Siege of Dubrovnik (1991)

On 1 October 1991, Peter Carington, 6th Baron Carrington came to Titograd and asked Bulatović if Dubrovnik was in danger of an attack by the Yugoslav People's Army.^[9] According to testimony by Nikola Samardžić to the ICTY, a member of Bulatović's cabinet, Bulatović promised Carrington that Dubrovnik would not be attacked.^[9] Just a few hours after meeting Carrington, Bulatović attended a meeting with several generals of the Yugoslav People's Army, including Pavle Strugar, after which Bulatović told Samardžić that "30,000 Ustashe are coming from Dubrovnik to seize the Bay of Kotor", and that a response was urgent.^[9] Bulatović ultimately participated in ordering an attempted annexation of Dubrovnik to Montenegro, additionally claiming that it was historically linked to Montenegro.^[10] After the war ended, Bulatović claimed that the attack on Dubrovnik was "the only way to prevent the conflict from spreading into Montenegro", but also asserted that the military gave the government of Montenegro "false information".^[9]

"Stjepan Mesić asked me back in 1993, 'What in God's name are you doing, why are you taking us over? Did you have any information how many of us were there?' I replied to him that Kadijević told me that there were 30,000 of them. [And] that for 30,000 close to our border we need to react with 60,000. Then Mesić told me that there were only 700 of them. We only found out later." -Bulatović for Vijesti on 31 September 2010.^[11]

Carrington's proposal (1991)

The siege of Dubrovnik, in addition to war crimes committed, had enormous consequences for Yugoslavia's international standing. The European Economic Community invited Carrington and representatives from Yugoslavia to negotiate a peace accord known as the Carrington plan on 19 October 1991, in The Hague. The proposal of a "loose federation of independent states" was a non-starter for Milošević, who preferred a centralized Yugoslavia with institutional powers in Belgrade. Bulatović, to the shock of Milošević and his own party members, agreed to Carrington's terms and even signed a draft of the plan during an overnight session of the Montenegrin parliament on October 17, arguing that it would secure Montenegro's interests and end the Yugoslav wars.^[12] Bulatović's signature potentially guaranteed Montenegro's legal right to secede from Yugoslavia, resulting in an almost explosive rift with the Yugoslav leadership in Belgrade.^[13] Borisav Jović contacted Bulatović about his support for the Carrington plan in disbelief, asking him if he had been paid off by the Croats, Austrians, or Italians.^[13] Bulatović claimed that the Carrington proposal offered Montenegro the Prevlaka peninsula, and that it guaranteed Montenegro would not be subject to sanctions.^[13] Furthermore, Montenegro was allegedly offered a large amount of aid from the West with Italian foreign minister Gianni De Michelis telling Bulatović that he "wanted to chart an independent course from Belgrade."^[13] In a follow-up session of the Montenegrin parliament on 24–25 October, parliament and party members ratified Bulatović's signature on the Carrington plan, making the accord more imminent.^[13]

However, in a sharp turn, the Narodna Stranka (People's Party) called for an emergency session in the Montenegrin parliament, during which Bulatović was accused of treason.^[14] Milo Đukanović defended Bulatović in the parliamentary hearing.^[14] Bulatović tried to make his own case, telling the parliament members "if servility and acceptance of everything coming from Belgrade is the criteria for good governance in Montenegro, then this nation doesn't need a government, elections, or political parties."^[14] Subsequently, Bulatović was invited to a meeting with Milošević and Jović in Belgrade; Bulatović described the meeting as "very explosive".^[15] As a result of the meeting, Milošević added a clause to Bulatović's Carrington commitment, such that a republic could decide to stay in Yugoslavia through a referendum.^[15] This resulted in the 1992 independence referendum, where voters in Montenegro decided to remain in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Muslim communities in Montenegro

With the war raging in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulatović faced the first serious threat of "spill-over" in the summer of in 1992, when Muslims in Pljevlja were subject to intimidation and violence. On 6 August 1992, a local warlord named Milika "Čeko" Dačević walked into Pljevlja's police headquarters to ask that a vehicle which was seized be returned to his personal envoy, threatening to "declare war" on Pljevlja.^[16] Although Bulatović described Dačević as someone "who hardly can be characterized as sane",^[16] over half of the police force turned themselves over to Dačević during his custody, essentially turning over the police station to Dačević's militia.^[16][17][18] In addition to the stand-off with Dačević, his militia included forces of the Kornjača brothers from Čajniče, who helped blocked off the town from a garrison of the Yugoslav People's Army.^[17] Duško Kornjača threatened to kill all of the Muslims in Pljevlja unless Dačević was released.^[16] The militia's control over Pljevlja was strong enough that the Yugoslav People's Army garrison in Pljevlja, composed of only 73 soldiers,^[16] refused to confront them.^[17] As a result, on 7 August 1992, Bulatović, Đukanović, Dobrica Ćosić and Života Panić came to Pljevlja to negotiate with all parties involved.^[16] During the negotiations, a representative of Pljevlja's Islamic community named Hakija Ajanović asked Bulatović to tighten border controls to prevent Serbian paramilitaries from Bosnia entering Montenegro.^[18] In contrast, Bulatović had been told by the police that "the border with Bosnia and Herzegovina was not possible to secure".^[17] In the end, Bulatović and his colleagues promised the Islamic community in Pljevlja that they would attempt to disarm the paramilitaries^[19] and add reinforcements of the Yugoslav People's Army to patrol the town.^[17] To satisfy the militia, Bulatović asked the local Muslims not to seek autonomy, although they had not done so over the course of the meeting.^[19]

"All of our efforts to assure the world how we're for peace fall into the water by the fact that self-proclaimed colonel Radović, who was once a JNA senior, who Šešelj promoted to a colonel, spoke in yesterday's airing by Studio Television of Montenegro, saying that he has his own forces, that he will kill all the Muslims...just by chance the journalist didn't put that. Simply, I think we're coming to the situation where we don't control the field, or the territory--that the self-proclaimed commanders and self-styled formations move and give statements which are catastrophic for our international position, yet we have absolutely no power whatsoever to take that space." -Bulatović on 7 August 1992.^[16]

In spite of Bulatović's reassurances, Pljevlja's Muslim community suffered various incidents, particularly in the village of Bukovica where 6 Muslim inhabitants were killed from 1992 to 1995.^[20] Additionally, the first kidnapping of Muslim inhabitants took place in Pljevlja on February 15, 1993, where Muslim family members were taken to a prison in Čajniče. After a negotiation leading to the release of Serbian reservists held as prisoners by the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulatović announced the freeing of the Bungur family from the Čajniče prison in 1993, crediting Ćosić and Radovan Karadžić "personal responsibility" for the family's freedom.^[20]

In May 1993, Bulatović participated in the negotiations of the Vance-Owen Plan, held in Athens in the presence of Greek Prime Minister Konstantinos Mitsotakis.^[21] Bulatović along with Ćosić and Milošević collaborated in pressuring Karadžić to sign the plan.^[21][22] Karadžić eventually signed the plan, after which Bulatović traveled with Ćosić and Milošević to Pale, where they tried to convince wartime Republika Srpska's parliament to adopt the resolution signed in Athens.^[22] The parliament of Republika Srpska in Pale rejected the resolution in defiance of the Milošević-Ćosić-Bulatović team, and the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina continued for another two years.^[22]

Loss to Đukanović and departure from DPS

On 11 July 1997, the national committee ("Glavni odbor", abbreviated as "GO") of DPS, formerly the League of Communists, held a closed doors session after which the committee selected Milica Pejanović-Đurišić to replace Bulatović as the party president.^[23] The party split had enormous implications, making a political confrontation between Đukanović and Bulatović inevitable. This manifested in the 1997 Montenegrin presidential election held in October, which Đukanović won by a thin margin. Although the OSCE recognized the result as legitimate, Bulatović claimed that the United States interfered in Đukanović's favor.^[24] Bulatović then participated in the mobilization of a large demonstration at Đukanović's inauguration in Podgorica on 14 January 1998. The protest at Đukanović's inauguration was confronted by the police, resulting in the injury of 44 policemen and four civilians.^[25]

On 21 March 1998, Bulatović mobilized a large fraction from DPS CG and helped found the Socialist People's Party of Montenegro (SNP).^[26]

Bibliography

• Morrison, Kenneth (2009). Nationalism, Identity and Statehood in Post-Yugoslav Montenegro. London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd. ISBN 978-1-84511-710-8.