias largely dominate control of the region.

Beginning with rackets such as Jogo do Bicho, Rio de Janeiro has had many incidents of collusion among criminal organizations and social and political institutions. Following the military dictatorship, political tools originally used by the regime, such as the prison complex Cândido Mendes, created the first prison gangs in Rio in the late 1970s.[8] With the subsequent cocaine boom in South America,[9] these gangs would go on to dominate the drug market and capitalize off it within favela communities. Heightened tensions for control of these neighborhoods contributed to turf wars and new factions of organized crime forming.

Criminal Organizations in Rio de Janeiro

CV drug gang

Comando Vermelho (Red Command) or the C.V. is Brazil's oldest criminal organization, which engages in drug trafficking, protection racketeering, and turf wars with rival drug gangs and militias in Rio de Janeiro, among other criminal activities.

The formation of the organization dates back to the late 1970s, when political prisoners and common criminals in the Cândido Mendes prison (located on the island Ilha Grande) formed a self-protective alliance.[10] Through the transfer of gang leaders by the Brazilian government, the gang was able to gain control of other prisons and establish itself on the ground in Rio de Janeiro. With the cocaine boom of the 1980s, the gang's focus shifted from petty crime to that of drug trafficking,[11] which allowed for larger profits and control of city municipalities.

Despite years of violent conflict with Brazilian police and deterrent efforts such as the Police Pacifying Unit (UPP), and among conflicts with other criminal organizations, the CV maintains significant power and governance in Rio de Janeiro's favelas. Current issues for the CV reside in outbreaks of violence with criminal organizations for control of drug routes and turf wars with militias[10] over territories such as their headquarters, Complexo do Alemão.

ADA drug gang

Amigos dos Amigos (Friends of Friends) or ADA is another of Rio de Janeiro's most prominent drug gangs, historically having strongholds in Rocinha -- the largest of the favelas in greater Rio de Janeiro. The criminal organization formed in the late 1990s by ex-members of Comando Vermelho -- who were expelled due to the killing of another member -- in order to compete for territorial dominance.[12] CV is still ADA's biggest rival, along with the Terceiro Comando Puro (Pure Capital Command, TCP).

in 2004, after the death of the previous boss of Rochinha, Luciano Barbosa da Silva, or Lulu, a leader of CV, Antônio Bonfim Lopes, better known as "Nem" or "Nem da Rocinha" gained control of Rocinha and became one of the major leaders of ADA. Under his control of Rocinha, corruption, rather than violence increased, leading to an era of relative calm in the favela[13] while continuously strengthening ADA's drug trafficking schemes and the consolidation of power over political networks and social projects.[14] This included the financial and social support of political candidates,[14] provision of services and regularly held parties and celebrations.[12] Nem's eventual arrest in 2011 led to years of incessant turf wars for control of Rocinha among ADA and CV, which are still ongoing. Although unconfirmed, it is thought that Nem still leads ADA operations from within prison.[15]

TCP drug gang

Terceiro Comando Puro (Pure Third Command) or TCP is yet another of Rio de Janeiro's most powerful organized crime groups, participating in the drug market and extortion. Originating in 2002, the group began as an off-shoot of the Terceiro Comando (Third Command),[16] which no longer operates and was originally a faction formed off of Comando Vermelho.

Although enemies now, Terceiro Comando and Amigos dos Amigos formed an alliance in the late 1990s to overtake territory held by their mutual enemy, CV.[16] Several years later, this alliance crumbled and led to the degradation of the Terceiro Comando, until former leader Nei da Conceição Cruz, alias “Facão, reformed the group in 2002 under the new name Terceiro Comando Puro.

Since then, TCP has maintained territorial control of the northern and western zones of Rio de Janeiro, although they may be attempting to expand their territory through the help of an alleged alliance with Primeiro Comando da Capital (First Capital Command) or PCC, Brazil's largest criminal organization, headquartered in São Paulo.[16] It is important to note the breakdown of the alliance between CV and the PCC in 2016, which has allowed this possible new alliance to form. TCP also engages in continual turf wars with ADA and CV, but have recently gained allies in the form of militias.

Jogo do Bicho illegal gambling groups

Jogo do Bicho (Animal game) is an illegal gambling game in Brazil, which is still incredibly popular and sought out despite its federal prohibition in 1946. The game is played all around the country, with lottery-style drawings in every state occurring daily in its headquarters in Rio de Janeiro.[17] The game is controlled by bosses, called bicheiros or banqueiros ("bankers").

Jogo do Bicho is a longstanding staple in Brazilian culture, with thousands participating in the game daily. Because of its potential to circulate and raise large sums of money, control of Jogo do Bicho is lucrative and largely contributes to corruption, with politicians, judicial personnel, and members of the police force all monetarily and politically benefitting from it.[17] Bicheiros also contribute funding to social programs, such as samba schools, which play a critical role in cultural festivities such as Brazilian Carnival.[17] Because of this, Jogo do Bicho, and in turn its bicheiros, are deeply ingrained in Brazilian culture, especially in Rio de Janeiro, and contribute to the landscape of organized crime and corruption.

Militia organizations

Brazilian milicias (militias), or paramilitary groups, consisting of current and retired police officers, prison guards, and military members, control much of the western territory of Rio de Janeiro[18] and continue to expand their territory through turf wars with ADA and CV. Militia groups have grown in size and power rapidly, originating in the early 2000s and growing to control highly populated areas since. Founded as vigilante groups, they've amassed enough power as to dominate and extort entire territories of Rio de Janeiro. Along with extortion methods, the groups have gained political influence and have even been previously supported by high-profile politicians, such as former president Jair Bolsonaro.[19]

Unlike the other criminal organizations such as CV and ADA, who have always invested in the drug market, militias positioned themselves against drug trafficking in order to gain community approval and trust, with some favela residents seeing them as the "lesser evil" of crime as compared to drug gangs.[18] Instead of drug trafficking, the groups participate in extortion, controlling civilian access to gas, land, and cable television.[20] Recently, some groups have decided to expand to allowing drug dealing within their territories or are doing so themselves, leveraging profit and control of important territories from drug gangs.[21]

Formation of the UPP

The Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora (Pacifying Police Units) or UPP was a security program in Rio de Janeiro that aimed to reclaim favelas from criminal organizations, most of which are drug gangs such as CV, ADA, and TCP, through community policing. The strategy worked in two parts: deployment of the Military Police of Rio (PMERJ) into the favelas, and then increasing the amount of police officers who were meant to interact with the community through units,[22] in hopes of creating a healthier relationship between favela residents and law enforcement than what existed in years prior. For decades, interactions with police in Rio de Janeiro were abrasive; violent interactions between drug gangs and the police led to civilian casualties, and numerous instances of abuses of power by the police led to a general distrust by favela residents.[23] The creation of the UPP aimed to both restructure the police force and its interactions with civilians, while also deterring criminal activity leading up to the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Summer Olympics, an increased period of tourism.

A secondary component of the UPP plan was the creation of UPP Social, which aimed to address the social welfare needs of the favelas by UPP units. This included improvements to sanitation, education, and healthcare, among other social issues.

Early Success

in 2009, the first UPP was set up in the Santa Marta favela, with more quickly following -- coalescing in 32 units overall, spanning all of Rio de Janeiro's zones (though most were located in Zona Norte). Despite urges for increased financial support, the UPP units amassed praise in their early years for evident decreases in both visible crime and violence within the favelas they were operating in.[24]

Because military presence was a precursor to actual UPP units, many drug traffickers fled occupied favelas to avoid persecution or capture by the Military Police of Rio's tactical unit, BOPE. Because of this, crime rates significantly dropped for a couple years. In interviews with residents, details of the freedoms they were allowed once UPP units were installed continued to highlight the successes of the project. [24]

Amarildo Souza, UPP abuses, and backsliding

Despite early success, some of the main hinderances of the UPP project were police abuses and disappearances that occurred. One of the most prominent cases of this was the disappearance of Amarildo Souza, a bricklayer from the Rocinha favela.[25] Souza, 42, had been fishing the morning of his disappearance and decided to go into the favela to get produce when he was confronted by UPP officers.[26] Souza was taken for questioning and subsequently never returned home.[26]

Souza was well known throughout Rocinha, leading to public outcry at his disappearance and a lack of response by the UPP unit. After more than two months of public outcry, an investigation was opened into his disappearance, where twenty-four UPP officers and the UPP commander were found accused of torture, concealing a body, procedural fraud, and conspiracy.[27] In the subsequent trial, twelve officers would be found guilty of torture, procedural fraud, and concealing a body.[28]

Despite the investigation and criminal case, the UPP suffered weakened support from favela residents, who felt both anger and fear at the actions of the local UPP unit. Coupled with insufficient training [29] and poorly strategized growth of the units, the UPP continued to fail as insignificant funding heavily derailed the project, which could not perform what it was intended to. [30] With the weakening of the UPP, criminal organizations could again attempt to reclaim their territories through shootouts and confrontations, but were this time more successful.[23]

The conflict

Militias and Criminal groups controlled areas.

The Brazilian pseudo-police militias emerged in the late 2000s, being composed mainly of off-duty police officers receiving assistance from local businessmen who needed protection from armed gangs.[31] The Comando Vermelho, as a response, began carrying out terrorist attacks against civilian targets between 27 and 31 December 2006, during these attacks, 19 people died, being 10 civilians, 2 policemen and 7 gang members. As retaliation, the pseudo-police conducted several raids against the Comando Vermelho, killing more than 100 gang members.[2][4] The militias launched several attacks between January 2007 and March 2008 against the Comando Vermelho, conquering the Cidade Alta favela on 4 February, three days later it was recaptured by the Comando Vermelho commanded by Gilberto Martins da Silva, alias "Mineiro da Cidade Alta". In the subsequent clashes 20 gang members were killed, and during the same period, several families were expelled by militias from their homes and assaulted in the Palmeirinha favela, in Guadalupe, Piauí.[32] The militias obtained a "Caveirão" (an armored vehicle used by the BOPE, Batalhão de Operações Policiais Especiais, and the Military Police of the State of Rio de Janeiro for high-risk operations) in January of the same year.[32] According to some investigations, the militias finance their armed struggle with illegal activities, such as extortion, kidnapping, usury, racketeering, robbery, human trafficking, pimping and arms trafficking[33][34][35] In May 2008, the militias, commanded by Coronel Jairo, kidnapped and tortured a group of journalists from the Brazilian newspaper O Dia who were reporting the criminal activities perpetrated by the militiamen. After 7 hours of torture, they were released.[36] In that same month, in clashes between the Comando Vermelho and the militias 10 people were killed. Residents were threatened by the fighting groups and the president of an association for local residents was kidnapped and subsequently disappeared.[37] On 5 August, Carlos Alexandre Silva Cavalcante, alias "Gaguinho", leader of a faction of the militias, was killed.[38] On 20 August 2008, the militias carried out a massacre, which resulted in the death of 7 people in the Carobinha favela in a false flag operation aiming to frame the Comando Vermelho for the massacre, and to shift public opinion against the gang, there was also an attempt to enforce the political candidacy of Carminha Jerominho, daughter of Jerônimo Guimarães Filho, alias "Jerominho", the leader of a militia faction.[39] On 5 October, "Mineiro da Cidade Alta" was killed by the militias for the murder of several paramilitary soldiers. From 2007 to 2008, three politicians were arrested for providing support to the militias: Josinaldo Francisco da Cruz, Natalino José Guimarães and the brother.[40][41] On 9 June 2009, Josinaldo Francisco da Cruz was killed.[42] Despite claims from the militias, such as the "Escritório do Crime" militia faction, militias have allied themselves with criminal drug trafficking cartels like the TCP.[43]

Police helicopter downed on Morro dos Macacos

The Morro dos Macacos is one of the most violent favelas in Rio de Janeiro, the community was invaded by CV on 17 October 2009, while it was also under the control of the ADA, who clashed with the Comando Vermelho to contend for territory, 5 gang members were killed in the clashes from 11 to 17 October.

In order to stop the clashes between the two groups, about 150 assault troops of the Special Operations Department of the Polícia Militar were dispatched for security purposes. In an attempt to prevent the intervention of the police in the ongoing feud, the criminals built makeshift barricades at several key points and subsequently set them on fire.[44]

On 17 October, in the morning, the rear propeller of a Fenix helicopter patrolling above the community was shot and severely damaged by drug traffickers of Amigos dos Amigos:[45] according to some sources the weapons used in the attack were a bazooka and machine guns. The helicopter crashed, killing 2 soldiers on impact, with another soldier dying later.[46] The attack sparked a massacre between police, militias and the drug cartels. The massacre went on from 17 to 25 October 2009 and ended with a government victory, there were 45 deaths as a consequence.

During the massacre, Brazilian authorities have admitted to corruption and brutality among the police force and the release of two narcos perpetrated by some policemen; confirming also the existence of the armed militias made up of off-duty police and firefighters who compete against drug traffickers for control of the drug market and government support for them.[47]

2010–present

After the battle, there were other several clashes between militiamen and gang members. Throughout the 2010s there were several arrests and convictions against militiamen and drug traffickers involved in the massacres. The militias managed to conquer several territories under the control of the Comando Vermelho, although some of them later returned to the gang's control after being reconquered during clashes. In November 2010, another massacre occurred between the military police and the CV, resulting in the deaths of 41 people.[48] On 1 February 2012, during a raid conducted by the Polícia Militar (PM), a "Caveirão" was destroyed by the Comando Vermelho in the favela of Jacarezinho, no injuries were reported.[49] During the course of the massacre, the CV and the militias began recruiting child soldiers.[50][51] On 19 November 2016, during an operation of the PM, a militar police helicopter was shot down by Comando Vermelho in the favela of Cidade de Deus, in the crash four policemen died.[52][53] On 9 February 2020, a prominent militia faction leader, Adriano Magalhães da Nóbrega, also known as "Capitão Adriano" or "Gordinho", was seriously injured in a police operation and later died in a hospital.[54] On 15 October, in one of the deadliest operations against militias, the PM clash with a convoy of the militias killing 12 paramilitaries on Itaguaí, also a policeman was injured.[55] In the Morro do Fubá favela, the residents were forced to pay a monthly fee of 50 brazilian reals as part of a protection racket. On 17 May 2022, militias attacked a civilian helicopter that was flying over the Rio area with rifles. No injuries were recorded but the helicopter suffered slight damage.[56] On 20 August of the same year, Delson Lima Neto, brother of one of the leader of the militias, Tandera Danilo Dias Lima, was killed alongside 3 paramilitaries soldiers by the Polícia Militar on Nova Iguaçu, in Baixada Fluminense, after his death the Comando Vermelho conquered the favela of Grão-Pará, in Nova Iguaçu.[57] After the raid, on 23 August, the police found and seized an improvised fighting vehicle (similar to a Caveirão) used by the militias to fight against Comando Vermelho in Nova Iguaçu.[58]

Timeline of massacres in the Greater Rio de Janeiro since the start of the conflict

Number Name date
1 Massacre in Complexo do Alemão 13 February 2007
2 Massacre in Favela do Rebu 16 April 2007
3 Massacre of Mineira 17 April 2007
4 Massacre of Jacarezinho 6 June 2007
5 Pan American Massacre 27 June 2007
6 Slaughter in the Muquiço Favela 23 August 2007
7 Massacre of Realengo 3 September 2007
8 Slaughter of Lagartixa and Pedreira 11 October 2007
9 Jardim América Massacre 25 November 2007
10 Massacre of Jacarezinho 10 January 2008
11 Massacre of Jacarezinho 30 January 2008
12 Massacre of Senador Camará 3 April 2008
13 Massacre of Vila Cruzeiro 15 April 2008
14 Massacre of Campo Grande 19 August 2008
15 Massacre of Lagoinha 4 August 2008
16 Chacina da Maré 11 June 2009
17 Slaughter of Morro dos Macacos 17 October 2009
18 Massacre of Jacarezinho 11 February 2010
19 Massacre of Rocinha 11 March 2010
20 Slaughter at Parque Floresta 24 November 2010
21 Slaughter at Morro do Engenho 23 June 2011
22 Massacre of Nova Holanda 24 June 2013
23 Massacre of Costa Barros 28 November 2015
24 Massacre of City of God 19 November 2016
25 Massacre of Morro do Juramento 15 September 2017
26 Slaughter of Salgueiro 11 November 2017
27 Caju Massacre 25 November 2017
28 Massacre of Rocinha 24 March 2018
29 Massacre of Praça Seca 19 May 2018
30 Chacina da Maré 20 June 2018
31 Slaughter of Penha 20 August 2018
32 Chacina do Fallet-Fogueteiro 8 February 2019
33 Chacina da Maré 6 May 2019
34 Massacre at Complexo do Alemão 15 May 2020
35 Massacre of Itaguaí 15 October 2020
36 Slaughter at Parque Roseiral 12 January 2021
37 Massacre of Jacarezinho 6 May 2021
38 Slaughter of Salgueiro 21 November 2021
39 Slaughter at Parque Floresta 3 February 2022
40 Massacre of Vila Cruzeiro 11 February 2022
41 Slaughter of Vila Cruzeiro 24 May 2022

See also

References

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  14. 1 2 Arias, Enrique Desmond (2013-09-01). "The Impacts of Differential Armed Dominance of Politics in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil". Studies in Comparative International Development. 48 (3): 263–284. doi:10.1007/s12116-013-9137-8. ISSN 0039-3606. S2CID 255513185.
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  18. 1 2 Phillips, Dom (2018-07-12). "'Lesser evil': how Brazil's militias wield terror to seize power from gangs". The Guardian. ISSN 0261-3077. Retrieved 2023-12-19.
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  23. 1 2 "The Dilemmas of Pacification: News of War and Peace in the 'Marvelous City'". Stability: International Journal of Security & Development. 3 (1): 22. 2014-05-22. doi:10.5334/sta.dt. ISSN 2165-2627.
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  26. 1 2 "Amarildo: The disappearance that has rocked Rio". BBC News. 2013-09-18. Retrieved 2023-12-19.
  27. ↑ Reporter, Contributing (2014-02-22). "Rio Court Hears from Police Accused in Amarildo Case: Daily". The Rio Times. Retrieved 2023-12-19.
  28. ↑ "Good News! - Brazil: 12 Military Police Officers Held Accountable in the Enforced Disappearance of Amarildo de Souza (UA: 202/13)". Amnesty International USA. Retrieved 2023-12-19.
  29. ↑ Clavel, Tristan (2017-08-01). "What LatAm Cities Can Learn From the Failures of Brazil's UPP Policing Model". InSight Crime. Retrieved 2023-12-19.
  30. ↑ Froio, Nicole (2015-03-30). "The Death of UPP Social: Failing to Make Participation Work". RioOnWatch. Retrieved 2023-12-19.
  31. ↑ "In Brazil's Belem, rogue cop-run militias 'make their own laws'".
  32. 1 2 "Milícias - Política do Terror: Elas já comandam 78 comunidades no Rio". odia.terra.com.br. Archived from the original on 3 June 2008. Retrieved 2022-06-01.
  33. ↑ Polícia Civil do Rio investiga atuação de milícias em comunidades do município Archived 2007-05-03 at the Wayback Machine - Agência Brasil, 5 febbraio 2007
  34. ↑ "Secretário vai golpear milícias". O Globo. 11 February 2007.
  35. ↑ "Beltrame diz saber nomes de policiais envolvidos com milícias". O Globo. 13 February 2007. Archived from the original on 28 June 2009. Retrieved 16 July 2022.
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  43. ↑ "Milícia do Rio se une ao tráfico em guerra contra o Comando Vermelho". noticias.uol.com.br. 22 January 2019. Retrieved 2022-09-19.
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  45. ↑ "Amigos dos Amigos". InSight Crime. 30 March 2018. Retrieved 5 November 2018.
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  52. ↑ "Brazil: Four dead after police helicopter 'shot down by gang'". www.bbc.com. 20 November 2016. Retrieved 2022-06-29.
  53. ↑ "Brazilian police probe military chopper crash" on YouTube
  54. ↑ "Miliciano Adriano Nóbrega morre em confronto com policiais na Bahia". g1.globo.com. 9 February 2020. Retrieved 2022-06-01.
  55. ↑ "Polícia mata 12 suspeitos em operação contra a milícia em Itaguaí". g1.globo.com. 15 October 2020.
  56. ↑ "Traficantes atiram de fuzil e atingem helicóptero civil no Rio de Janeiro". aeroin.net. 18 May 2022. Retrieved 2022-07-11.
  57. ↑ "Irmão de Tandera tinha prazer em torturar, apontam vídeos". odia.ig.com.br. 29 August 2022. Retrieved 2022-08-31.
  58. ↑ "Polícia apreende 'Caveirão da milícia' em Nova Iguaçu". g1.globo.com. 29 August 2022.
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