Berlin Operations Base (a.k.a. Berlin Operating Base, B.O.B., or BOB), was the headquarters of the CIA (initially OSS) in West Berlin during the Cold War. Established in 1945 by Allen Dulles, it was located in a villa at 19-21 Föhrenweg (52°27′28″N 13°16′30″E / 52.4577451°N 13.2751338°E / 52.4577451; 13.2751338) in the suburb of Dahlem in the Zehlendorf District, which had suffered minimal bomb damage during World War II.[1][2] The building housing BOB was designed by Albert Speer and built in 1936-1940 with air raid protection in mind; accordingly, it had three stories underground.[3] By the early 1950s the Berlin Operations Base was shifted from the Föhrenweg villa to the more secure U.S. Armed Forces Headquarters Berlin Command compound located nearby on the Clayalee (52°27′06″N 13°16′17″E / 52.451610°N 13.271376°E / 52.451610; 13.271376).[4]

During its early years, BOB vied for primacy with CIA’s operating base in Vienna. When Austria’s occupation was lifted and Vienna ceased to be a Four Power territory, BOB became the forefront of US intelligence in the Cold War.[5]

History

Leadership

During the Cold War BOB was headed by the following personnel:

Early Years (1945-1947)

At the time of its inception in 1945, the base suffered from severe personnel shortages, inadequate funds, and involvement in black market operations.[11] Additionally, relations with the American military were initially cool; General Clay in particular feared that OSS intelligence operations directed at targets in the Soviet zone could damage the relationship between the Americans and the Soviets. Nonetheless, as Soviets increased controls along zonal demarcation lines, the American military government came to feel the need for intelligence to help judge the economic and political situation in East Germany,[8] and by 1947 even Clay had come to appreciate BOB’s value.[12]

During this period, as US intelligence restructured its intelligence and counterintelligence agencies (progressing from the OSS to the SSU to the CIG before finally settling as the CIA) BOB struggled to define its overall mission.[11] SSU headquarters in Washington felt that BOB should concentrate on collecting strategic, national-level intelligence, while the US occupation authorities wanted current information on the Soviet Zone. The latter ultimately won out, with BOB focusing primarily on local information requirements.[8]

Starting from late summer 1945, BOB increased reporting on Soviet zone issues including transportation, food supply, land reform, public opinion, and industrial conditions. These reports initially relied on interviews with refugees, but BOB soon began to develop agent sources to provide ongoing updates on these topics. The Soviet takeover of East German railroads in 1945 was a particular focus.[13] Political reporting started to become a focus from December 1945, when issues between the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and Soviet authorities brought East German politics to the attention of American intelligence leadership.[14]

References

  1. ↑ Kellerhoff, Sven Felix; Von Kostka, Bernd; Lyons, Linden (2021). Capital of Spies: Intelligence Agencies in Berlin During the Cold War. Havertown Pennsylvania: Casemate. p. 6. ISBN 978-1-636-24000-8.
  2. ↑ Murphy, David E.; Kondrashev, Sergei A.; Bailey, George (1997). Battleground Berlin: CIA vs. KGB in the Cold War. New Haven: Yale University Press. pp. 6–8. ISBN 978-0-300-07871-8.
  3. ↑ Murphy, Kondrashev & Bailey 1997, p. 456-457.
  4. ↑ Kellerhoff, Sven Felix; Von Kostka, Bernd; Lyons, Linden (2021). Capital of Spies: Intelligence Agencies in Berlin During the Cold War. Havertown Pennsylvania: Casemate. p. 6. ISBN 978-1-636-24000-8.
  5. 1 2 3 4 5 Stockton, Bayard (2006). "Baptism in Berlin". Flawed Patriot: The Rise and Fall of CIA Legend Bill Harvey. Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, Inc. ASIN B005CWJ6UQ. ISBN 978-1-57488-991-8.
  6. ↑ Murphy, Kondrashev & Bailey 1997, p. 8.
  7. ↑ Murphy, Kondrashev & Bailey 1997, p. xv, 10.
  8. 1 2 3 Murphy, Kondrashev & Bailey 1997, p. 11.
  9. ↑ Murphy, Kondrashev & Bailey 1997, p. xvi.
  10. 1 2 3 Murphy, Kondrashev & Bailey 1997, p. xv.
  11. 1 2 Murphy, Kondrashev & Bailey 1997, p. 10.
  12. ↑ Murphy, Kondrashev & Bailey 1997, p. 8-10.
  13. ↑ Murphy, Kondrashev & Bailey 1997, p. 11-12.
  14. ↑ Murphy, Kondrashev & Bailey 1997, p. 12.

Further reading

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