Weapons used

Loyalist 75mm cannon

Several types of Army artillery were used in the combats in São Paulo, with calibers of 75, 105 and 155 millimeters.^[7] Most of the pieces dated from the beginning of the century; the most modern ones were bought after the First World War, under the influence of the French Military Mission.^[8] The guns were transported by animal traction; it was not until the 1930s that the Brazilian Army began to use motorized transport for its guns.^[9]

The 75mm Krupp artillery existed in two models of field guns (C/28, model 1905, and C/28, model 1908), one of mountain guns (C/14, model 1906), and one of howitzers (C /14, model 1906).^[8] The 1908 field cannon fired seven-kilogram shell, of the high-explosive type, for the destruction of houses, and shrapnel, for anti personnel. Its range was 6.8 kilometers. The mountain cannon was similar, but could be broken down into bales for transport on the back of mules. Its ammunition was the same, but with a smaller case and protective charge. It had a range of three kilometers and poorer aim.^[7] The Army also had 75mm C/36 Model 1920 field guns from Saint-Chamond and C/18.6 Model 1919 mountain guns from Schneider.^[8]

Loading of a 75mm Krupp battery

105mm Krupp guns from 1910 fired fifteen kilogram shells in direct and indirect fire up to four miles away. Each shell could damage structures or, due to shrapnel, kill people within 400 meters of the hit point.^[9] The most powerful artillery of the Army were the 155mm howitzers, model 1917, by Schneider, whose shots had a range of up to eleven kilometers, and could kill a person within a 600-meter radius from the point hit.^[10][11][8]

The Army's infantry had guns of lesser firepower to directly accompany their attacks: Stokes mortars and 37mm Puteaux revolver-cannons.^[12] The 37mm guns had an effective range of 1,500 meters.^[13] The Brazilian Navy also contributed 16 small-caliber rapid-fire cannons, installed in railway gondolas in the workshops of Companhia Docas de Santos. They were 38mm Nordenfelt, 47mm Armstrong, and 57mm Nordenfelt models, taken from the Naval Academy and battleships.^[14] This railway artillery was used to attack Mooca through the tracks of the São Paulo Railway.^[15]

Transport of guns

The rebels' greatest firepower consisted of twenty 75mm and six 105mm guns, all from Krupp.^[16][11] The first loyalist artillery arrived on 7 July: two Armstrong 75mm guns from the Navy and two Krupp, also 75 mm, from the Army.^[17] The range of these pieces was inferior to that of the revolutionary artillery, which managed to fire against the loyalist pieces.^[18] Throughout the month, the loyalist artillery was reinforced and achieved qualitative and quantitative superiority, with Schneider and Saint Chamond guns of up to 155mm. The heavy and old-fashioned cannons in the hands of the revolutionaries did not have the range to reach the more than 100 loyalist guns, well positioned in the hills on the outskirts of the city.^[11][19]

Both sides employed military aviation, but the rebels' only bombing mission was an unsuccessful attempt on the Catete Palace in Rio de Janeiro. The loyalists had six Breguet 14A2/B2 bombers from Army Aviation.^[20][21] They dropped over a hundred small grenades and at least three 75-kilogram bombs on the city.^[22]

Hierarchical responsibility

Eduardo Sócrates and Carlos de Campos, respectively the first and second from right to left

The artillery units present in the state of São Paulo in July 1924, in the 2nd Military Region, were the 2nd Independent Group of Heavy Artillery (GIAP), in Quitaúna, Osasco; the 2nd Mountain Artillery Group (GAM), in Jundiaí; the 4th Mounted Artillery Regiment (RAM), in Itu; and the 3rd Coastal Artillery Group, at the Itaipu Fort, Praia Grande.^[23] All of these units, plus several groups and regiments from other military regions, participated on one side or the other in the revolt.^[24][25]

Lieutenant Custódio de Oliveira, from the 2nd GIAP, was instrumental in the lieutenant conspiracy and subsequent revolt. The outbreak of the movement depended on his battery, whose position to be occupied in the city was defined months in advance. Oliveira moved his battery at dawn, simulating an exercise, and, with some delay, was already positioned in the capital of São Paulo in the morning.^[26] The 2nd GAM, belonging to lieutenant colonel Olinto de Mesquita Vasconcelos, came to São Paulo to join the revolt the following day. After the withdrawal of the state government, the 4th RAM, under Captain Clístenes Barbosa, did the same.^[27]

Loyalist artillery units formed part of the Division of Operations in the State of São Paulo, commanded by General Eduardo Sócrates,^[28] in which they formed part of one of its infantry brigades or served as divisional troops. Its order of battle was published shortly after the revolt by writers Ciro Costa and Eurico de Góis, based on official notes from the military commands, and by general Abílio de Noronha, commander of the 2nd Military Region at the start of the revolt. The two listings have some differences:

General Staff of the loyalist Divisional Artillery

The loyalist bombers came from the Aviation School of Campo dos Afonsos, in Rio de Janeiro, whose commander, lieutenant colonel Álvaro Octávio de Alencastre, served as Director of Aeronautics in operations against the revolt. The commander of the pilots and aerial observers was captain Marcos Evangelista da Costa Villela Júnior.^[30]

The effective command of the Army was disputed between the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Minister of War, both, in practice, appointed by the president of Brazil.^[31] The bombing was carried out with the approval of Minister of War Setembrino de Carvalho and president Artur Bernardes.^[32] Thus, the responsibility fell to the federal government. The state government of Carlos de Campos supported this decision by Bernardes.^[33]

By the revolutionaries

Damage to the binding workshops at Liceu Coração de Jesus

On the morning of 5 July, the 105mm guns of the 2nd GIAP were positioned by the rebels on Campo de Marte.^[9] From there, they fired the first artillery shots of the conflict, after 09:00 AM, aimed at the Campos Elíseos Palace, seat of the state government,^[34] where the loyalist forces concentrated their defensive effort.^[35] The bombardment was supposed to break the resistance of the defenders,^[36] but it did not intimidate the governor to leave the palace or even to take refuge in the cellars.^[34]

The target was four kilometers away from Campo de Marte. Due to the need to fire regulation shots,^[9] the imperfection of the maps and the inexperience of the shooters, several shells hit civilians, causing the first deaths of the conflict.^[37] At Liceu Coração de Jesus, 350 meters from the palace, a student was seriously injured.^[9] Two more shots hit homes on Nothmann Boulevard, killing a woman and a boy and wounding a woman.^[38] At the São Bento Monastery, artillery interrupted a mass for those killed in the Copacabana Fort revolt.^[36] General Isidoro suspended the bombardment due to civilian deaths,^[39] but it was resumed at 4:00 PM, targeting the region of Praça da Sé, where the government secretariats were located.^[38] Collateral damage occurred in the office of architect Ramos de Azevedo, on Rua Boa Vista, and in the bandstand of the Largo do Palácio garden. In Liberdade, rebel artillery targeted the barracks of the 5th Battalion of the Public Force.^[37]

Luz water tank pierced by artillery

On the morning of 6 July, the bombardment of the palace eased and the focus shifted to the besieged loyalists in the 4th Battalion of the Public Force, in Luz. From Ponte Pequena, lieutenant Eduardo Gomes destroyed the machine gun emplacements and set fire to the command building. The bombardment only ceased when revolutionary commander Miguel Costa was informed of the prisoners held inside the barracks—captains Joaquim and Juarez Távora and lieutenants Índio do Brasil and Castro Afilhado.^[38][40][41] Revolutionary artillery also damaged Luz's water tank and the Polytechnic School.^{[lower-alpha 6]}

The bombardment of the Campos Elíseos Palace was resumed with greater efficiency on the afternoon of the 8th.^[2] Heavy artillery, positioned, depending on the sources, on Morro dos Ingleses, Araçá Cemetery or on Campo de Marte itself, convinced the governor to leave the place and take refuge in the Secretariat of Justice, next to Patio do Colégio.^[42] His opponents did not know this, but they saw the concentration of high-ranking officials at the site. A 105mm howitzer at the intersection of Cantareira Avenue and João Teodoro Street, under orders from Eduardo Gomes, opened fire at 3:30 PM. Due to its elevated position, Largo do Palácio was easy to reach,^[43] and a single petard killed six of the sailors guarding the site. Again the governor withdrew, this time to the concentration of legal forces in Guaiaúna.^[44]

Revolutionary artillery remained active throughout the month, but loyalist reinforcements left it at a severe disadvantage.^[45] The rebel gunners had no fixed point, moving from one point to another during the night.^[46] In a rare case of friendly fire, on 12 July, 105mm guns hit rebel positions at the Maria Zélia Factory, whose defenders had requested artillery support.^[47] On 15 July, artillery targeted the loyalists at the Glória Church, in Largo do Cambuci.^[48]

In the book Sob a metralha, published in 1924, Ciro Costa and Eurico de Góis accuse the rebels of having shot at random, with hidden guns, to deceive the population, making them believe that they were being bombed by the government. The accusations were based on the origin and direction of the howitzers, which would have been observed by many people from São Paulo. The authors are strongly loyalist and against the rebels; according to Moacir Assunção, there is no evidence for this accusation.^[36][49]

By the loyalists

Effect of a shell on the revolutionary command in the Luz barracks

On 8 July, the barracks of the Public Force of São Paulo in Luz, where the revolutionary command was located, were attacked by cannons from the Brazilian Navy, positioned on Travessa do Mercado, and from Itaipu Fort, positioned on Esplanada do Carmo. The resulting artillery duel damaged the shutters of Itaipu's guns and the shaft of one of the Navy's guns.^[50] On the night of 8 to 9 July, by order of general Cândido Pamplona, loyalist cannons in Vila Matilde fired 50 shots towards Brás and Luz, causing two fires in Brás and several deaths, all of them civilians, including three children in a working-class village at Conselheiro Belisário Street.^[51][52][53]

As reinforcements arrived, the divisional artillery stayed on the sides of Guaiaúna and Ipiranga.^[11] The intensity of the bombings increased on 10 and 11 July, now also reaching Mooca, Belenzinho^[51] and the city's centre.^[54] The shells landed in densely populated areas devoid of military targets, destroying houses and starting fires.^[55] At the Santa Casa hospital, most of the wounded were civilians from Brás, people "almost all hit by shells inside their own homes". Houses of entire families victimized on the same occasion by the same shell are cited.^[51]

On 12 July, a 75mm battery was ordered to bombard Praça da República, on information that the rebels had placed cannons there. Some people present there tried to demonstrate that it would be impossible to position a battery in the square, but they were ignored. Loyalist guns opened fire, but missed; two shells exploded on the Santa Ifigênia viaduct, one on Largo São Bento, one on Hotel d'Oeste and another on Largo do Paissandu.^[56]

The bombardment "lasted days and nights without ceasing".^[57] The affected area extended on 14 July to Liberdade, Aclimação, Vila Mariana^[51] and two wealthy neighborhoods, Vila Buarque and Campos Elíseos.^[54][58] Paraíso was also hit throughout the month.^[59] Working-class neighborhoods in the east of the city, such as Brás, Belenzinho and Mooca, in addition to Luz, were the hardest hit;^[60] to the south, Ipiranga and Cambuci stood out.^[61][62] The more upscale residential neighborhoods suffered much less damage, but they were not spared.^[61]

• Residential areas hit by the bombing
• 
  Caetano Pinto Street
• 
  Serra de Araraquara Street
• 
  Almeida Lima Street
• 
  Lacerda Franco Avenue
• 
  21 de Abril Street

An emblematic target was the Theatro Olympia,^[63] located on Rangel Pestana Avenue, in Brás, half a kilometer from the nearest trenches, in Estação do Norte, and more than a kilometer from the Luz barracks. On 15 July, loyalist artillery collapsed the columns, ceiling and walls on the dozens of displaced families present there. Dozens of people manually removed the rubble, from which the groans of the buried victims could be heard. There were 30 dead and around 80 wounded.^[64][65][54]

On the front line, the Arlindo brigade positioned 38, 75 and 105 millimeter cannons on the heights of Aclimação and Vila Mariana. They silenced the machine-gun fire of the rebels located at the Ipiranga Museum, on 10 July, carried out a previous bombardment of the Glória Church before an attack on 15 July, and hit the tower of the Guanabara brewery, where there were machine-gun positions, on 20 July.^[66][67] Around 12 July, the Pantaleão Telles brigade received artillery support in its attack on the Maria Zélia Factory, opening furrows in the ground just five meters from the enemy positions.^[68]

Effect of an air strike

The Navy's railway artillery was used in Mooca, where it was harassed by a rebel cannon.^[69] On the 25th, a rebel armored train was caught in an ambush at the warehouses of the Central do Brasil Railway. Two shots from loyalist artillery on Penha Hill were enough to blow up a wagon and derail the locomotive. Another train, right behind, was also hit when it came to help the wounded, including colonel João Francisco, commander of the sector.^[70][71]

Loyalist aviation began bombing missions on 22 July. There was a single attack on the Luz barracks, with three bombers, but they flew too high and missed the target. There were no casualties and material damage was less than that caused by artillery, but the psychological impact was considerable.^[72][73]

The attack on the symbol of São Paulo's industrial power, the Cotonifício Crespi, in Mooca, shocked and impressed even loyalist observers.^[61] The factory complex, occupied by rebel troops and displaced families, was set on fire as many as five different times and partially destroyed.^[63][74] The incendiary shells started several fires in houses in the neighborhood.^[75] The last of the factory fires, on the 22 July, raised plumes of smoke visible for miles around.^[76] The spinning section, several cloth sections, and the manager's residence were ruined, and the stock of goods was destroyed. A large yarn of thread finishing and cloth had its roof destroyed, and the damage was serious enough for it to be demolished after the conflict.^[77][74]

Other industries damaged in Mooca were Companhia Antarctica Paulista, Duchen Biscuits, and Moinhos Gamba.^[78] The mayor's report on the conflict recorded 1,800 buildings damaged by shells and bullets and 103 commercial and industrial establishments damaged, of which 17 suffered major damage from the bombing.^[79] This was the largest bombing in the city's history.^[80] Targets such as Theatro Olympia, Glória Church, Cotonifício Crespi and Duchen Biscuits were emblematic.^[81]

• Factories hit by the bombing
• 
  Cotonifício Crespi
• 
  Guanabara Brewery
• 
  Matarazzo Industries
• 
  Duprat Workshops
• 
  Duchen Biscuits

Military analysis

The rudimentary trenches of the rebels

The Minister of War had a very positive impression of the loyalist army's performance, especially of infantry-artillery coordination.^[6] Conversely, several combatants report the bombing as ineffective against the revolutionary army. According to lieutenant João Cabanas, "while the shells lightly wounded any soldier, they killed hundreds of civilians, mostly women and children".^[118] For corporal Antônio Bueno Salgado, "they fired without knowing where, because we were never dislodged by enemy artillery, they only hit houses".^[32] Juarez Távora defined the bombing as "deadly for the civilian population, but innocuous for the revolutionary troops", "without the precise directive of a prefixed military objective, without careful observations that corrected its errors, without shortage of ammunition that limited it", "dispersive and useless".^[119]

The need for the bombardment, according to general Sócrates, was to overcome the good defensive positions of the enemy in the urban terrain, "a stronghold of streets with large buildings that, even destroyed, would offer room for defense, organized from rubble".^[120] The government, perhaps because it did not trust its troops, may have opted for a strategy of progressive attrition, even if this meant "sterile and pernicious bombing of civilian targets".^[121] To the leadership, bombing may have seemed like a way to spare legal soldiers by avoiding direct combat.^[122]

But there was no need for large caliber artillery, as evaluated by general Abílio de Noronha, because, contrary to Sócrates' description, the enemy fortifications were weak and discontinuous.^[123][32] Shortly after the conflict he published a critique of loyalist army tactics, based on his technical knowledge of bombing and weaponry.^[124][125] He wrote:^[126]

What is the true role of artillery?

That of destroying the opponent, however, for that, precise, slow shots are necessary, with rigorous observation of the impacts and with a use of ammunition necessary to destroy, in complete safety, the objective (...) Effective shots must be preceded, as a general rule, by a regulation shot (...)

Was this the role of the Guaiaúna artillery?

We have no hesitation in answering in the most absolute negative. Who does not remember the continuous and accelerated firing of the various batteries during the night, without aim, without regulation, without observation of impacts and without the slightest military range?

Night fire, recalled Noronha, only took place in the First World War thanks to a very meticulous previous study of enemy positions, and even so, the general rule was the interruption of artillery at the end of the afternoon. In São Paulo, reconnaissance aviation provided only very vague information, and at no time were planes used to correct the shots. Loyalist artillery, he said, fired aimlessly at the capital, falling on targets of no military value.^[127]

Targets: military or civilian

General Sócrates' report described how the 155mm guns were called in to destroy "depots and enemy organizations", presenting loyalist artillery as an instrument to overcome military resistance. This is not consistent with the targets actually hit, most of which were of no military value, nor with the obituary statistics, in which civilians were the main victims.^[128] Ciro Costa and Eurico de Góis defended the bombing, claiming the "fatality of this unpatriotic moment"; if there were no orders to spare civilians, the city would be off the map; and only “rare shots” missed their targets. At least one miscalculation is known, the attempted bombing of Praça da República, but the number of buildings hit in the city was enormous (1,800).^[129]

Revolutionaries, government critics and even general Abilio de Noronha accused the government artillery of firing without a defined target against densely populated areas, with full knowledge that it would kill civilians, in a "terrorizing bombing" or "German-style bombing".^{[130][lower-alpha 8]} Historians lend credence to this accusation; the civilians would not have been killed by miscalculations, but deliberately.^{[131][51][132][133][134]} Blaise Cendrars, a poet passing through Brazil at the time, wrote:^[135]

As soon as he had his artillery in position on the hills overlooking the city, general Sócrates, commander of the federal siege troops, unleashed a 'German' bombardment on the open city (...). He knew how to take advantage of the lessons of the Great European War. Having no Reims cathedral to demolish, Sócrates targeted his cannons sometimes at a gleaming new hotel, then a beautiful modern factory, at one of the city's new skyscrapers, wrecking a tram, sending a pastry shop flying, destroying a school, blowing up a square or a bar. (...) It was perceived that the 'loyalist' officers did this with a happy heart. The orders were formal: it was necessary to crush the sedition, the worse for the city, it would be rebuilt.

Ruins of a church in Canudos, 1897

The "terrozing bombardment" would be a way of accelerating the enemy's capitulation, applying psychological pressure for the rebels to abandon the city.^{[130][136][61][83]} Brazilianist Frank McCann speculated that the Brazilian Army was setting aside advice from the French Military Mission and reverting to the brutal methods of the Canudos and Contestado wars, an astonishing decision; the population was instructed to leave the city, but São Paulo was too big to be razed like the villages in these two conflicts.^{[137][32][lower-alpha 9]} The memory of the two conflicts was alive, and three important loyalist generals of 1924 were Contestado veterans: Setembrino de Carvalho, Eduardo Sócrates and Tertuliano Potiguara. For Moacir Assunção, these generals may have seen the bombing as a quicker resolution to the conflict, as the enemy was much better prepared than in Canudos and Contestado.^[122]

If the goal was to put pressure on the rebels, it worked. The suffering of the population was the justification for the withdrawal given by Isidoro to Macedo Soares.^[138] The bulletins dropped by government planes, threatening an even more intense bombing, were on the minds of the revolutionary leadership.^[139] They compared the suffering of the population with the futility of urban combat: the combatants were worn out, many of them wounded, and the only chance of victory would be in the case of uprisings in Rio de Janeiro and Minas Gerais, which were under firm government control.^[140][141] The legalist advances in the interior, through Sorocaba and Itu, were a serious threat to the rearguard: it was not long before the "Southern Column" cut off the possibility of withdrawal.^[142][143]

Another explanation is that the government punished the population of the working-class neighborhoods for their approach to the rebels, even forming foreign battalions within the revolutionary army,^[97][65] or even in retaliation for the rebel attack against the Campos Elíseos and the looting of the city by the population.^[144] For Carlo Romani, war had taken the place of politics as an exercise of power, and the poor civilian population is the target of war.^[83] Testimonials from inhabitants of Mooca and Brás show the impression that they were targets of the government.^[145] The government's attitude, both in Canudos and in São Paulo, can be interpreted as State terrorism, directed against the population.^[146]

The attack on the factories can be interpreted as an attack on the workers,^[65] but these buildings had military value: they were used as defensive positions by the rebels, taking advantage of their chimneys to observe enemy movements.^[61] Cotonifício Crespi, for example, "dominates the entire height of Mooca", in the words of lieutenant João Cabanas, who positioned a machine gun on top of the building.^[147] The tower of the Maria Zélia Factory, according to Cabanas, was the "most important position in the sector", with visibility for the movements of the enemy brigade on the banks of the Tietê.^[148] The Antarctic factory is described by other sources as "one of the strongest strongholds of the rebels",^[149] "tenaciously defended stronghold".^[150]

Legality or illegality

Reims, in France, bombed by the Imperial German Army

Shortly after the end of the fighting, the legality of the government bombing came into debate.^[33] The international law of the time already repudiated armed attacks against eminently civilian targets, especially against open cities (not fortified and not defended).^[151] The "terrorizing bombardment" was judged immoral, unjust, useless and inhumane.^[152] The Hague Convention of 1907 prohibited, in its article 23, "the use of weapons, projectiles or materials intended to cause unnecessary suffering", in article 25, "the attack or bombardment, by whatever means, of cities, villages, villas or buildings without established defenses", and in article 27, the attack on "buildings devoted to worship, arts, sciences, charity, historic monuments, hospitals and places where the sick and wounded were accumulated".^[153]

Brazilians had already been exposed to the subject since the First World War, when, in the words of Abílio de Noronha, "the press, in almost all countries of the Universe, spent tons of ink and the best of its flower of rhetoric, to preach hatred against the Germans, calling them pirates and Huns, because they fired their artillery at open cities; the great dailies of our country tuned their pitch to that of the allies and rare was the newspaper that did not launch anathema against those vulgar murderers, destroyers of cities, monuments and temples".^[154]

Noronha called São Paulo an “open city par excellence, and occupied by a small number of rebels, without fortifications that required long-distance destructive shots".^[52] For historian Hélio Silva, "the bombing of an open city represented a monstrosity for which no one wanted to take the blame".^[57] Manoel da Costa Manso, a justice of Brazil's Supreme Federal Court (STF) criticized the "inhuman and criminal bombing, dumping cannons on the open city, without respect for the civilian population".^[155]

Jurist Lemos Brito defended the government's actions, questioning this interpretation of open cities: "the legitimacy of the aggression does not really depend on the fortification, but on the defense of the place at gunpoint".^[156] In international law, there were precedents for attacking an open city under certain conditions. According to jurist Lafayette Rodrigues Pereira, "if the open city shelters the enemy in its bosom, if it resists by raising barricades and converting houses and buildings, walls and terrain accidents into trenches and redoubts, immunity disappears". For René Foignet, the bombing of private buildings could be legal to make the city surrender more quickly; in that case, the bombing of São Paulo would only be a war measure for an exceptional situation. STF justice Carlos de Carvalho had recalled in 1895 that acts of war, due to the force majeure of public necessity, did not need to be compensated by the State.^[157]

In the case of the bombardment of a city defended by enemy troops, the commander of the attacking troops had the obligation to notify the local authorities in advance, except in circumstances where surprise is permitted.^[158] Ciro Costa and Eurico de Góis stated that the government assisted those in need, as far as possible, and gave prior notice to the population. However, the only warning was the bulletin dropped by the planes on 26 July, after 15 days of attack, and even then, the remaining population of the city would not be able to withdraw.^[159]

Moreover, the bombing could not be indiscriminate. The attacker was supposed to spare monuments, hospitals and historic sites. According to jurist Clóvis Beviláqua, "the bombardment must be directed against the fortifications of the city and its dependencies and not, intentionally, against the part inhabited by the civilian population, in order to move it to influence the garrison, so that it does not persist in the resistance".^[160] The loyalist artillery failed in this regard, as the fortifications were the least affected targets by the bombing, which mainly hit civilians. Jurist Jules Badesvant, consulted by Macedo Soares (at the time, already an enemy of the government), wrote, based on the IV Hague Convention, of 1909:^[161]

The city in question was defended by the rebels; but the bombardment was not, it seems, intended to support an attack designed to take the city; it was directed against the whole of the city rather than against the rebel forces; it had more the character of intimidation of the inhabitants than a military operation against an armed adversary. In its execution, apparently, the general duty of not directing hostilities against the entire civilian population was forgotten, thus carrying out destructions that were not imperiously required by the needs of the struggle, contrary to what article 23 of the same regulation prescribes.

Thus, jurists accepted the bombing of military targets, but condemned the indiscriminate attack on densely populated areas. By this reasoning, the Brazilian government committed a war crime in the bombing of São Paulo.^[162]

Citations

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