Siege of Boston

As head of the Continental Army, George Washington successfully used deception to equalize the odds in the fight against the larger, better-equipped, and better-trained British army and its mercenary allies. During the Siege of Boston from April 1775 to March 1776, the newly organized Continental Army suffered from numerous equipment and supply shortages. Among the most critical was a lack of gunpowder, which was so acute that in a battle, Washington's troops would be able to fire no more than nine bullets per man. To conceal the lack of gunpowder from the British, Washington's quartermaster soldiers filled gunpowder casks with sand and shipped them from Providence, Rhode Island to the Continental Army's depots.^[58][59] The deception fooled British spies, and British commanders decided not to risk an attack during the siege.^[58]

Battle of Long Island

After the Patriot defeat at the Battle of Long Island in late August 1776, Washington's forces retreated to Brooklyn Heights, with a superior British force surrounding them on three sides and their backs to the East River. The British expected Washington would find his position untenable and surrender. Washington instead arranged for a flotilla of small boats to ferry his 9,000 troops across the river to the relative safety of Manhattan Island. Moving under cover of darkness, Washington's troops withdrew unit by unit to avoid the appearance that a general retreat was taking place. The wheels of supply wagons and gun carriages were wrapped in rags to muffle their noise, and troops ordered to remain silent to avoid alerting the nearby British. Rear guard units kept campfires blazing through the night. These measures fooled British scouts into thinking the Patriot army was still on Brooklyn Heights. A morning fog obscured visibility, which helped the Continentals complete their retreat, and all 9,000 were safely ferried across the river. When the British advanced, they were surprised to find the American positions completely empty.^[60]

Battle of Trenton

Deception played a key role in Washington's success at the Battle of Trenton in 1776

Prior to the Battle of Trenton on Christmas Day 1776, Washington used a spy, John Honeyman to gain information about the positions of Britain's Hessian mercenaries.^[61] Posing as a Loyalist butcher and weaver, Honeyman traded with British and Hessian troops and acquired useful intelligence.^[61] At the same time, he aided Washington's plan by spreading disinformation that convinced the British and Hessians that Continental Army morale was low and an end-of-year attack against British positions unlikely.^[61][62] Honeyman's deceptive information enabled Washington to gain the element of surprise, and his troops routed the stunned Hessians.^[61]

Battle of Princeton

After the Battle of Trenton, the British dispatched a large army under General Charles Cornwallis to chase down Washington's smaller force.^[63] At the 2 January 1777 Battle of the Assunpink Creek, the Continental troops under Washington successfully repulsed three British attacks on their positions.^[63] Darkness ended the British attacks and they planned to resume the following morning.^[63] That night, Washington again resorted to the same deceptive tactics he had used in Brooklyn, including muffling the wheels of wagons and gun carriages to reduce noise, and leaving a rear guard to keep campfires burning.^[63] The British were again fooled, and Washington was able to move his army into a position from which he defeated the British at the Battle of Princeton on 3 January.^[64]

Siege of Fort Stanwix

In August 1777, the first Patriot attempt to relieve the Siege of Fort Stanwix, New York was blocked by the British as the result of the Battle of Oriskany.^[65] A second attempt, led by Benedict Arnold succeeded in part because of a successful effort to deceive the British besiegers.^[65] Arnold dispatched a messenger, Hon Yost Schuyler to the British lines.^[65] Schuyler was a Loyalist and regarded by the British army's Mohawk allies as a prophet because of his strange dress and conduct.^[65] To ensure his good conduct, Arnold held Schuyler's brother as a hostage.^[65] Upon reaching the British positions outside Fort Stanwix, Schuyler informed the Mohawk that Arnold's relief column was nearer than it was, and that it was much larger than it actually was.^[65] The Mohawk initially disbelieved Schuyler, but assumed he was telling the truth after other American Indian messengers sent by Arnold began to arrive with the same information.^[65] The Mohawk decided to leave, forcing British commander Barry St. Leger to order a retreat.^[65] The end of the siege also ended British attempts to control the Mohawk Valley.^[65]

Battle of Cowpens

Schematic of the Battle of Cowpens, which shows Daniel Morgan's deceptive employment of the Patriot militia under his command

In the fall of 1780, Continental Army general Nathanael Greene, commander of the Southern Department, carried out a harassment campaign against the British in North and South Carolina.^[66] One of Greene's subordinates, Daniel Morgan, commanded a force of approximately 600, and was tasked with harassing the enemy in the backcountry of South Carolina.^[66] In January 1781, as a British force commanded by Banastre Tarleton closed in on Morgan near Cowpens, South Carolina on the Broad River, he opted to fight rather than risk being attacked while attempting to cross the water.^[66]

Knowing the British regarded Patriot militia as inferior, Morgan used this perception to his advantage by arranging his troops in three lines.^[66] The first was sharpshooters, who provided harassing fire and attempted to pick off British officers.^[66] The sharpshooters would then fall back to the second line, which would consist of militiamen.^[66] The militia would fire two volleys, then feign a rout and pretend to flee.^[66] If the British believed they had caused a panic in the militiamen, they would charge forward.^[66] But instead of catching up to the fleeing militia, they would run into the third line—Continental Army soldiers commanded by John Eager Howard.^[66] As a reserve, Morgan had a small Continental cavalry force commanded by William Washington.^[66]

Morgan's deception proved decisive.^[66] At the Battle of Cowpens on 17 January 1781, the British under Tarleton launched a frontal assault.^[66] The militia feigned retreat, and Tarleton's troops charged forward.^[66] As planned, they were met by Howard's troops, then surprised by Washington's cavalry charging into their flanks.^[66] The British lost over 100 killed, over 200 wounded, and over 500 captured.^[66] Morgan's command sustained only 12 killed and 60 wounded.^[66]

First American Invasion of Canada

In July 1812, General William Hull was at Fort Detroit as the British fortified a defensive position across the Detroit River in Windsor, Ontario.^[70] Hull decided to move the British to Fort Malden, further away from Detroit, so that he could seize the defenses in Windsor.^[71] To implement his plan, Hull resorted to deception, which began when his troops collected all the boats and canoes they could find.^[71] On 11 July 1812, Hull sent some boats down the river to Springwells, south of Detroit, in full view of the British.^[71] At the same time, the American regiment commanded by Duncan McArthur marched from Detroit to Springwells, also observed by the British.^[71]

With the British now anticipating an American crossing south of Detroit, a second American force moved north in the dark until they reached Bloody Run, a crossing point a mile and a half north of Fort Detroit and opposite the Ontario town of Sandwich.^[71] Finding no activity at Springwells, the British believed the Americans had already crossed the river and marched on Fort Malden.^[71] Assuming Fort Malden was vulnerable, the British troops in Sandwich marched south, and in the morning the Americans at Bloody Run crossed to Sandwich unopposed.^[71] After landing in Sandwich, the Americans then marched from Sandwich to Windsor and seized the British defensive works.^[71]

Retaking the brig Nerina

In July 1812, the British warship HMS Belvidera captured the American brig Nerina, which had sailed for New York City from Newry, Ireland without knowing that war had been declared in June.^[72][73] Nerina's crew was transferred to a British ship, except for the captain, James Stewart,^[74] who remained on board with a British prize crew which intended to sail Nerina to Halifax, Nova Scotia so a prize court could adjudicate the British claim.^[73] When the British ship was out of sight, Stewart suggested to the prize master the propriety of opening the hatches to air out Nerina's hold.^[73] The master gave the order, and the fifty American passengers Stewart had hidden belowdecks before Nerina was boarded rushed out and retook the ship.^[73] Stewart's successful deception enabled him to resume command and sail Nerina to New London, Connecticut, which he reached on 4 August.^[73]

Siege of Detroit

William Hull, the target of successful British deception during the War of 1812

In a notable deception that occurred during the War of 1812's Siege of Detroit, British Major General Isaac Brock and Native American chief Tecumseh used a variety of tricks, including letters they allowed to be intercepted which exaggerated the size of their forces, disguising Brock's militia contingent as more fearsome regular army soldiers, and repeatedly marching the same body of Native Americans past U.S. observers to make it appear they were more numerous than they were.^[75] Though he had superior troop strength, the U.S. commander, Brigadier General William Hull, believed he faced overwhelming numbers of British regular troops and hordes of uncontrollable Indians.^[75] Fearing a massacre, in August 1812 Hull surrendered the town and the attached fort.^[75] Most of his militia were allowed to return home, while his regular army soldiers were held as prisoners of war.^[75]

Capture of brigs Catharine and Rose

American Lieutenant John Downes was in command of Georgiana as part of Captain David Porter's naval force, which raided British shipping in the Galapagos chain.^[76] On 28 May 1813, lookouts on Georgiana spotted two British ships, Catharine and Rose, off James Island.^[76] Resorting to deception, Downes raised the British flag, which tricked the British whalers into thinking they were not under threat.^[76] When the Americans were within range they lowered a few boats filled with men, which rowed to Catharine and Rose and captured them without resistance.^[76] The British captains revealed to Downes that they had no idea of the attack until the Americans were already on deck.^[76]

Capture of HMS Eagle

In 1813, the British Royal Navy continued to blockade America's major ports.^[77][78][79] The British flagship HMS Poictiers, commanded by Commodore J.B. Beresford maintained station just outside Sandy Hook on Lower New York Bay, supported by the schooner HMS Eagle.^[77][78][79] Eagle had a notorious reputation among local fishermen for seizing both fishing boat crews and the boats' valuable cargoes.^[77][78][79] John Percival of the United States Navy volunteered to end the threat, and acquired a fishing boat named Yankee.^[77][78][79] On the morning of 4 July 1813, he concealed 34 armed volunteers in the hold, while he and two volunteers stayed on deck dressed as fishermen.^[77][78][79] Percival then sailed Yankee as though it was departing on a fishing voyage.^[77][78][79] Eagle's commander spotted Yankee and sailed in close so he could order it to transfer the livestock it carried on deck to the nearby Poictiers.^[77][78][79] Percival pretended to comply, and when Eagle was less than ten feet away, he signaled his volunteers to launch a surprise attack by shouting "Lawrence!" in honor of slain U.S. Navy Captain James Lawrence.^[77][78][79] Percival's volunteers poured out on deck and began firing.^[77][78][79] Eagle's crew were taken by surprise and fled below deck.^[77][78][79] One of Eagle's crew struck her colors, thus surrendering to Yankee.^[77][78][79] Two British sailors were killed and another received mortal wounds, but there were no American casualties.^[77][78][79] Percival brought the captured Eagle into port and delivered his prisoners to New York City's Whitehall Street docks as thousands of Americans were celebrating Independence Day.^[77][78][79]

Ambush at Black Swamp Road

In July 1813, Benjamin Forsyth, one of the company commanders in the American Regiment of Riflemen wanted to enlist the aid of Seneca warriors during planned military operations against the British near Newark, Ontario (now Niagara-on-the-Lake).^[80] Forsyth and the Seneca leaders agreed to work together to ambush the Mohawks who were allied with the British.^[80] American riflemen and Seneca warriors hid on both sides of the Black Swamp Road.^[80] A few Seneca horse riders rode out to gain the Mohawks' attention, then conducted a feigned retreat.^[80] After the Seneca horsemen passed the hidden American riflemen and Senecas, Forsyth blew his bugle as a signal.^[80] The concealed Americans and Senecas rose from their hiding places and fired into the pursuing Mohawks.^[80] Fifteen Mohawks were killed and thirteen surrendered, including a British interpreter.^[80] A few Mohawks escaped, while the Americans and their Seneca allies marched their prisoners back to American lines.^[80]

Battle of Fort Stephenson

Schematic of the Battle of Fort Stephenson. Position B on the north side of the fort shows the position of the cannon George Croghan concealed to catch the British attackers by surprise

In August 1813, American Major George Croghan was in charge of 160 soldiers at Fort Stephenson, a base on the Sandusky River in what is now Sandusky County, Ohio which guarded a nearby supply depot.^[81] British commander Henry Procter arrived with a superior force that included at least 500 British regulars, 800 American Indians under Major Robert Dickson, and at least 2,000 more under Tecumseh.^[82] Procter met Croghan under a flag of truce and urged him to surrender, but Croghan refused.^[83][84] The British then bombarded the fort by artillery and gunboat, to little effect.^[85] Croghan returned fire with his single cannon, "Old Betsy" while frequently changing its position in the hopes that the British would believe he had more than one artillery piece.^[85] When Croghan's supply of ammunition ran low, he ordered his men to cease fire.^[85][86][87]

Croghan deduced that the British were going to strike in full force at the northwestern angle of the fort, so he ordered his men to conceal "Old Betsy" in a blockhouse at that location.^[87][88][89] The next morning, the British feinted twice at the southern angle, then approached the northwest one.^[83][90] American gunners surprised them by uncovering "Old Betsy" and firing at point blank range, which destroyed the British column.^[90][91][92] Procter withdrew and sailed away.^[89][93] Procter reported British casualties as 23 killed, 35 wounded, and 28 missing.^[85] American casualties were only one killed and seven wounded.^[94] Croghan was celebrated as a national hero and promoted to lieutenant colonel.^[85]

Ambush at Odelltown

On 28 June 1814, Benjamin Forsyth, commander of the American Regiment of Riflemen, advanced from Chazy, New York to Odelltown, Lower Canada intending to draw a British force of Canadians and American Indian allies into an ambush.^[95][96] Upon arriving at the British positions, Forsyth sent a few men forward as decoys to make contact.^[95][96] When the British responded, the American decoys conducted a feigned retreat, which successfully lured 150 Canadians and American Indian allies into the ambush site.^[95][96]

During the ensuing fight, Forsyth needlessly exposed himself by stepping on a log to watch the attack and was shot and killed.^[95][96] Forsyth's riflemen, still hidden and now enraged over the death of their commander, rose from their covered positions and fired a devastating volley.^[95][96] The British were surprised by the ambush and retreated in confusion, leaving seventeen dead on the field.^[95][96] Forsyth was the only American casualty.^[95][96] Even though Forsyth was killed, his feigned retreat and ambush succeeded at inflicting heavy casualties on the British force.^[95][96]

Battle of Lundy's Lane

In the July 1814 Battle of Lundy's Lane, American forces used deception at several critical points.^[97] When troops under Winfield Scott returned from attacks on British formations they were twice mistaken in the dark for a British unit and allowed to pass.^[97] In one incident, a British leader asked who was approaching by shouting "The 89th?" The Americans recognized the opportunity to pass unmolested and called back "The 89th!"^[97]

In another event, American Captain Ambrose Spencer saw a unit approaching in the dark.^[97] He rode up and called out "What regiment is that?"^[97] "The Royal Scots, Sir!" a Scottish officer replied.^[97] Spencer called out "Halt, Royal Scots!" and then rode off.^[97] Believing a superior officer had given them a command, the regiment stopped, then remained in place until a real British officer found them and gave them new orders.^[97]

In a third incident, British soldier Shadrach Byfield reported that an individual in a company of hidden Americans impersonated a British officer and told the British troops opposing them to form up and stand tall in preparation for inspection.^[97] The British troops believed a superior officer was addressing them and stood, enabling the Americans to fire a volley, after which they escaped retaliation by scattering in the dark.^[97]

Battle of Conjocta Creek

In August 1814, American Major Lodowick Morgan of the Regiment of Riflemen, who was based in Buffalo, New York, correctly deduced that the British were going to attack Buffalo from Canada by crossing the bridge at Conjocta Creek (also called Scajaquada).^[98] Morgan and 240 riflemen marched to the point where the road from Black Rock crossed the Conjocta.^[98] They sabotaged the bridge by pulling up a number of planks, then built breastworks at the south side.^[98] Afterwards, they continued on to Black Rock.^[98] Once at Black Rock, Morgan's troops marched back the way they came while playing music and making as much noise as possible to gain the attention of the British and make them believe the Americans were headed to Buffalo.^[98]

Once out of sight, Morgan and his men marched secretly through the woods to occupy the breastworks they had constructed on the south bank of the creek.^[98] The unsuspecting British arrived at the bridge and discovered the sabotage.^[98] While they halted to consider their options, Morgan began the Battle of Conjocta Creek by blowing a whistle to signal his soldiers, who fired a devastating volley.^[98] The British sought cover on the north bank and fired back, but the American troops remained protected behind their breastworks.^[98] The British attempted an assault on the breastworks, which the Americans repulsed.^[98] The British then attempted a flanking maneuver, which the Americans also repulsed.^[98] Unable to proceed past the Conjocta, the British retreated back to Canada.^[98] The Americans lost two killed and eight wounded, while the British sustained twelve killed and twenty-one wounded.^[98]

Peninsula campaign

John B. Magruder, Confederate general whose deceptions prevented a Union attack early in the war

In the American Civil War's Peninsula campaign, Union commander George B. McClellan was the victim of a deception executed by the forces under Confederate commander John B. Magruder during the 1862 Siege of Yorktown.^[99] Magruder, who had acted in and produced plays, used his knowledge of visual and audio effects to deceive McClellan into believing Magruder's force was larger than it was.^[100] These included placing straw dummy crewmen alongside Quaker guns—logs painted black to resemble cannons—in his defensive works.^[101] Magruder interspersed his Quaker guns with the few real cannons he possessed, making his artillery seem more numerous than it was.^[102] In addition, he used shouted orders and bugle calls to march his relatively small force of about 10,000 in front of Union positions until they were out of sight, then had them loop around unseen and march through the same area again, making his troop strength seem greater than it was.^[103] Magruder's elaborate charade convinced McClellan, who outnumbered Magruder by ten to one, that he faced a more formidable opponent than was actually the case, which caused him to delay attacking.^[104] McClellan's delay allowed Confederate reinforcements to arrive, causing him to retreat back to Washington, D.C.^[104]

Vicksburg campaign

In early 1863, Union naval commander David Dixon Porter lost a new ironclad, USS Indianola after it ran aground on the Mississippi River near Vicksburg, Mississippi and was captured by Confederate forces.^[105] As the Confederates attempted to repair and refloat the damaged ship so they could use it against Porter's fleet, Porter executed a deception to thwart their effort.^[105] His men constructed a giant dummy ironclad from barges, barrels, and other materials that were on hand.^[105] Made to resemble a new, real ironclad, USS Lafayette (1848), the dummy was painted black to give it a sinister appearance and flew the Jolly Roger pirate flag.^[105] Porter's sailors floated the dummy, christened Black Terror, downstream at night, and it appeared impervious to Confederate shore battery fire.^[105] Exaggerated rumors about the seemingly indestructible super ship quickly spread to Vicksburg and reached salvage crews working on Indianola.^[105] In a panic, they halted their efforts, blew up Indianola, and abandoned the wreckage.^[105] When Black Terror ran aground and was inspected by Confederates, local newspapers roundly criticized military and naval commanders for being unable to tell the difference between a real warship and a fake.^[105]

Gallipoli campaign

During World War I, deception shifted from the tactical level to the strategic as modernized warfare and advances in technology increased the size and complexity of battlefield organizations.^[107] Several methods of deception were used by the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (Anzac) during its withdrawal from Gallipoli in Turkey, which was completed on 20 December 1915.^[108] As early as mid-November, artillery and sniper activity went silent for periods of time, giving the impression that the Anzacs were preparing to remain in the defense with limited resupply of ammunition during the upcoming winter.^[108] To cover the removal of the last troops, "drip rifles" were prepared to fire about 20 minutes after they were set, with a water can leaking into a second can that was tied to a rifle trigger.^[109] When the second can was full, the weight caused the unmanned rifle to fire.^[109] The sporadic firing created by this ruse convinced the Turks that the Anzac troops were still manning their defenses.^[109] In addition, Anzac troops used dummy artillery and mannequins to further enhance the impression that soldiers remained in their positions.^[109] As a result of these deceptive measures, both the main body of Anzac troops and the rear guard retreated unmolested.^[109] Given the failure of the Gallipoli effort from the Anzac perspective, the evacuation was considered the most successful part of the entire campaign.^[110]

Western front

World War I Australian troops carrying a dummy Mark IV tank that was intended to deceive German forces during the following day's assault on part of the Hindenburg Line (September 1918)

In March 1917, leaders of the German Army on the Western Front decided to withdraw from their positions in France to the Hindenburg Line, a 90-mile long defensive position that ran from Arras to Laffaux.^[111] With Germany unable to conduct an offensive because of personnel losses earlier in the war, commanders intended for unrestricted submarine warfare and strategic bombing to weaken the British and French, giving the German army time to recuperate.^[112] In addition, the move to the Hindenburg Line supported the plan of commanders Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff to shift the German focus to Russia and the Eastern Front.^[111] The withdrawal to the new defensive line would shorten Germany's front by 25 miles, enabling 13 divisions to be employed against the Russians.^[111]

Under the plan code named Operation Alberich, the Germans abandoned their old positions in a staged series that began in late February.^[111][112] The majority of their movement occurred between 16 and 21 March, and the full German withdrawal to the Hindenburg Line was completed on 5 April.^[111] The German withdrawal included numerous efforts to deceive the Allies, among them night movements and skeleton crews who remained behind to provide screening fire from machine guns, rifles, and mortars.^[111] The deception activities proved generally successful, and Germany completed its withdrawal to the Hindenburg Line largely unmolested.^[111]

In August 1918, the Allies intended to launch two offensives, one led by British Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, Commander-in-chief (C-in-C) of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF), near Amiens, and the other by American General John J. Pershing, C-in-C of the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF), near Saint-Mihiel.^[113] Prior to the Battle of Amiens, Haig's subordinate, General Henry Rawlinson, commander of the British Fourth Army, employed several deceptive tactics, including periods of radio silence by units involved in the coming attack and false radio traffic from other parts of the British lines.^[114] In addition, Rawlinson delayed troop movement for as long as possible prior to the start of the attack to prevent German observers from obtaining data on his disposition of forces, and moved troops and materiel almost entirely at night.^[114] The British offensive was immediately successful because they had maintained the element of surprise.^[114] British troops and tanks advanced eight miles, captured 400 artillery pieces, and inflicted 27,000 casualties, including 12,000 prisoners.^[114]

In an effort to gain an advantage near Saint-Mihiel, U.S. planners including Arthur L. Conger attempted to deceive the Germans into believing the American attack would come at Belfort, 180 miles to the south.^[113] False orders left where spies or informants could find them and staff officer reconnaissance activity created the appearance that the U.S. intended to conduct operations in and around Belfort.^[113] Pershing gained surprise at Saint-Mihiel and his offensive was successful.^[113] In 1926, Conger discovered from a former German officer that while the Belfort Ruse had not been completely successful, it had aided Pershing.^[113] Concerned that an Allied attack in the Belfort area was at least a possibility, many German units that could have reinforced German lines in the Saint-Mihiel area delayed movement from their rear area positions near Saint-Mihiel until it was too late.^[113] As a result of the success of Pershing's offensive, they did not have time to execute their withdrawal plans, and either abandoned their weapons and fled or were taken as prisoners.^[113]

Eastern front

At a war council held with senior commanders and the czar in April 1916, Russian General Aleksei Brusilov presented a plan to the Stavka (the Russian high command), proposing a massive offensive by his Southwestern Front against the Austro-Hungarian forces in Galicia.^[115] Brusilov's plan aimed to take some of the pressure off French and British armies in France and the Italian Army along the Isonzo Front and if possible to knock Austria-Hungary out of the war.^[115] As the Austrian army was heavily engaged in Italy, the Russian army enjoyed a significant numerical advantage in the Galician sector.^[115]

Brusilov's plan was approved, and he massed 40 infantry divisions and 15 cavalry divisions in preparation for the Brusilov Offensive.^[115] Deception efforts included false radio traffic, false orders sent by messengers who were intended be captured, and equipment displays including dummy artillery to mislead Austria-Hungary as to the location of his units.^[116][117] Beginning in June 1916, Brusilov's surprise offensive caused Germany to halt its Western front attack on Verdun and transfer considerable forces to the Eastern front.^[116] It also severely reduced the fighting effectiveness of Austria-Hungary's forces, effectively depriving Germany of its most important ally.^[118]

Palestine

Richard Meinertzhagen, credited with several British deceptions in Palestine during World War I.

In October 1917, Edmund Allenby, commander of Britain's Egyptian Expeditionary Force, planned to attack the Ottomans in southern Palestine.^[119] Rather than repeat previous frontal assaults at Gaza, which had been unsuccessful, he planned a flanking attack at Beersheba.^[119] As part of the larger deception effort to convince the Ottomans that Gaza was his objective, an officer under Allenby's command executed a deceptive tactic now known as the Haversack Ruse.^[119] In this effort, usually attributed to Richard Meinertzhagen, the officer intentionally dropped a knapsack which contained false plans for an attack on Gaza, which the Ottomans recovered.^[119] As a result of the Haversack Ruse and other deceptive measures, the British surprised the Ottomans and achieved victory at the 31 October 1917 Battle of Beersheba.^[119]

Allenby again resorted to deception as he prepared to attack the Ottomans again at Tel Megiddo in September 1918.^[120][121] In preparation for the battle, British forces concealed the movement of three cavalry and several infantry divisions from the eastern end of the front line, the Jordan Valley, to the western end on the Mediterranean Sea.^[120][121] The single mounted division that remained in the east, reinforced with infantry, maintained the illusion that the Jordan Valley remained fully garrisoned.^[120][121] Deceptive measures included marching infantry into the valley during the day when they could be observed by the Ottomans, transporting them out by truck at night, then marching them back the next day.^[120][121] The tents of the departed units were left standing, and dummy horses, mules, and soldiers made from canvas and straw were displayed throughout the encampment.^[120][121] In addition, mules dragged branches up and down the valley to generate thick clouds of dust, giving the impression of more animals and men on hand than there actually were.^{[121][122][123]} Though the deceptions did not induce Otto Liman von Sanders, the commander of the Ottoman Army, to concentrate his forces on the eastern flank, as Allenby hoped, the Ottomans could not be certain of his intentions, so they could not mass their forces.^[120][121] With the Ottomans spread throughout their line, Allenby's forces had a numerical advantage at the 19 to 25 September Battle of Megiddo (1918), and attained victory over the Ottomans.^[120][121]

At sea

Britain's Royal Navy made extensive use of Q-ships to combat German submarines.^[124] Camouflaged to look like a civilian sailing vessel or decrepit tramp steamer, the Q-ships were decoys that carried concealed heavy guns.^[124] The function of the Q-ships was to appear to be an undefended target.^[124] If successful, German submarines would be lured to the surface to sink or destroy the ship by using deck guns, enabling the submarine to conserve its limited supply of torpedoes for use against warships.^[124] If a German U-boat surfaced, the Q-ship would immediately display the Royal Navy's White Ensign flag in compliance with international law, then deploy its guns against the submarine.^[124] In 150 engagements, British Q-ships destroyed 14 U-boats and damaged 60.^[124] 27 of the 200 Q-ships the British employed were lost to German attacks.^[125]

Eastern Front

Before Operation Barbarossa in June 1941, the German High Command explained away the creation of a massive force arrayed to invade the Soviet Union by informing Soviet leaders including Joseph Stalin that it was training in preparation for an invasion of the United Kingdom.^[126] The deception worked, and Stalin continued to ignore German preparations until after the invasion of the Soviet Union had actually commenced.^[126]

When the Allies on the Western Front planned the Normandy invasion for June 1944, the Soviet Union simultaneously planned for a major Eastern front offensive against German forces.^[127] Called Operation Bagration, this Soviet attack was designed to catch the Germans unprepared in Belorussia, at the center of their lines.^[127] To gain and maintain the element of surprise for Bagration, the Soviets executed a successful deception effort.^[127] The overall intent was to make German commanders believe the Soviets would only defend in the center of the front (Belorussia), while launching a major offensive to the south in Ukraine and Crimea and a feint to the north in Finland.^[127] Soviet military leaders successfully masked preparations for action in Belorussia and limited German reconnaissance in the center of the front while drawing German attention to deceptive activities in the north and south.^[127] Germany was caught off-guard at the start of the Bagration offensive on 23 June, and the Soviets quickly pushed retreating German forces from the Soviet Union all the way to Poland.^[127]

Western Front

North Africa

British magician Jasper Maskelyne, credited with numerous deception activities during World War II

Deception played an important part in the war in North Africa.^[130] In 1941, a British Army unit led by magician and illusionist Jasper Maskelyne prevented the destruction of Alexandria, Egypt by using lights to recreate the nighttime image of the city, while blacking out the actual city lights.^[130] Coupled with explosives that simulated German bombs landing on the city, Maskelyne's illusion caused German planes to release their ordnance on the empty coastal site he had prepared rather than on the city.^[130]

Maskelyne was subsequently tasked with preventing the Germans from attacking the Suez Canal, a key asset in the Allied supply chain.^[130] He responded by creating a system of swirling searchlights which cast a spray of strobe light over more than 100 miles of the sky above Egypt.^[130] German pilots were unable to see the canal, and so were unable to destroy it.^[130]

As part of the deception surrounding Operation Crusader during the Siege of Tobruk, camouflage artist Steven Sykes built a dummy railhead near Misheifa in Egypt.^[131] The intent, which succeeded, was to divert German aerial attacks from the real railhead and deceive the Germans into believing that the British attack would not begin until the dummy was completed.^[131] Before the Second Battle of El Alamein, camouflage unit commander Geoffrey Barkas led Operation Sentinel and Operation Bertram, which used dummy equipment and other deceptive measures to deceive German commander Erwin Rommel about Allied strength and the timing and location of the Allied attack.^[132]

In Operation Sly Bob, Maskalyne's unit attempted to create a dummy submarine that would draw the attention of German reconnaissance aircraft along the German and Italian Italy-to-Tripoli supply line, enabling British ships to gain the element of surprise when attacking Axis shipping.^[130][133] By using old railroad sleeper cars, a wooden frame, nailed and welded beams, and metal tubing, Maskalyne's unit succeeded in creating a prototype that British ship commanders unaware of the deception plan nearly sank when they observed it near the Suez Canal.^[133] The difficulty in creating a viable dummy rendered the project impractical, and Sly Bob was abandoned before it was fully implemented.^[133]

Based on the experience with Sly Bob, the British attempted to portray an aging cruiser as a battleship that would pose a threat to German shipping.^[130][133] When the effort proved unsuccessful because the dummy equipment and fixtures added to the cruiser were unrealistic, Maskalyne's team used the partially-dummied cruiser as "sucker bait".^[134] With sucker bait, a magician uses an audience's powers of observation against it by allowing members to falsely believe they see through a trick.^{[134][lower-alpha 1]} By appearing to attempt to camouflage the cruiser-turned-dummy battleship, which Maskalyne christened HMS Houdin after magician Jean-Eugène Robert-Houdin, but allowing German observers to see through the camouflage, Maskalyne's team enabled the Germans to conclude on their own that the British were attempting to hide a battleship.^[134] Allowing the Germans to believe they had penetrated the camouflage and detected the battleship created in the minds of German military leadership the same risk to German shipping a real battleship would have posed.^[134]

Pacific theater

Japan continued diplomatic engagement with the U.S. on several issues of concern throughout late November and into early December 1941 even though attacking ships had sailed from their base in the remote Kuril Islands.^[136] The surprise 7 December 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor took place several hours before Japan presented a formal declaration of hostilities and officially broke diplomatic ties.^[136] Japan also made extensive use of decoys and other deceptive displays throughout the war, which took on increased importance as the tide of the war went against it in 1944 and 1945.^[137]

Prior to the October 1944 Battle off Samar, the Japanese incorporated deception into their plan of attack by luring Admiral William Halsey Jr. into leading his powerful Third Fleet to chase a decoy fleet, a target so inviting Halsey took with him every ship he commanded.^[138]

With Halsey's force out of the way, the Japanese intended to attack the Allied landings on Leyte.^[138] The U.S. responded with their few remaining forces, the three escort carrier groups of the Seventh Fleet.^[138] Escort carriers and destroyer escorts had been built to protect slow convoys from submarine attack, and were later adapted to attack ground targets, but they had few torpedoes, as they normally relied on Halsey's fleet to protect them from armored warships.^[138] These ships, organized as Task Unit 77.4.3 ("Taffy 3"), and commanded by Rear Admiral Clifton Sprague, possessed neither the firepower nor the armor to oppose the 23 ships of the Japanese force, which included Yamato's 18-inch guns, but took the initiative and attacked.^[138] In addition to ships firing on the Japanese from point-blank range, aircraft including FM-2 Wildcats, F6F Hellcats and TBM Avengers, strafed, bombed, torpedoed, rocketed, and depth-charged the Japanese force until they ran out of ammunition.^[138] They then resorted to deception, including numerous "dry runs" at the Japanese ships.^[138] Concerned that he faced a larger force than he actually did, Japanese commander Admiral Takeo Kurita decided to withdraw.^[138]

During the Battle of Iwo Jima in February and March 1945, Japanese deception included dummy tanks sculpted out of the island's soft volcanic rock.^[137] At the Japanese-held airfield in Tianhe District, China, the Japanese painted on the ground the image of a B-29 Bomber that appeared to be on fire.^[137] Their intent was for the painted image to appear real to high-flying aircraft, which would lower their altitude to investigate, thus making them targets for Japanese anti-aircraft fire.^[137] In addition, the Japanese made extensive use of bamboo-framed dummy aircraft to project airpower and protect their remaining aircraft, straw dummy soldiers and wood weapons that made defensive works appear to be manned, and wood dummy tanks to make infantry soldiers appear to have more combat power than they actually possessed.^[137]

The Allies planned an invasion of Japan to take place after the end of fighting in Europe.^[139] This plan, codenamed Operation Downfall, had several components, including the Operation Olympic invasion of the southern Japanese island of Kyushu.^[139] The deception created to enable Olympic to succeed, Operation Pastel, would have included false attacks against Japanese held-ports in China, as well as Japanese positions on the island of Formosa.^[139] The end of the war following the U.S. atomic bomb attacks on Japan ended the need for a ground invasion or a deception plan, so Pastel was never implemented.^[139]

At sea

Beach Jumpers monument at Ocracoke Island, North Carolina

As a liaison to the British Navy early in the war, actor and U.S. Navy officer Douglas Fairbanks Jr. observed and participated in several raiding parties and diversions on the French coast.^[140] Upon returning to the United States, Fairbanks proposed to Ernest King, the Chief of Naval Operations the creation of a unit that would plan and execute diversionary and deception missions.^[140] King authorized Fairbanks to recruit 180 officers and 300 enlisted men for the program, which was named Beach Jumpers.^[140] There are several stories about how the unit was named; during an interview late in life, Fairbanks said British admiral Louis Mountbatten coined it with the intention of creating a designation that provided cover for the unit's activities by being partly descriptive and partly in code.^[141]

On 16 March 1943 Beach Jumper Unit ONE (BJU-1) was commissioned with the mission "To assist and support the operating forces in the conduct of Tactical Cover and Deception in Naval Warfare."^[140] Eleven BJUs deployed during the war, and were used in all theaters.^[140] The Beach Jumpers raided false landing zones and shore defenses during amphibious attacks, sowing confusion with the enemy about actual landing sites and causing the enemy to defend in the wrong place.^[140] To carry out these deceptions, their boats were equipped with two .50 caliber machine guns, 10 window (chaff) rockets, smoke generators, and floating time-delay explosive packs.^[140] They were also outfitted with naval balloons and communications and psychological operations equipment, including recorders, speakers, generators, and radio jammers.^[140] The balloons included radar reflective strips that when towed would cause Beach Jumper units to appear to enemy radar operators as a larger force than they actually were.^[140]

Beach Jumper units created diversionary landings during several battles, including Operation Husky and Operation Dragoon.^[140] The Beach Jumpers were inactivated after World War II, but were reconstituted for service during the Korean War and Vietnam War.^[140] With the U.S. military creating and fielding an Information Operations capability beginning in the early 1990s, the modern Beach Jumpers exist as part of U.S. Naval Information Forces.^[140]

Operation El Paso

As part of Operation El Paso, which took place from May to July 1966, the U.S. 1st Infantry Division deliberately exposed information about a planned resupply and engineer equipment convoy from Minh Than north to An Lộc.^[149] Division planners anticipated the enemy response would be an ambush at one of a number of possible locations.^[149] As a result, the supposedly lightly armed convoy actually consisted of armored cavalry and infantry.^[149] Additionally, 1st ID planners prepared for air assault operations at the most likely ambush sites.^[149] Events unfolded as the planners had foreseen, and the Viet Cong ambushed the convoy.^[149] The ambush sprang the 1st Infantry Division's trap, and the subsequent Battle of Minh Thanh Road resulted in 50 percent of the Viet Cong regiment becoming casualties.^[149]

Operation Bolo

Robin Olds, who led the Operation Bolo deception, is celebrated after completing his 100th aerial combat mission in September 1967

Both North Vietnam and the forces of South Vietnam and the United States made use of deception during the Vietnam War. In 1967's Operation Bolo, a United States Air Force unit led by Robin Olds successfully countered the threat posed by Soviet MiG-21 fighter planes operating in North Vietnam.^[150]

During bombing missions, unescorted U.S. Republic F-105 Thunderchief fighter-bombers would often be attacked by MiG-21s.^[150] Heavily laden with ordnance, the F-105s were no match for the faster MiGs.^[150] On occasions when the F-105s were escorted by F-4 Phantom II fighter planes, the MiGs would refuse to engage.^[150] In addition, the rules of engagement on the U.S. side prevented attacking the MiGs when they were on the ground.^[150] This measure was intended to keep the Soviet Union from becoming further engaged in the conflict by preventing casualties to the Soviet mechanics and technical advisors who were assisting North Vietnam.^[150]

To counter the MiG threat, Olds' 8th Fighter Wing prepared its F-4s to display the electronic and radar signatures of F-105s.^[150] To create this effect, the 8th Fighter Wing outfitted F-4s with QRC-160 jamming pods, a device used only by F-105s.^[150] When they flew the mission, Olds and his fellow pilots assumed the route, elevation, speed, and formation of an F-105 flight.^[150] They also staggered the takeoff and arrival times of the F-4s, enabling later-arriving F-4s to prevent the MiGs from landing.^[150]

The Bolo deception was executed successfully.^[150] The North Vietnamese believed they faced an F-105 flight and dispatched their MiGs.^[150] The later-arriving F4s prevented the MiGs from returning to their base.^[150] The 8th Fighter Wing destroyed seven MiGs in a matter of minutes, while Olds' fighters sustained no losses.^[150] The destruction of half their MiGs and uncertainty about whether future flights observed on radar and electronic sensors were unescorted F-105s or F-4s pretending to be F-105s caused North Vietnam to ground its MiGs.^[150] The MiGs failed in their mission of preventing U.S. Operation Rolling Thunder bombing runs over North Vietnam.^[150]

Tet Offensive

In 1967, the government and military of North Vietnam began planning for an offensive that would begin in early 1968.^[151] The intent within the war's area of operations was to spark an uprising by the Viet Cong and others in South Vietnam who were sympathetic to the government in the north.^[151] In a wider sense, North Vietnam hoped the offensive would cause a withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Vietnam by undermining U.S. public confidence in the war.^[151]

North Vietnam implemented several deceptive measures to mask preparations for the offensive.^[151] In October, the North Vietnamese government announced that it would observe a seven-day holiday truce from 27 January to 3 February 1968, several days longer than previous Tet truces had lasted.^[151] The U.S. and South Vietnam presumed that the coming offensive, of which they had received some intelligence, would take place before or after the truce.^[151] When the attacks had not commenced before the holiday, South Vietnamese and U.S. leaders assumed it would come after the holiday.^[151] As a result, they allowed many soldiers to take holiday leave and relaxed the usual security measures.^[151]

As an additional deceptive measure, while intending to attack South Vietnam's major cities and military installations, the North Vietnamese continued attacks along the border between the two countries during late 1967.^[151] These diversionary assaults served to draw U.S. attention to the border and U.S. forces away from the actual objectives—the heavily populated South Vietnamese coastal lowlands and cities.^[151]

When the offensive commenced, South Vietnam and the U.S. were surprised by the coordinated attacks.^[151] However, the U.S. and South Vietnam regrouped and over several days repulsed the North Vietnamese assaults.^[151] North Vietnam failed to attain the immediate objective of creating an uprising in South Vietnam.^[151] In the longer term, the offensive aided in swaying U.S. public opinion against the war, which led to a decreased U.S. presence in Vietnam and eventual withdrawal.^[151]