Subhi al-Tufayli
صبحي الطفيلي
al-Tufayli in 1979
Secretary-General of Hezbollah
In office
1989–1991
Preceded byPosition established
Succeeded byAbbas al-Musawi
Personal details
Born1948 (age 75–76)
Brital, Lebanon

Subhi al-Tufayli (Arabic: صبحي الطفيلي; born 1948) is a senior Lebanese Shi'ite cleric and politician who founded the Hezbollah militant group in 1982 and was its first Secretary-General from 1989 until 1991. From a comparatively young age, Tufayli achieved popular following amongst Lebanese Shi'ite community, who viewed him as the most learned Shi'ite scholar in the Beqaa Valley.[1][2][3][4]

Al-Tufayli is a Shia Islamist, but is a very vocal critic of Iran and the current Hezbollah leadership. Tufayli's split with Hezbollah arose during 1990s after the death of co-founder Abbas al-Mousavi, when the faction of Hassan Nasrallah favoured by Iran began to emerge dominant.[5][6] The main dispute was over Tufayli's insistence on shunning Lebanese politics and instead focus on fighting armed insurgency against Israel, which the Nasrallah faction downplayed.[7][8] After violent confrontations between Tufayli's followers and Hezbollah members, he was expelled from Hezbollah in 1998.[9]

The cleric has since been active as a fierce opponent of Hezbollah and Iran; and has urged his followers to stand against Iranian hegemony in the region.[10][11][12]

Early life and education

Al-Tufayli spent nine years studying theology in the city of Najaf, Iraq, during the Saddam Hussein era, where he met other Islamist clerics, and he was influenced by Lebanese cleric Musa al-Sadr.[13] Returning to Lebanon, al-Tufayli joined with Abbas al-Musawi to help found the Shiite Islamic group of Hezbollah in the Beqaa Valley in 1982. Beqaa is one of Hezbollah's three main regions of support in Lebanon.[14]

Tufayli attained reputation as the most learned Shi'ite cleric in the Beqaa Valley from a comparatively young age.[15] Viewing him as the top-ranking Shia religious cleric within its ranks, Hezbollah elected al-Tufayli as their "President of the Islamic Republic" of Ba'albek. Hezbollah militant units patrolled Beqaa valley, enforcing strict religious norms and dress-codes amongst its residents; and banned Western cultural trends.[16]

In Hezbollah

In 1984, al-Tufayli was replaced by Abbas al-Musawi as head of Hezbollah. Hezbollah's hostage-taking campaign had wound down since the "Kuwait 17" bombers of the 1983 Kuwait bombings who were linked to leading Hezbollah members were now free, and the Taif Agreement had essentially ended the Civil War in Lebanon.[17]

After the death of Khomeini in 1989, Hezbollah saw increasing Iranian control and was made to undergo fundamental structural changes. During the first conclave of the organization in 1989, Al-Tufayli was chosen as the first Secretary-General of Hezbollah, a position he held until 1991. However, the period was marked by heavy factionalism within the organization, between Tufayli's followers who pursued a more independent policy and the Nasrallah faction that toed a staunchly pro-Iranian line. Tufayli supporters got systematically sidelined and the Nasrallah faction steadily gained ascendency in the organization structures with the backing of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and Iranian President Rafsanjani. This culminated in the appointment of Khamenei loyalist Hassan Nasrallah as the third Secretary-General of Hezbollah during its third conclave in 1993.[18][19]

As flashpoint in the rivalry was Tufayli's opposition to Hezbollah's participation in 1992 general elections, which was supported by Ali Khamenei. Tufayli viewed this as a distraction from the more pressing armed struggle against Zionist occupation of Southern Lebanon. Despite strong protests from the Tufayli faction, Hezbollah participated in elections, winning 12 seats and effectively transformed into a political party within the Lebanese system.[20][21] By 1994, Tufayli had publicly admitted that he no longer any influence in the group:

"I am an ordinary militant, and I do not participate in decision-making. This has been true since the time of the legislative elections."[22]

Al-Tufayli continued to oppose Hezbollah's participation in Lebanese national elections[23][24] and its "moderation" toward the Lebanese state.[25] He also disagreed with Hizbollah’s support of the Government crack down on drug cultivation.[26] al-Tufayli himself however stated that the internal split in Hezbollah was caused by Iran's take over of Hezbollah from the original Lebanese leadership, and Iran's opposition to tactics under his leadership of violence against Israel and a demand to the end of the state of Israel; al Tufayli stated explicitly that Iran wanted to use Hezbollah as a "border guard" for Israel.[27]

Al-Tufayli also promoted the cause against the corruption in South Lebanon, Beirut and the whole state, as Musa al-Sadr did, in his Movement of the 1970s. On 4 July 1997 he organised a protest demonstration in Baalbeck. Despite being banned and the army being deployed in attempt to prevent people attending an estimated 10,000 people took part in the demonstration. The protest received support from Zahle and Dany Chamoun.[28][29]

Al-Tufayli said it is "completely unacceptable that a human being could be humiliated because of poverty or because they were in need."[30] In the autumn he organised demonstrations in sixty villages around Brital and Nabi Chit protesting neglect of rural areas and competition from imported crops. Roads were blocked with burning tyres and dumped farm produce. Around 3,000 troops were deployed and 23 protesters arrested. One of the triggers of the protest was the increase of school fees for the new academic year to $300 per child. At the time the average annual per capita income in the Beqaa valley was less than $500. Al-Tufayli advocated refusing to pay taxes and stopping repayment of UNDP soft loans.[31]

Post-Hezbollah

In January 1998 al-Tufayli and MP Khadr Tulays were expelled from Hizbollah. A week later, 30 January, al-Tufayli and a group of armed men took over a school in Baalbek where Hizbollah officials were meeting. There followed a two hour shootout with the Lebanese Army which left two soldiers and three of al-Tufayli’s followers, including MP Tulays, dead. There were fifty civilian casualties including a woman killed. Al-Tufayli and around thirty gunmen succeeded in escaping to his home village, Brital. Subsequently his office in Beirut and radio station, “The Voice of the Resistance”, were closed down but al-Tufayli himself was not detained.[32]

He created a breakaway group from Hizbollah with a more populist anti-corruption tone.[33]

In February 2013, al-Tufayli berated Hezbollah for fighting on behalf of the Syrian government in the Syrian civil war. He said "Hezbollah should not be defending the criminal regime that kills its own people and that has never fired a shot in defense of the Palestinians". al-Tufayli added: "those Hezbollah fighters who are killing children and terrorizing people and destroying houses in Syria will go to hell".[34] He also berated the Lebanese Army for not stopping Lebanese citizens crossing the border to fight in Syria.[35]

He also claimed that ISIS was created by Iranian and Syrian Governments with help from Russia.[36]

Views

More recently, al-Tufayli has stated that Hassan Nasrallah is implementing the agenda of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ali Khamenei,[37] that the Islamic Republic's doctrine of "Rule of the Jurisprudent" (Wilayat al-Faqih) is un-Islamic and its government tyrannical.[38] al-Tufayli claims that Hezbollah today is acting as border guards for Israel and mercenaries for Iran and the West.[39]

Explaining his opposition to the Iranian regime and its geo-political agenda, Tufayli states:

"[Khomeini's] successors who came after him built their politics on Persian identity... They exploited sectarianism for the benefit of their Persian project... They deceive the Shia in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and everywhere else telling them ‘you are minorities in Sunni areas’ and this is not true."[40]

See also

References and notes

  1. ↑ Elie Alagha, Joseph (2011). Hizbullah's Documents: From the 1985 Open Letter to the 2009 Manifesto. Pallas Publications. pp. 22, 23. ISBN 978-90-8555-037-2.
  2. ↑ Ranstorp, Magnus (1997). Hizb'Allah in Lebanon: The Politics of the Western Hostage Crisis. London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 35, 36. doi:10.1057/9780230377509. ISBN 978-0-333-68401-6.
  3. ↑ Reich, Walter; Kramer, Martin (1998). "8: The moral logic of Hezbollah". Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind. Washington DC, USA: Woodrow Wilson Center Press. p. 138. ISBN 0-943875-89-7.
  4. ↑ M. Shaw, J. Demy, Jeffrey, Timothy (2017). War and Religion: An Encyclopedia of Faith and Conflict. ABC-CLIO. p. 339. ISBN 978-1-61069-516-9.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  5. ↑ Elie Alagha, Joseph (2011). Hizbullah's Documents: From the 1985 Open Letter to the 2009 Manifesto. Pallas Publications. pp. 22, 23. ISBN 978-90-8555-037-2.
  6. ↑ al-Aloosy, Massaab (2020). The changing ideology of Hezbollah. Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 77, 78. ISBN 978-3-030-34846-5.
  7. ↑ Ranstorp, Magnus (1997). Hizb'Allah in Lebanon: The Politics of the Western Hostage Crisis. London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 35, 36. doi:10.1057/9780230377509. ISBN 978-0-333-68401-6.
  8. ↑ al-Aloosy, Massaab (2020). The changing ideology of Hezbollah. Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 77, 78. ISBN 978-3-030-34846-5.
  9. ↑ al-Aloosy, Massaab (2020). The changing ideology of Hezbollah. Palgrave Macmillan. p. 78. ISBN 978-3-030-34846-5.
  10. ↑ "Pressure intensifies on Lebanese Hizbullah as top Shia clerics speak out". Diyaruna. 2021. Archived from the original on 5 February 2023.
  11. ↑ Kawas, Mohamed (8 May 2016). "Former Hezbollah chief: 'Tehran is only investing in Lebanon's Shia to serve its own interests'". The Arab Weekly. Archived from the original on 18 June 2021.
  12. ↑ El-Bar, Karim (30 December 2016). "'They exploited sectarianism': Former Hezbollah leader Tufayli talks Iran, Syria". Middle East Eye. Archived from the original on 20 October 2021.
  13. ↑ Alagha, Joseph Elie (2006). The Shifts in Hizbullah's Ideology: Religious Ideology, Political Ideology and Political Program. Amsterdam University Press. ISBN 9789053569108.
  14. ↑ Ranstorp, Magnus, Hizb'allah in Lebanon : The Politics of the Western Hostage Crisis, New York, St. Martins Press, (1997), p.46
  15. ↑ Reich, Walter; Kramer, Martin (1998). "8: The moral logic of Hezbollah". Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind. Washington DC, USA: Woodrow Wilson Center Press. p. 138. ISBN 0-943875-89-7.
  16. ↑ Ranstorp, Magnus (1997). Hizb'Allah in Lebanon: The Politics of the Western Hostage Crisis. London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 35, 36, 65, 66. doi:10.1057/9780230377509. ISBN 978-0-333-68401-6.
  17. ↑ Ranstorp, Magnus, Hizb'allah in Lebanon, 1997, p.105
  18. ↑ Elie Alagha, Joseph (2011). Hizbullah's Documents: From the 1985 Open Letter to the 2009 Manifesto. Pallas Publications. p. 22. ISBN 978-90-8555-037-2.
  19. ↑ Ranstorp, Magnus (1997). Hizb'Allah in Lebanon: The Politics of the Western Hostage Crisis. London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 72, 77. doi:10.1057/9780230377509. ISBN 978-0-333-68401-6.
  20. ↑ Elie Alagha, Joseph (2011). Hizbullah's Documents: From the 1985 Open Letter to the 2009 Manifesto. Pallas Publications. pp. 22, 23. ISBN 978-90-8555-037-2.
  21. ↑ Ranstorp, Magnus (1997). Hizb'Allah in Lebanon: The Politics of the Western Hostage Crisis. London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 75–77. doi:10.1057/9780230377509. ISBN 978-0-333-68401-6.
  22. ↑ Ranstorp, Magnus (1997). Hizb'Allah in Lebanon: The Politics of the Western Hostage Crisis. London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. p. 77. doi:10.1057/9780230377509. ISBN 978-0-333-68401-6.
  23. ↑ "The break with Hezbollah and Hassan Nasrallah". Archived from the original on 16 July 2011. Retrieved 19 December 2007.
  24. ↑ Lebanese army hunts down radical cleric
  25. ↑ Hezbollah: Between Tehran and Damascus Archived 13 October 2007 at the Wayback Machine
  26. ↑ Middle East International No 562, 7 November 1997; Publishers Lord Mayhew, Dennis Walters MP; Giles Trendle p.16
  27. ↑ Archived at Ghostarchive and the Wayback Machine: "Iran Alliance with US-Israel- YouTube2". YouTube.
  28. ↑ Middle East International No 554, 11 July 1997; Giles Trendle p.9
  29. ↑ News from Beirut July 7 1997
  30. ↑ News from Beirut July 7 1997
  31. ↑ Middle East International No 562, 7 November 1997; Giles Trendle p.16
  32. ↑ Middle East International, No 568, 13 February 1998; Reinoud Leenders p.12 Daily Star reported Tulays killed while attempting to negotiate ceasefire
  33. ↑ Hizballah Rising: The Political Battle for the Loyalty of the Shi'a of Lebanon MERIA Archived 8 November 2006 at the Wayback Machine March 2005
  34. ↑ "Hezbollah fighters dying in Syria will go to hell, Tufaili". Ya Libnan, 26 February 2013. Retrieved 26 February 2013.
  35. ↑ "Hezbollah fighters killed in Syria will ‘go to hell,’ says former leader". Al Arabiya, 26 February 2013. Retrieved 26 February 2013.
  36. ↑ "FMR. Hizbullah Leader Tufayli Criticizes Intervention in Syria: The Shiites Must Reach Understanding with All Sunnis "Without Exception," Confront West, Russia".
  37. ↑ Former Hizbullah Secretary-General Subhi Al-Tufeili: Nasrallah Implements Khamenei's Policy in Lebanon 28 January 2007
  38. ↑ Former Hizbullah Secretary-General Subhi Al-Tufeili: 'The Worst Dictatorships Do Not Do What Is Being Done Today in Tehran'; The Rule of the Jurisprudent Is a 'Heretical Doctrine'. (from an interview with former Hizbullah secretary-general Subhi Al-Tufeili, which aired on Murr TV on January 30, 2012)
  39. ↑ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ERqE2XiVFy8 "True Face of Hezbollah" video
  40. ↑ El-Bar, Karim (30 December 2016). "'They exploited sectarianism': Former Hezbollah leader Tufayli talks Iran, Syria". Middle East Eye. Archived from the original on 20 October 2021.
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